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This report has been prepared at the request of the European Commission. The views expressed are 
those of the three independent experts and are thus not the views of the Commission. 
The sources used in the preparation of this report are those included in the non-confidential file of 
the investigation. To the extent other sources have been used they appear in the footnotes of the 
report. 
 3 
Table of Content 
 
ABBREVIATIONS........................................................................................................................................................... 6 
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1. GSP+................................................................................................................................................................... 7 
1.2. SRI LANKA’S APPLICATION FOR GSP+ BENEFITS................................................................................................. 8 
1.3. THE INVESTIGATION .......................................................................................................................................... 10 
1.4. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REPORT ....................................................................................................................... 11 
1.5. METHODOLOGY................................................................................................................................................. 12 
1.6. ACTIVITIES OF THE PANEL................................................................................................................................. 13 
2. PRELIMINARY ISSUES....................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1. SOURCES AND BASIS OF THE EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE ............................................................................ 13 
2.2. ATTRIBUTION .................................................................................................................................................... 15 
2.3. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION............................................................................................................................ 15 
2.4. DEROGATION..................................................................................................................................................... 16 
2.5. THE RELEVANCE OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT/INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND  
THE MANNER IN WHICH AND EXTENT TO WHICH, IT CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ........................................... 18 
2.6. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SYSTEMATIC AND WIDESPREAD ............................................................................. 20 
3. APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN SRI LANKA ................................. 21 
3.1. THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN SRI LANKA .................................................................................................................... 21 
3.1.1. The Constitution.............................................................................................................................................. 21 
3.1.2. The 17th Amendment to the Constitution ......................................................................................................... 24 
3.1.3. The ICCPR Act ............................................................................................................................................... 25 
3.1.4. The CAT Act.................................................................................................................................................... 25 
3.1.5. The rights of the child ..................................................................................................................................... 26 
3.1.6. The emergency legislation .............................................................................................................................. 26 
3.2. INSTITUTIONS WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING REMEDIES FOR ALLEGED  
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ......................................................................................................................... 27 
3.2.1. The National Police Commission.................................................................................................................... 27 
3.2.2. The courts ....................................................................................................................................................... 27 
3.2.3. The National Human Rights Commission ....................................................................................................... 28 
3.2.4. Commissions of inquiry .................................................................................................................................. 29 
4. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES ........................................................ 31 
4.2. LEGISLATIVE STEPS........................................................................................................................................... 31 
4.3. NON-LEGISLATIVE MEASURES ........................................................................................................................... 35 
4.2.1. Investigations carried out by the police .......................................................................................................... 35 
4.2.2. The role of the Attorney General’s Department ............................................................................................. 38 
4.2.3. The courts ....................................................................................................................................................... 39 
4.2.4. The National Human Rights Commission ....................................................................................................... 40 
4.2.5. Commissions of Inquiry .................................................................................................................................. 42 
4.2.6. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 43 
5. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLIANCE .............................................................................. 44 
5.1. UNLAWFUL KILLINGS ........................................................................................................................................ 46 
5.1.1. International standards................................................................................................................................... 46 
 4 
5.1.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 47 
5.1.3. Unlawful killings by State agents or persons for whom the State is responsible in a law enforcement 
context............................................................................................................................................................. 47 
5.1.4. Unlawful killings during the course of active hostilities................................................................................. 51 
5.1.5. Deaths in custody............................................................................................................................................ 52 
5.1.6. Killings by unknown persons .......................................................................................................................... 53 
5.1.7. Killings by persons for whom the State is not responsible.............................................................................. 55 
5.1.8. Obligation to investigate killings .................................................................................................................... 55 
5.1.9. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 56 
5.2. TORTURE ........................................................................................................................................................... 57 
5.2.1. International standards .................................................................................................................................. 57 
5.2.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 57 
5.2.3. Proscribed ill-treatment during the normal investigative process.................................................................. 63 
5.2.4. Proscribed ill-treatment of those detained under Emergency Regulations and/or 
 those detained in the North and East of Sri Lanka ........................................................................................ 64 
5.2.5. Inhuman conditions of detention - general ..................................................................................................... 66 
5.2.6. Inhuman conditions of detention – the camps................................................................................................. 66 
5.2.7. Seeking a remedy ............................................................................................................................................ 68 
5.2.8. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 69 
5.3. ARREST AND DETENTION ................................................................................................................................... 69 
5.3.1. International standard .................................................................................................................................... 69 
5.3.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 70 
5.3.3. Duration of detention...................................................................................................................................... 72 
5.3.4. Detention in the camps ................................................................................................................................... 74 
5.3.5. Seeking redress ............................................................................................................................................... 76 
5.3.6. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 77 
5.4. DISAPPEARANCES.............................................................................................................................................. 77 
5.4.1. International standard .................................................................................................................................... 77 
5.4.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 79 
5.4.3. Pattern of uninvestigated disappearances ...................................................................................................... 80 
5.4.4. Pattern of "abductions" followed by subsequent recognition that the individual is detained......................... 82 
5.4.5. Other disappearances where there is evidence that State agents or persons for whom  
the State is responsible are implicated ........................................................................................................... 83 
5.4.6. Seeking redress ............................................................................................................................................... 85 
5.4.7. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 85 
5.5. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT................................................................................................................................... 85 
5.5.1. International standard .................................................................................................................................... 85 
5.5.2. Domestic legislation ....................................................................................................................................... 87 
5.5.3. Freedom of movement in practice................................................................................................................... 87 
5.5.4. Seeking redress ............................................................................................................................................... 91 
5.5.5. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 91 
5.6. FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY .................................................................................................................................... 91 
5.6.1. International standards................................................................................................................................... 91 
5.6.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 92 
5.6.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 93 
5.7. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.................................................................................................................................. 93 
5.7.1. International standards................................................................................................................................... 93 
5.7.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 93 
5.7.3. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................................... 99 
5.8. FREEDOM OF RELIGION...................................................................................................................................... 99 
5.8.1. International standards................................................................................................................................... 99 
5.8.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................... 99 
 5 
5.8.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 101 
5.9. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL ...................................................................................... 101 
5.9.1. International standards................................................................................................................................. 101 
5.9.2. Domestic implementation ............................................................................................................................. 102 
5.9.3. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 104 
5.10. THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD ............................................................................................................................... 104 
5.10.1. Situation of child soldiers ........................................................................................................................... 104 
5.10.2. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 110 
5.11. THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION ................................................................ 111 
5.11.1. International standards............................................................................................................................... 111 
5.11.2. Domestic implementation............................................................................................................................ 111 
5.11.3. Other grounds for discrimination ............................................................................................................... 115 
5.11.3.1. Gender based discrimination ...................................................................................................................................115 
5.11.3.2. Discrimination of LGBTIQ persons ........................................................................................................................117 
5.11.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 117 
6. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................................... 118 
 
 6 
 
Abbreviations 
 
CAT Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
CCP Code of Criminal Procedure 
CID Criminal Investigation Department 
CIDT Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
CPA Centre for Policy Alternatives 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
EO Evidence Ordinance 
ER 2005 Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation No. 1 of 2005 
ER 2006 Emergency (Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist 
Activities) Regulations No. 7 of 2006 
GSP+ Special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance 
Guidelines UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of 
Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka 
HRC UN Human Rights Committee 
HRW Human Rights Watch 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICCPR Act International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)) Act No. 56 of 2007 
ICJ International Commission of Jurists 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
IDP Internally Displaced Persons 
IIGEP International independent group of eminent persons 
IPG Criminal Inspector General 
IRPP Institute on Religion and Public Policy 
JMO Judicial Medical Officer 
JSC Judicial Services Commission 
LOAC/IHL The law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
PSO Public Security Ordinance 1947 
PTA Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
PTP Prosecution of Torture Perpetrators Unit 
SA/PRS State agents or persons for whom the State is responsible 
SIU Special Inquiry Unit 
TMVP Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Plidal, the Karuna faction 
UN United Nations 
UPR Universal Periodic Review 
 7 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
1.1. GSP+ 
 
Under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance (the 
GSP+) provided for in Article 8 of Council Regulation 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 (the Regulation) 
applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences the Common Custom Tariff ad valorem duties 
on certain products which originate in a country included in the arrangement shall be suspended.  
According to Article 9(1) of the Regulation a GSP+ arrangement may be granted to a country 
which, inter alia, has ratified and effectively implemented the conventions listed in Part A of Annex 
III of the Regulation, among them the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). It is further required that 
the country in question gives an undertaking to maintain the ratification of the conventions and their 
implementing legislation and measures and accepts regular monitoring and review of its 
implementation record in accordance with the implementation provisions of the conventions it has 
ratified.1 The Commission shall keep under review the status of ratification and effective 
implementation of the conventions (Article 9(4)). 
According to Article 16(2) the GSP+ may be temporarily withdrawn, in respect of all or certain 
products, in particular if the national legislation no longer incorporates the conventions or if that 
legislation is not effectively implemented. Where the Commission or a Member State receives 
information that may justify temporary withdrawal and where it is considered that there are 
sufficient grounds for an investigation, the Commission may, after certain procedural steps, decide 
to initiate an investigation (Article 18). The beneficiary country concerned shall be notified of the 
decision and interested parties shall be invited to make known their views on the issue (Article 19). 
Council Regulation 980/2005 was replaced by Council Regulation 732/2008 of 22 July 2008 
applying a scheme of Generalized Tariff Preferences for the period 1/1/09 to 31/12/11 (the 2008 
Regulation). 
                                                          
1 The government of Sri Lanka provided this undertaking with Note Verbale Ref.B/EC/8(5) submitted to the EC on 20 
September 2005. 
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1.2. Sri Lanka’s application for GSP+ benefits 
 
In its application in 2005 for GSP+ benefits Sri Lanka stated, inter alia, that it had deposited 
instruments of ratification and effectively implemented all 16 Human Rights Conventions referred 
to in Article 9 and listed under Part A of Annex III of the Regulation. The ICCPR, the CAT and the 
CRC were listed among conventions ratified.  
The Government of Sri Lanka also gave an undertaking to maintain the enforcement of the 
conventions and their implementing legislation and measures and accepted regular monitoring and 
review of its implementation record.  
In a Status Report on ratification and implementation of conventions referred to in Annex III and 
listed under Parts A & B of Annex III prepared by the Government of Sri Lanka and annexed to its 
GSP+ application (the Status Report) it was stated, inter alia, that Sri Lanka has subscribed to the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.2  
As far as legislation incorporating the three conventions in issue is concerned it was stated in the 
Status Report that the Constitution of Sri Lanka guarantees the promotion and protection of human 
rights of the citizens of Sri Lanka and other persons. The rights of all persons declared and 
recognized by the Constitution include freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT), right to equality, freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and detention and punishment and prohibition of retroactive penal legislation, 
freedom of speech, assembly, association occupation and movement.3 
As noted in the Status Report some of the derogable rights may be restricted as may be prescribed 
by law only for specific purposes, such as in the interest of national security, racial and religious 
harmony and the national economy.4  
The Status Report also refers to the role of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the 
Provincial High Courts in the protection of human rights.5 It describes the 17th amendment to the 
Constitution as a means to safeguard the citizen’s rights.6 It also describes the national Human 
Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (NHRC), which is empowered to inquire into complaints of 
                                                          
2 Status Report on Ratification and Implementation of Conventions referred to in Article 8 & 9 and listed under Parts A 
and B of Annex III by Sri Lanka, annexed to Note Verbale Ref.B/EC/8(5) and submitted to the EC on 20 September 
2005, p. 2. 
3 Status Report p. 2. 
4 Status Report, p. 3. In the terminology of the ICCPR it is a question of limitations rather than derogations. 
5 Status Report, p. 2-3. 
6 Status Report, p. 3. 
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infringements of any of the fundamental rights set out in the Constitution but is only empowered to 
give recommendations.7 Lastly, it contains more detailed information, inter alia, on 
disappearances,8 freedom of expression,9 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA).10 
The Status Report also contains information about the implementation of the CRC11 and the CAT.12 
In its application for GSP+-benefits under the 2008 Regulation the government of Sri Lanka states 
that Sri Lanka has continued to show tangible progress and advances in complying with the 
legislative and administrative implementation of the conventions in issue.13 The attached Status 
Report14 contains, inter alia, a reference to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.15 The Report 
refers to an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. That opinion states that the 
provisions of the Constitution,16 the ICCPR Act17 and other laws including decisions of the 
Superior Courts of Sri Lanka give adequate recognition to the civil and political rights referred to in 
the ICCPR. Rights recognized in the ICCPR are justiciable through the medium of the legal and 
constitutional processes prevailing in Sri Lanka.18  
The Status Report 2008 further states that the declaration of a state of emergency and the 
promulgation of regulation is in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 of the ICCPR.19 
As far as freedom of expression is concerned the Status Report 2008 states that it is the intention of 
the Government to bring the Constitutional guarantee to be consistent with Article 19 of the 
ICCPR.20 
The Status Report 2008 also refers to a bill concerning assistance and protection to victims of crime 
and witnesses that had been placed before Parliament.21 It discusses implementation of ICCPR 
rights despite allegations of disappearances22 and states that where allegations of torture, extra 
                                                          
7 Status Report, p. 4-5. 
8 Status Report, p. 4-6. 
9 Status Report, p. 6-8. 
10 Status Report, p. 8. 
11 Status Report, p. 9-14. 
12 Status Report, p. 14-19. 
13 Application, p. 1. 
14 Annex II. Status Report on ratification and implementation on Conventions referred to in Articles 8 & 9 and listed 
under Parts A and B of Annex III by Sri Lanka, annexed to Note Verbale Ref.B/EC/8(20) and submitted to the EC on 9 
October 2008 (hereinafter Status Report 2008). 
15 Status Report 2008, p. 9. 
16 The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. 
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)) Act No. 56 of 2007, referred to as the ICCPR Act. 
18 Status Report 2008 p. 13. 
19 Status Report 2008 p. 15. 
20 Status Report 2008 p. 15. 
21 Status Report 2008 p. 18. 
22 Status Report 2008 p. 20-21. 
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judicial killings and enforced disappearances are levelled against the armed forces or the police 
service, impartial investigations has been initiated and necessary punitive measures are taken. It 
also discusses internally displaced persons,23 the CRC,24 the CAT,25 noting that Sri Lanka follows a 
zero-tolerance policy in respect of torture, as well as other matters. 
 
1.3. The investigation 
 
On 14 October 2008 the European Commission adopted a decision to initiate an investigation into 
the effective implementation of the three conventions in issue in Sri Lanka.26 By a notice of 18 
October 2008 interested parties were invited to send any relevant information and comments within 
4 months to the Commission. 
The European Commission (DG TRADE) requested President Leif Sevón (coordinator), Professor 
Françoise Hampson and Professor Roman Wieruszewski (the Panel) to make an assessment of the 
effective implementation of the three conventions in issue. President Sevón is a former judge of the 
Court of Justice of the European Community and former President of the Supreme Court of 
Finland. Professor Hampson holds a chair at the University of Essex and is a former member of the 
UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Minorities and has frequently represented 
clients before the European Court of Human Rights. Professor Wieruszewski is Professor at the 
Poznan Human Rights Centre of the Polish Academy of Science and a former Member of the UN 
Human Rights Committee and an ad hoc Judge at the European Court of Human Rights (the Panel). 
In  line with the Commission’s Decision opening the investigation a major focus of attention for the 
Panel is "to establish whether the national legislation of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka incorporating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel. Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child is effectively implemented". The exercise must also be 
undertaken in light of the underlying purpose of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable 
development and good governance (the GSP+) under Article 9 of the Regulation and the 
substantive criteria Sri Lanka had to meet in order to qualify for GSP+ preferences. Thus the Panel 
                                                          
23 Status Report 2008 p. 27-29. 
24 Status Report 2008 p. 30-42. 
25 Status Report 2008 p. 42-48.  
26 See OJEU L277 of 18 October 2008. 
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must also consider any other aspects affecting the effective implementation of the three conventions 
at stake beyond those relating to the effective implementation of existing Sri Lankan legislation.  
 
1.4. The objectives of the report 
 
The objective of the present report is to assist the European Commission in the conduct of its 
investigation as to whether Sri Lanka is effectively implementing its obligations under the ICCPR, 
CAT and CRC by providing independent and expert legal advice on these matters. In particular, this 
involves a thorough examination of the legal and factual situation with respect to Sri Lanka’s 
fulfilment of its human rights obligations and commitments under the three UN instruments. 
The report is expected to make an assessment of the effective implementation of the ICCPR, the 
CAT and the CRC in Sri Lanka in the context of the GSP+ Investigation C 265/1 of 18.10.2008. 
The task is threefold: 
-  First, the report will assess whether the national legislation of Sri Lanka corresponds to the 
obligations under the three conventions, whether the obligations under the conventions are actually, 
adequately and effectively applied in practice and whether the institutions set up in Sri Lanka to 
protect human rights actually, adequately and effectively fulfil their task.  
- Second, a main objective of the report is to assess how the obligations imposed by the three 
conventions are met in practice. For that purpose it is necessary to examine both the national 
legislation and the conduct in practice of national authorities, including the courts, which have the 
potential to violate human rights.  
- Third, the report looks into the structure and functioning of the authorities for the protection 
of human rights, including providing a remedy for any violations. The purpose of these elements in 
the report is to assess whether the judicial and administrative infrastructure is adequate and if the 
authorities are effective in the protection of human rights. Such judicial and administrative 
mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violation under domestic law are necessary in order to 
give effect to human rights. 
The granting of GSP+ -benefits to Sri Lanka was based on the understanding that Sri Lankan 
legislation fully incorporated the obligations under the three conventions as was stated in the 
application. This report does not purport to assess all aspects on the questions whether the Sri 
Lankan legislation fully incorporates the three conventions. Instead the Panel has chosen to look 
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into areas where doubts have been raised in respect of the effective implementation of the 
conventions, in particular in the light of activities and events occurring after 27 June 2005. 
The report deals mainly, but not exclusively, with events and actions after the GSP+ benefits were 
granted to Sri Lanka on 27 June 2005. The report focuses on the Sri Lankan government and 
authorities. It does not deal with violations by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The 
focus on the government action must not be understood as disregarding or minimizing the 
significance of the LTTE violations or those of any other group. 
The representations made by many organisations emphasised the implications of any suspension or 
withdrawal of GSP+.27 In some cases, the organisations emphasised Sri Lanka’s compliance with 
ILO standards.28 The Panel was not asked to examine compliance with ILO standards but only the 
implementation of three human rights treaties. Two organisations did address the implementation of 
the three human rights treaties.29 
 
1.5. Methodology  
 
The full and comprehensive assessment of the implementation by Sri Lanka of its international 
obligations under ICCPR, CAT and CRC presupposes an analysis of the Sri Lankan legal system: 
Constitution, relevant laws, case law, in particular that of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. It further 
requires a review and analysis of available reports from international organizations and reputable 
non-governmental organizations concerning human rights in Sri Lanka, as well as of all other 
available relevant information. In addition, it must be based on documents and other information 
from the Government of Sri Lanka.  
Consequently, the Panel has studied the documents submitted in response to the Commissions 
notice 2008/C 265/01. Some of the organizations that submitted observations have also orally 
commented on the prevailing situation in Sri Lanka. 
The Panel has also studied other documents obtained from publicly available sources. Among these 
sources are domestic legislation, court reports, reports and statements from the United Nations (UN) 
                                                          
27 British Retail Consortium; Calzedonia Holding Spa; Chamber of Garment Exporters; European Branded Clothing 
Alliance; Free Trade Zone Manufacturers’ Association; Joint Apparel Association Forum; Jinadasa Group of 
Companies; Sri Lanka Apparel Exports Association; Sri Lanka First; Stirling Group; The Business to Peace Alliance.  
28 For example, the submission of Calzedonia Holding Spa. 
29 Joint Apparel Association Forum and Sri Lankan Apparel Exporters Association. 
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bodies and the UN special procedures, as well as from other international organizations, media 
reports, NGO reports, academic commentaries and other materials. 
This has served as a basis for verification of Sri Lanka’s records as far as implementation of 
international human rights standards is concerned. 
In order to be able to confront information thus gathered with the position of the Government of Sri 
Lanka, a visit to Sri Lanka and meetings with representatives of the Government were sought but 
not obtained. The establishment of the facts was thus made on the basis of available sources. 
The legal analysis is based primarily on existing laws and practices, and not on undertakings and 
announcements. 
 
1.6. Activities of the Panel  
 
The work has mainly consisted in a desk study of relevant reports and other commentaries on the 
Human Rights situation in Sri Lanka after 27 June 2005, as well as by meetings of the Panel in 
Geneva on 15 and 16 June 2009, in London on 24 and 25 June 2009 and in Brussels on 30 and 31 
July 2009. The Panel met with representatives of organizations that had made submissions in 
response to the Commission’s invitation as well as of organizations that had not made submissions 
but which had produced documentation in the public domain that suggested they would be likely to 
have information relevant to the Panel. 
By a Note Verbale the Commission requested permission for the Panel and representatives of the 
Commission to conduct an on-site visit in Sri Lanka. However, the request was rejected.30 
This Draft report is based on materials available by 31 August 2009. 
 
2.   Preliminary Issues 
 
2.1. Sources and basis of the evaluation of the evidence 
 
The principal source used to determine the scope of the obligations of Sri Lanka under the three 
human rights treaties is the treaties themselves. In interpreting the scope of the treaty provisions, 
                                                          
30 European Commission Note Verbale of 28 May 2009 and Sri Lanka Note Verbale of 17 June 2009. 
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attention has been paid to relevant General Comments, the Concluding Observations of the treaty 
bodies in the exercise of their monitoring functions with regard to Sri Lanka and, in the case of the 
ICCPR, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee under Optional Protocol 1 in relation to 
Sri Lanka. A secondary source for determining the scope of obligations is material produced in 
connection with the Universal Periodic Review process and the mandates of Special Procedures 
which address rights also covered by the three human rights treaties. 
The Panel took note of the resolution S-11/1 "Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and 
protection of human rights" adopted at the special session of the Human Rights Council.31  
Domestic legislation and case-law was used as the principal source of domestic law. 
The sources used to establish the facts include reports submitted by Sri Lanka to the three treaty 
bodies and in connection with the UPR process, material gathered by the treaty bodies and Special 
Procedures and reputable national and international non-governmental organizations.32 In addition, 
material produced by intergovernmental bodies, such as UNHCR and UNICEF, has also been taken 
into account. 
In evaluating conflicting factual evidence, the Panel sought to determine the extent to which 
evidence was independently corroborated in other reports. Particular attention was paid to evidence 
gathered by persons or organizations with access to information from individuals or organizations 
in Sri Lanka. In line with the practice of the treaty bodies, the Panel treated generalized denials as 
not being sufficient to displace specific allegations. 
With regard to the standard of proof, the Panel chose to apply as a criterion proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. The Panel did not seek to determine whether violations had occurred in particular 
cases but sought rather to determine whether the evidence available established that the right in 
question was being generally effectively implemented. 
 
                                                          
31 Adopted by a recorded vote of 29 to 12, with six abstentions on 27th May 2009. 
32 Sri Lanka submitted its report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, due on 10 August 2008, on 24 
October 2008. Sri Lanka submitted its report to the UN Committee against Torture, due on 1 February 2007, on 14 
August 2009. Sri Lanka’s report due under the ICCPR to the UN Human Rights Committee on 1 November 2007 has 
not yet been submitted. See, in addition, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 
National report submitted by Sri Lanka, 2 May 2008, A/HRC/WG.6/2/LKA/1, and the outcome of the review at Human 
Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review - Sri 
Lanka, 5 June 2008, A/HRC/8/46 (paras. 82-84 of that document indicate the response of Sri Lanka to 
recommendations made by submitting States). 
 15 
2.2. Attribution  
 
Human Rights treaty obligations only bind the State and its agents. As part of its obligation the 
State is required to protect individuals within the jurisdiction from violations, including violations 
at the hands of third parties. Individuals and non-State groups are likely to be affected by the State’s 
implementation of its own obligations and are therefore, indirectly, affected by human rights law. 
State agents are not limited to the executive or to security forces. They include all persons who 
exercise authority in the name of the State. They therefore include courts, judges and prosecutors.33 
This is consistent with the requirement for their independence. It is up to the State to determine how 
such officials are to be required to take account of the human rights obligations of the State. In 
addition to being responsible for the acts of State security forces, the State is also responsible for 
any other forces over which they exercise or could exercise effective or actual control. The Panel 
has proceeded on the basis that the acts of forces under "Colonel" Karuna, who defected to the 
government side in 2003, are attributable to the State from the start of the period under 
consideration in this report. Where responsibility is attributed on this basis, it will be made clear in 
the text. 
 
2.3. Effective implementation 
 
The State is under an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights obligations contained 
in the three treaties. The State is required to implement those international obligations. 
Implementation includes, but is not limited to, legislative enactment.34 It also includes secondary 
legislation and administrative policies necessary to give effect to the commitments. From this can 
be derived an obligation to ensure that State agents receive training so as to give effect to the rights 
in question. The State is required not only positively to deliver the right but also to put in place 
measures to guard against the risk of abuse. That includes, but is not limited to, an effective system 
of investigation in the event of alleged violations. The test of implementation is practical and not 
theoretical. Implementation is reflected in the lived experience of the population in the jurisdiction 
of the State. Only in such a case can implementation be called effective. 
                                                          
33 General Comment No.31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on State Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), para. 4 
34 Ibid. 
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Isolated cases of alleged violations are not necessarily a sign of failed implementation. An 
individual State agent might engage in unauthorized action. Generally speaking, where the State’s 
system for providing redress is functioning properly, it should be able to identify whether a 
violation has occurred, to compensate the victim and to ensure that the necessary steps are 
identified and implemented to ensure that the violation does not occur again. It is also possible that 
the domestic authorities fail to identify the act or omission as a violation. That will not necessarily 
be a sign of inadequate implementation, on condition that the State accepts the finding of the 
relevant international body and takes the steps necessary to ensure that the domestic interpretation 
is corrected.  
This being said, where there is clear and consistent evidence of conduct in violation of the State’s 
obligations and where this is not corrected by the domestic remedial system, there is a lack of 
effective implementation of the relevant instruments which also constitutes a violation of the State’s 
obligation to implement its international undertakings.35 Rather than examining the right to a 
remedy (ICCPR Article 2(3)) as such, the report examines the effectiveness of the operation of 
domestic remedies in relation to each right examined. 
 
2.4. Derogation 
 
Under some, but not all, human rights treaties, States are free to derogate from certain of their 
human rights commitments in specific situations. There is no possibility of derogation under the 
CAT.36 That is consistent with treaties covering a wider range of rights, such as the ICCPR, under 
which the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT) is 
non-derogable. There is no reference to derogation in the CRC. Article 38 does, however, refer to 
situations of conflict, in relation to child soldiers and the protection of children in situations of 
conflict.37 
                                                          
35 This is independent of but related to the violation of the obligation to provide an effective domestic remedy. 
36 CAT, Article 2(2). 
37 This clearly implies that the CRC is applicable in situations of conflict. This raises a question as to the significance of 
a derogation under the ICCPR in relation to children. Since this report addresses the concerns of children principally 
with regard to the issue of child soldiers, which does not come within the scope of the ICCPR, the report will not 
further consider the impact of a derogation under the ICCPR in relation to a right also covered by the CRC. 
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Under the ICCPR, a State may derogate in situations of public emergency which threaten the life of 
the nation.38 Derogation means that States may modify, not eliminate, certain of their human rights 
obligations in specific circumstances. Certain rights are non-derogable, meaning that they apply in 
all circumstances. Under the ICCPR, the prohibition of arbitrary killings (Article 6), torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7), slavery and servitude (Article 8 para. 1 
and 2) and freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18) and certain other rights are non-
derogable.39 In addition, derogation measures must not discriminate on grounds of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin. Derogation measures must be consistent with the State’s other 
obligations under international law, most obviously obligations under the law or armed conflict or 
international humanitarian law (see further below).40 
The government of Sri Lanka has availed itself of the possibility of derogation, most recently on 30 
May 2000, when it informed the Secretary-General that it had declared a State of Emergency and 
was derogating from Articles 9 (2), 9 (3), 12 (1), 12 (2), 14 (3), 17 (1), 19 (2), 21 and 22. For the 
purposes of this report, it will be assumed, first, that the situation in Sri Lanka entitled the State to 
derogate throughout the period under examination. It should be noted that, following the declaration 
of the end of the conflict on 19 May 2009, it can be expected that the State of Emergency and notice 
of derogation will be lifted in the near future. For the purposes of this report, it has been assumed 
that the need for derogation may not cease conterminously with the end of hostilities. It has also 
been assumed, second, that the procedural requirements attaching to derogation have been satisfied. 
In particular, it is assumed that sufficient explanation has been provided of the need both to 
derogate and for the specific measures adopted.41 
Where a State seeks to derogate from a provision in an Article, the derogation must be both 
necessary and proportionate. General Comment 29 indicates how the analysis will be approached. A 
State will not be able to establish the necessity of derogation where the conduct in question 
constitutes a crime against humanity.42 Similarly, States will not be able to establish the need to 
derogate from the requirement of humane treatment of detainees, the prohibition of abduction and 
                                                          
38 ICCPR, Article 4; see also General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001), reprinted  in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 186 (2003). 
39 ICCPR, Article 4(2). 
40 Ibid. 
41 In its last Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka in 2003, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) did not comment on 
the derogation beyond referring to the fact that the Sri Lankan Constitution permitted derogation from a right which is 
non-derogable under the Covenant; CCPR/CO/79/LKA1 December 2003, para.8.  It should be noted that Sri Lanka 
submitted combined fourth and fifth reports in 2002. Sri Lanka’s sixth report is overdue. 
42 General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para.12. 
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unacknowledged detention or the prohibition of the forcible transfer of parts of the population.43 
Whilst a State may modify the usual application of domestic remedies, it will not be able to justify 
the total removal of effective remedies.44 The provisions in the Covenant relating to procedural 
rights may not be made subject to measures which would circumvent the protection of non-
derogable rights.45 The General Comment expressly provides that,  
  "In order to protect non-derogable rights, the right to take proceedings before a  
   court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention,  
   must not be diminished by a State party’s decision to derogate from the  
   Covenant."46 
 
In assessing the implementation in law and practice of Sri Lanka’s obligations in relation to 
provisions from which the State has sought to derogate, the Panel will seek to apply the approach 
set out in General Comment No. 29. 
 
2.5. The relevance of the law of armed conflict/international humanitarian law 
and the manner in which and extent to which, it can be taken into account  
 
When seeking to determine what constitutes an arbitrary killing or an arbitrary deprivation of 
liberty, it may be necessary to decide whether a law and order or an armed conflict paradigm is 
applicable. This requires an examination of the relationship between human rights law and the law 
of armed conflict or international humanitarian law (LOAC/IHL). It is clear that both fields of law 
may be applicable simultaneously.47 LOAC/IHL is applicable by virtue of the facts. It is not 
necessary for the parties to recognise its applicability.  
Until the end of hostilities, there was an armed conflict in varying parts of Sri Lanka. The conflict 
was non-international in character. Sri Lanka is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 but 
                                                          
43 Ibid., para. 13. 
44 Ibid., para.14. 
45 Ibid., para. 15. The example given is that a trial resulting in the imposition of the death penalty must be in compliance 
with all the (derogable) provisions of Articles 14 and 15 because Article 6, which deals with the death penalty, is non-
derogable. 
46 Ibid., para. 16. 
47 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, July 8, 1996, para. 
25. ICJ, Advisory Opinion, The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, 9 July 2004, para. 106; Case concerning armed activity on the territory of the Congo, (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Uganda), judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 216-20. See also General Comment No. 29, op. cit., 
para. 9. 
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not to the Additional Protocols of 1977. As a matter of treaty law, it is therefore bound by common 
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. It is also bound by any rules of customary international 
humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts.  
The detailed operationalisation of the inter-relationship between human rights law and LOAC/IHL 
has not yet been established. For the purposes of this report, the Panel has made the following 
assumptions.  
First, LOAC/IHL can only affect the operation of human rights law in areas where the fighting is 
taking place or in relation to issues arising directly out of the conflict but having an effect 
everywhere. So, for example, the law and order paradigm will be applicable to killings outside areas 
where active hostilities are occurring but the LOAC/IHL paradigm will be applicable to the conduct 
of active hostilities. Similarly, detention will generally be covered by human rights law. Where, 
however, detention is based on grounds relating to the conflict, wherever the detention occurs, it 
will be examined in the light of LOAC/IHL.  
Second, when dealing with an issue which concerns the protection of victims of the conflict, 
priority will be given to human rights law. Victims are people who have been adversely affected by 
the fighting, who have not or have ceased to take a direct part in the hostilities and who are in the 
power of the other side. They include all detainees, including former fighters. Given the obligation 
of the State under human rights law to protect all those within the jurisdiction and given that, by 
definition, victims have to be in the power of the State, the priority given to human rights law is 
consistent with both LOAC/IHL and human rights law. The contrast is between rules concerned 
with the protection of victims of the conflict and rules concerning the conduct of hostilities. In the 
case of the latter, in areas of active hostilities, priority will be given to LOAC/IHL as the lex 
specialis. Areas in which isolated killings occur are not areas in which active hostilities are being 
conducted. They will therefore be analysed in terms of the law and order paradigm. The fighting in 
the last few weeks of the conflict, however, did constitute active hostilities and killings during the 
course of that fighting will be analysed in terms of LOAC/IHL. 
When required to apply customary LOAC/IHL, the starting point in determining the existence and 
content of such rules will be the ICRC Customary Law Study.48 The rules identified in that work 
will be treated as a guide to the content of customary law and not as a definitive account. 
It should be noted that LOAC/IHL binds all the parties to a conflict. Unlike human rights law, non-
State armed groups are required to respect the provisions of LOAC/IHL and not only can but should 
                                                          
48 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 2 vols., CUP, 2005. 
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be called to account for failing to do so. It goes without saying that all forces fighting on behalf of 
the State are also required to respect the same rules and should equally be prosecuted for failing to 
do so. 
 
2.6. The distinction between systematic and widespread 
 
Whilst individual violations represent a breach of the State’s obligations under human rights law, 
particular significance has traditionally been attached to violations which are systematic or 
widespread. Historically, they were subject to a special procedure precisely on account of that 
character.49 More recently, the Statute of the International Criminal Court requires that attacks 
against the civilian population be widespread or systematic in order to constitute a crime against 
humanity.50  
In order to determine that violations are widespread, it is sufficient to establish many cases of the 
particular violation, possibly in a range of geographical locations. They do not need to occur 
throughout the territory of the State. Violations will be systematic where they occur, possibly in 
fewer cases than widespread violations, in circumstances which suggest the active complicity of the 
State. This can be manifested by the attitude of a particular group of State agents. It does not require 
that the central authorities of the State should have authorised the conduct in question. Systematic 
violations occur as a result of the way in which a particular issue is routinely handled. Whilst the 
perpetrators may not be obeying specific orders, they understand that they are expected to behave in 
a certain way or at least will not be punished for doing so.51  
It is sufficient to establish that violations are either widespread or systematic. In this report, 
wherever violations are widespread as defined, they will be described as such. That should not be 
taken to imply that they are not also systematic. Violations will only be described as systematic 
where they do not occur on a sufficient numerical or geographical basis to describe them as 
widespread and where there is evidence that they are systematic as defined.  
Where any violation occurs on a widespread or systematic basis, there is a strong implication that 
domestic remedies are not operating effectively in that particular field. The assumption is that, if 
                                                          
49 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) of 27 May 1970. 
50 Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7. Where conduct constitutes a crime against humanity, it is non-
derogable according to General Comment No. 29, op. cit., para.12. This suggests that conduct which might, in isolated 
cases, come within the terms of a derogation will not do so where it occurs on a widespread or systematic basis. 
51 The use the terms "widespread" and "systematic" is not necessarily the same in sources referred to in the report. 
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remedies were working effectively, they would both put an end to the practice and act as a deterrent 
against future violations. In case of violations occurring on a widespread or systematic basis the 
implementation of the relevant Convention cannot be deemed effective. 
 
3.   Applicability of international human rights law in Sri Lanka 
 
3.1. The legal system in Sri Lanka  
 
Sri Lanka is a constitutional democracy. Legislation is passed by Parliament elected by universal 
suffrage and proportional representation for a period of six years.52  
Parliament supervises the proclamation of an emergency which is necessary for issuing emergency 
regulations under the Public Security Ordinance (PSO).53 
 
3.1.1. The Constitution  
The basic law of Sri Lanka is the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 
(the Constitution). The Constitution was adopted in 1978. It has since been subjected to 17 
amendments, the last one in September 2002 (the 17th Amendment). 
Chapter III of the Constitution contains provisions on fundamental rights. The provisions relevant 
for the purposes of this report are as follows:  
"10. Every person in entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including 
the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
11. No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 
… 
13. (1) No person shall be arrested except according to procedure established by law. 
Any person arrested shall be informed of the reason for his arrest. 
(2) Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty 
shall be brought before the judge of the nearest competent court according to procedure 
established by law, and shall not be further held in custody, detained or deprived of 
personal liberty except upon and in terms of the order of such judge made in accordance 
with procedure established by law. 
                                                          
52 Article 62 of the Constitution. 
53 Article 155 of the Constitution.  
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(3) Any person charged with an offence shall be entitled to be heard, in person or by 
attorney-in-law, at a fair trial by a competent court. 
(4) No person shall be punished by death or imprisonment except by order of a 
competent court, made in accordance with procedure established by law. The arrest, 
holding in custody, detention or other deprivation of personal liberty of a person, 
pending investigation or trial, shall not constitute punishment. 
(5) Every person shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty; 
Provided that the burden of proving particular facts may, by law, be placed on an 
accused person. 
(6) No person shall be held guilty of an offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not, at the time of such act or omission, constitute such an offence, and no 
penalty shall be imposed for any offence more severe than the penalty in force at the 
time such offence was committed. 
Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognized by the community of nations. 
It shall not be a contravention of this Article to require the imposition of a minimum 
penalty for an offence provided that such penalty does not exceed the maximum penalty 
prescribed for such offence at the time such offence was committed. 
(7) The arrest, holding in custody, detention or other deprivation of personal liberty of a 
person by reason of a removal order or a deportation order made under the provisions of 
the Immigrants and Emigrants Act or the Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) 
Act, No. 14 of 1967, or such other law as may be enacted in substitution therefore, shall 
not be a contravention of this Article. 
14. (1) Every citizen is entitled to – 
(a) the freedom of speech and expression including publication; 
(b) the freedom of peaceful assembly; 
(c) the freedom of association; 
(d) the freedom to form and join a trade union; 
(e) the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching; 
(f) the freedom by himself or in association with others to enjoy and promote his own 
culture and to use his own language; 
(g) the freedom to engage by himself or in association with others in any lawful 
occupation, profession, trade, business or enterprise; 
(h) the freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka; and 
(i) the freedom to return to Sri Lanka. 
(2). A person who, not being a citizen of any other country, has been permanently and 
legally resident in Sri Lanka immediately prior to the commencement of the 
Constitution and continues to be so resident, shall be entitled, for a period of ten years 
from the commencement of the Constitution, to the rights declared and recognized by 
paragraph (1) of this Article. 
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15. (1) The exercise and operation of fundamental rights declared and recognized by 
Articles 13(5) and 13(6) shall be subject only to such restrictions as may be prescribed 
by law in the interest of national security. For the purposes of this paragraph "law" 
includes regulations made under the law for the time being related to public security. 
(2) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Article 14(1)(a) shall be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the 
interest of racial and religious harmony or in relation to parliamentary privilege, 
contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. 
(3) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Article 14(1)(b) shall be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the 
interest of racial and religious harmony. 
(4) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Article 14(1)(c) shall be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the 
interests, of racial and religious harmony or national economy. 
(5) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Article 14(1)(g) shall be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the 
interest, of national economy or in relation to – 
(a) the professional, technical, academic, financial or other qualifications necessary for 
practicing any profession or carrying on any occupation, trade, business or enterprise, 
and the licensing and disciplinary control of the person entitled to such fundamental 
right, and 
(b) the carrying on by the State, a State agency or a public corporation of any trade, 
business, industry, service or enterprise whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of 
citizens or otherwise. 
(6) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Article 14(1)(h) shall be subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the 
interest of national economy. 
(7) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Articles 12, 13(1), 13(2) and 14 shall be subject to such restrictions as may be 
prescribed by law in the interest of national security, public order and the protection of 
public health or morality, or for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others, or of meeting just requirements of the general welfare 
of a democratic society. For the purposes of this paragraph "law" includes regulations 
made under the law for the time being relating to public security. 
(8) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared and recognized by 
Article 12(1), 13 and 14 shall, in their application to the members of the Armed Forces, 
Police Force and other forces charged with the maintenance of public order, be subject 
to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the interests of the proper discharge 
of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them. 
16. (1) All existing written law and unwritten law shall be valid and operative 
notwithstanding any inconsistency with the preceding provisions of this chapter. 
(2) The subjection of any person on the order of a competent court to any form of 
punishment recognized by any existing written law shall not be a contravention of the 
provisions of this Chapter. 
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17. Every person shall be entitled to apply to the Supreme Court, as provided for in 
Article 126, in respect of the infringement or imminent infringement, by executive or 
administrative action, of a fundamental right to which such a person is entitled under 
the provisions of this Chapter." 
 
Under Article 126(2) an application shall be filed within one month from the alleged infringement 
of a fundamental right. 
In a provision on Directive Principles of State Policy, it is stated, inter alia, that the State is pledged 
to establish a democratic socialist society, the objectives of which include the full realization of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons.54 
The Constitution also contains provisions on the language of the administration stating basically 
that a person normally has the right to communicate with authorities in his or her language, or in 
English.55 It also contains provisions on the language of the courts including provisions on the right 
to interpretation and translation.56  
 
3.1.2. The 17th Amendment to the Constitution  
The 17th Amendment to the Constitution was passed by Parliament in 2001. It established a 
Constitutional Council comprising the Speaker, the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition 
and seven other eminent persons including one person appointed by the President, five persons 
appointed by the President on the nomination of both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the 
Opposition. One member is nominated by the other smaller parties in Parliament.  
The Constitutional Council shall, inter alia, recommend or approve the appointment of suitable 
persons including the Attorney General, the Inspector General of the Police, the Chief Justice and 
other judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, members of the Judicial Service 
Commission, as well as the chairman and members of the Human Rights Commission. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Article 27. 
55 Article 22. 
56 Article 24. 
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3.1.3. The ICCPR Act  
By the ICCPR Act57, the human rights legislation of Sri Lanka was developed further. The ICCPR 
Act was a response to the ruling by the Supreme Court in the Singarasa case,58 in which the 
Supreme Court had held that Sri Lanka’s accession to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was 
unconstitutional.  
The objective of the ICCPR Act as specified in the Act is to give effect to certain Articles in the 
ICCPR which have not been given recognition either through the Constitution or through other 
legislative measures and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
The ICCPR Act deals with the right to be recognized as a person before the law (Article 2). Under 
the Act no person shall propagate war or advocate national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence (Article 3). Violation is a criminal offence. The 
Act further contains provisions regarding the rights of persons charged of criminal offence under 
any written law, inter alia, to legal assistance, interpretation and safeguard against self 
incrimination (Article 4), regarding certain rights of the child (Article 5), and the right of every 
citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs and to have access to public services (Article 6). 
According to Article 7 every citizen shall be entitled to apply by way of petition addressed to the 
High Court against the infringement or imminent infringement by executive or administrative 
action of any human right to which such person is entitled under Articles 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Act. 
In addition to the Constitution and the ICCPR Act a number of other provisions in the Sri Lankan 
legislation were designed to give effect to the ICCPR.59 
 
3.1.4. The CAT Act  
The objective of the CAT Act60 is to give effect to the CAT. It provides, inter alia, that the fact that 
any act constituting an offence under the Act was committed at the time when there was a state of 
war, threat of war, internal political instability or any public emergency, or on an order of a superior 
officer or a public authority, shall not be a defence to an offence (Article 3). The CAT Act vests 
                                                          
57 Certified on 16th November 2007. 
58 Nallaratnam Singarasa v. Attorney General, S.C. SPL (LA) No. 182/99 (2006). 
59 A list of the legislation in question is to be found in the Status Report, p. 5, and in the submission by the Joint 
Apparel Association Forum, 20 January 2009, Annex 5. See also The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, In the matter of a 
Reference under Article 129(1) of the Constitution, 17 March 2008. 
60 Convention against Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Act, No. 22 of 1994. 
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jurisdiction with the High Court to try offences of torture committed by a Sri Lankans or a non-Sri 
Lankans, in or outside the territory of Sri Lanka.61 
 
3.1.5. The rights of the child  
Provisions giving effect to the CRC are to be found in the Constitution as well as in a number of 
laws.62 Many of the laws enacted deal with issues surrounding the labour of young people, a field in 
which Sri Lanka has achieved considerable progress.63 Amendments to the Penal Code introduced 
in 1995 and 1998 included provisions on, e.g., incest, use of children for obscene publications, 
begging, procuring for sexual intercourse and trafficking in persons. Amendments to the 
Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act of 2003 enhanced the penalties for the 
violation of child labour laws.64 
 
3.1.6. The emergency legislation  
The foundation of Sri Lanka’s emergency laws is the Public Security Ordinance 1947 (PSO). In 
addition, in 1979 the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) was adopted.  
Using the powers under Section 5 of the PSO the President of Sri Lanka has enacted a number of 
emergency regulations. For the purposes of this report two of these regulations deserve particular 
attention. The Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulation No. 1 (ER 2005)65 
deals, inter alia, with arrest and detention. It provides that persons acting in any manner prejudicial 
to the national security or the maintenance of public order, or to the maintenance of essential 
services may be arrested and held in detention for up to one year without access to judicial review 
by an independent body.66 ER 2005 also contains provisions on powers of search and seizure 
without the need for a court warrant. The provisions on trial procedures allow the use of 
confessional evidence, create a duty for persons to answer police questions and reverse the normal 
burden of proof. The Regulation also contains a provision according to which persons should not be 
released on bail. 
                                                          
61 Status Report, p. 20. 
62 See a list in the Status Report p. 14-16 and the Status Report 2008 p. 30-32. 
63 Status Report, p. 16. 
64 Ibid., p. 18. 
65 Published in the Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on 13 August 2005. 
66 Amendment to Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations of 2005 extend that period with a 
further six months. 
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The Emergency (Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorist Activities) 
Regulations No. 7 of 2006 (the ER 2006) define and criminalise terrorism and acts of terrorism and 
create new offences including engaging in transactions with a terrorist or terrorist group regardless 
of knowledge and intent. It also attempts to limit the accountability of civilian and military 
authorities in the performance of their duties. 
 
3.2. Institutions with the responsibility for providing remedies for alleged 
violations of human rights 
 
3.2.1. The National Police Commission 
The National Police Commission was created by the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of Article 
155A in 2001 and then appointed in 2002. It is in charge of disciplinary control over all officers 
except the Inspector General (Article 155G(2)).67 However, this procedure was only established in 
January 2007 and therefore no conclusions are yet available regarding its effectiveness.68 The 
legitimacy and credibility of the National Police Commission was called into question due to 
Presidential appointments of Commissioners in 2006.69 
 
3.2.2. The courts  
The Constitution provides that the institutions for administration of justice shall be the Supreme 
Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court and other such courts of first instance, tribunals and 
such institutions as Parliament may from time to time ordain and establish.70  
The Supreme Court hears and determines as first and only instance any question relating to the 
infringement or imminent infringement by executive or administrative action of any fundamental 
                                                          
67 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred 
Nowak, A/HRC/7/3/Add.6, 26 February 2008 (hereinafter "Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture"), para. 56-58, 
p. 16-17; Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Follow-up to country recommendations, 
A/HRC/8/3/Add.3 14 May 2008, para. 59, p. 16 (hereinafter "Report of the Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions"). 
68 Implementation rules were adopted on 17 January 2007. See Rules of Procedure (Public Complaints) 2007, 
reproduced in Sri Lanka's report submitted to the UN Committee against Torture on 14 August 2009, Annex 1. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Article 105. 
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right declared and recognized by Chapter III of the Constitution.71 A petition to that effect shall be 
brought within one month of the alleged infringement.72 
Where in the course of a hearing in the Court of Appeal into an application for orders in the nature 
of a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, procedendo, mandamus or quo warranto, it 
appears to such Court that there is prima facie evidence of an infringement or imminent 
infringement of the provisions of Chapter III or Chapter IV by a party in such application, such 
Court shall forthwith refer such matter for determination by the Supreme Court.73 
The President may refer a question to the Supreme Court for its opinion.74 
Since 2005 the President has made appointments to the Supreme Court without a recommendation 
of the Constitutional Council as prescribed in the Constitution.75 
In order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary it is provided that a judge shall not be 
removed from office except by an order of the President made after an address of Parliament 
supported by a majority of the total number of Members of Parliament (including those not present) 
has been presented to the President for such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour of 
incapacity.76  
There is a Judicial Service Commission which shall consist of the Chief Justice and two Judges of 
the Supreme Court. The appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of judicial officers 
are vested in that Commission. "Judicial officer" does not include a Judge of the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeal or of the High Court.77 
 
3.2.3. The National Human Rights Commission  
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was created by legislation in 1997 and 
recognized under 17th Amendment of Constitution. It was empowered to conduct investigations into 
complaints of violations of fundamental rights, such as violations of Article 11 of the Constitution 
                                                          
71 Article 126(1). 
72 Article 126(2). 
73 Article 126(3). 
74 Article 129(1). 
75 International Bar Association, Justice in retreat: A report on the independence of the legal profession and the rule of 
law in Sri Lanka. May 2009 (hereinafter the "IBA Report"), p. 24. It should be noted that Sri Lanka emphasized the 17th 
Amendment to the Constitution in the Status Report, but certain elements of the amendment do not appear to be applied 
in practice. 
76 Article 107(2). 
77 Article 114. 
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prohibiting torture (Article 14 of Establishment Act No. 21).78 The NHRC can refer the matter for 
reconciliation or mediation.79  If this procedure fails, the NHRC may recommend initiating a 
prosecution of an alleged perpetrator.80  The NHRC is empowered to inquire into complaints of 
infringement of any of the fundamental rights set out in the Constitution. The NHRC is only 
empowered to make recommendations.81 
Since 2005 the President has made appointments to the NHRC without a recommendation of the 
Constitutional Council as prescribed in the Constitution.82 
On 26 October 2007 the sub-committee on accreditation of the International Coordinating 
Committee (ICC) of National Human Rights Institutions took the decision to downgrade the NHRC 
from "A" to observer "B" status (not fully compliant with Paris Principles) due to two primary 
concerns: 1) It was not clear that the appointment of Commissioners was in compliance with the 
Paris Principles; and 2) in practice, it was not clear the NHRC remained balanced, objective and un-
political particularly with regards to the discontinuation of follow-up to 2,000 cases of 
disappearances in July 2006.83 
 
3.2.4. Commissions of inquiry  
Under the Presidential Commission of Inquiry Act No. 17 of 1948 the President can set up a 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the administration of public departments, offices or agencies, 
or allegations of misconduct by a member of the public service.84 The President is authorized to set 
the terms of reference for the commissions and appoint its members. He or she can also revoke the 
warrant establishing a commission at any time. The Act does not require commissions’ reports or 
recommendations to be made public. Whether the report or any part of it is to be made public is 
subject to presidential discretion.  
Since 1991 there have been nine Commissions of Inquiry to investigate enforced disappearances 
and a number of other human rights inquiries.85 
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On 4 September 2006 the President announced that the government would invite an international 
independent commission to probe abductions, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions. 
But on 6 September 2006 he announced that he would invite an international independent group of 
eminent persons (IIGEP) to act as observers of the activities of a local commission.86 Subsequently, 
on 2 November 2006 the President created a Commission of Inquiry to investigate and inquire into 
15 cases of alleged serious violations of human rights arisen since 1 August 2005. Later a 16th case 
was added. The Presidential Warrant authorized the Commission of Inquiry to conduct 
"independent and comprehensive investigations" and to "examin(e) the adequacy and propriety of 
the investigations already conducted pertaining to such incidents amounting to serious violations of 
human rights".87 
In 2007 the Commission created a victim and witness assistance and protection unit and on 8 May 
2007 it adopted a scheme for the providing assistance and protection to victims and witnesses. For a 
short period of time the Commission used video conferences when hearing witnesses living abroad. 
However, the Presidential Secretariat ordered the suspension of witness testimony through video 
conferencing. The Presidential Directive cited future witness protection laws.88 
In March 2008 the IIGEP decided to conclude its work. Subsequently, some of the members of the 
Commission resigned. 
The term of the Commission of inquiry came to end in June 2009. At that stage hearings into seven 
cases were concluded and reports on five cases finalized. According to the Chairperson of the 
Commission the Commission had by then not started the hearings in two cases and decided not to 
embark on two other cases.89 
To the knowledge of the Panel the reports of the Commission have not been made public. 
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4.   Effective implementation of human rights treaties 
 
4.2. Legislative Steps 
 
After the ruling by the Supreme Court in the Singarasa case the government prepared the ICCPR 
Act. It sought an advisory opinion of the Supreme Court as to the extent of compliance of the Sri 
Lankan Constitution and law with the rights contained in the ICCPR. The Supreme Court arrived at 
the conclusion that "the legislative measures referred to in the communication of … the President 
dated 4.3.2008 and the provisions of the Constitution and of other law, including the decisions of 
the Superior Courts of Sri Lanka give adequate recognition to the Civil and Political Rights 
contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and adhere to the general 
premise of the Constitution that individuals within the territory of Sri Lanka derive the benefit and 
guarantee of rights contained in the Covenant".90 
The opening language of the ICCPR Act states that the objective of the Act is to give effect to 
certain Articles in the ICCPR which have not been given recognition through legislative measures 
and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
The following remarks on the views expressed in the advisory opinion and the above statement in 
the ICCPR Act do not purport to be exhaustive. 
Article 16 of the Constitution ensures the continuation in force of laws that existed when the 
Constitution entered into force notwithstanding any inconsistency with constitutionally declared 
fundamental rights; Article 16 thus undermines the protection of fundamental rights that are in fact 
recognized by the Constitution. For example, provisions of criminal law or laws on land and 
succession that are discriminatory against women remained in force.91 
A second problem arises in the context of the First Additional Protocol to the ICCPR. Any 
interference in the submission of applications to the Human Rights Committee is not consistent 
with the State’s obligations under the Optional Protocol. The fact that the Sri Lankan government 
did not use the opportunity in the context of the ICCPR Act to make it clear that individuals were 
free to submit such applications might be misleading for individuals who, in the light of the 
Singarasa case might believe that such an application amounts to a contempt of the Sri Lankan 
                                                          
90 Supreme Court (S.C.) Ref. No 1/2008. 
91 Submission of the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA), p. 4-5. 
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courts and therefore refrain from making a submission. This could amount to a violation of the 
Optional Protocol. 
The Sri Lankan legislation does not include provisions corresponding to all the rights covered under 
the ICCPR. An example is the right to life.92 The right to life has nevertheless been protected by the 
courts in a number of cases.93 It has therefore been suggested that the right to life is well entrenched 
into the domestic law of Sri Lanka.94 However, the omission of a provision on the right to life runs 
contrary to the objective stated in the opening language of the ICCPR Act, i.e. to give effect to 
certain Articles in the ICCPR which have not been given recognition through legislative measures. 
A number of problems also arise in the context of restrictions in Article 15 of the Sri Lankan 
Constitution. In the ICCPR the distinction between "limitations" and "restrictions" is a safeguard. 
Some human rights may legitimately be limited in their enjoyment and exercise and may be 
suspended in exceptional circumstances such as states of emergency. 
The Sri Lankan bill of rights speaks of "restrictions" on points where the ICCPR uses the 
expression "limitation". The bill of rights does not follow the ICCPR expressly setting out a list of 
non-derogable rights but identifies them by implication. The rights which are susceptible of 
restriction under the Constitution are not as extensive as those provided for in ICCPR Article 4(2). 
The Constitution does not refer to the substantive controls of necessity and proportionality. The 
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has in some cases by interpretation imposed a requirement of 
reasonableness on the imposition of restrictions on rights. However, this requirement has been 
introduced on an ad hoc basis and has not introduced a change that is generally and universally 
applicable. Further, the general nature of Article 15(7) of the Constitution has the effect of 
undermining many of the limits on permitted restrictions enumerated in the other subsections of the 
Article, as it permits restrictions as may be prescribed by law, for instance, in the interest of 
national security, public order and the protection of public health and morality.95 
It has been held that these restrictions, some of which are not strictly within the permitted scope of 
derogations set out in Article 4(1) of the Covenant, nevertheless appear to have been included in the 
collective interest of the community of persons and the general well being of the nation, and in this 
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 33 
perspective may be argued to be justified.96 To this has been added that the emergency regulations 
are subject to monthly review by the Legislature and judicial scrutiny by the Supreme Court.97 
Neither of these arguments is convincing. Article 4(1) of the Covenant cannot be given an extensive 
interpretation. The conditions for declaring an emergency and enacting emergency laws are strictly 
and narrowly defined and limited to exceptional circumstances, with safeguards to ensure that the 
rights of the population in general are not abused under the colour of law. These limits must be 
observed to ensure that the emergency laws are an extension of the rule of law rather than an 
abrogation of it.98 The scrutiny by the Legislature and the Supreme Court does not remove the 
problems unless they take such an approach to the limits. That does not seem to be the case. 
Further problems arise out of the emergency regulations. Only some of them are raised here.99 
The principle of legality requires criminal offences to be clearly defined in unambiguous language. 
The HRC has stressed that vague, imprecise and ambiguous definitions of the offences of terrorism 
in domestic legislation are in breach of the principle of legality of offences.100 Many of the 
provisions in the emergency regulations do not meet this requirement as it is difficult to know with 
certainty what acts will be considered unlawful. For instance, ER 2006 creates the offence of 
engaging in terrorism or "acts of terrorism" (Regulations 6 and 20) and criminalizes certain 
activities, transactions and communications with persons or groups committing terrorist offences 
(Regulation 7, 8 and 9).  
ER 2005 and Presidential orders made under the PSO delegate sweeping powers to the military 
personnel to perform functions normally carried out by law enforcement officials, including powers 
of investigation, search, arrest and detention. Under Regulation 19 the Secretary of the Ministry of 
Defence may order the arrest and detention of a person for up to one year. The ordinary courts are 
expressly excluded from questioning the making of a Regulation 19 order. The HRC has previously 
expressed concerns about the Secretary of Defence having the power to order detention.101 It has 
also stated that if administrative detention is used, for reasons of public security, it must be 
controlled by the same provisions governing detention while under arrest or awaiting trial.  It must 
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not be arbitrary, and must be based on grounds and procedures established by law (ICCPR Article 
9(1)), information of the reasons must be given (IICPR Article 9(2)) and court control of the 
detention must be available (ICCPR Article 9(4)) as well as compensation in the case of breach 
(ICCPR Article 9(5)).102 
Basic fair trial rights are guaranteed in international law and the Constitution of Sri Lanka, and 
should be respected even during a state of emergency. The Sri Lankan emergency laws undermine 
the right against self-incrimination by permitting the use of confessional evidence and creating a 
"duty" for persons to answer police questions. Provisions under ER 2005 also reverse the normal 
burden of proof, undermining the principle of presumption of innocence. The HRC has consistently 
affirmed that the burden of proof should always be on the prosecution, based on the principle of 
presumption of innocence.103 
Finally, people whose rights are limited or infringed because of an emergency law should be able to 
challenge the legality of measures taken against them, and states are obliged to conduct prompt, 
effective, impartial and independent investigations and to bring to justice those responsible for 
violations. The ICCPR and other international standards require States to bring to trial and punish 
those guilty of human rights violations. HRC considers that amnesty laws, or other similar 
measures, help to create a climate of impunity for the perpetrators of human rights violations and 
undermine efforts to re-establish respect for human rights and the rule of law, in breach of the 
ICCPR. Failure to investigate or bring to justice perpetrators of human rights violations may in 
itself give rise to a breach of the ICCPR. States Parties to the ICCPR may not relieve such 
perpetrators from personal responsibility.104 
The Secretary General of the UN underlined at the conclusion of his visit to Sri Lanka on 23 May 
2009 the importance of an accountability process for addressing violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law. 
However, ER 2006 and other emergency laws attempt severely to limit the accountability of civilian 
and military authorities in the performance of their duties. ER 2006, Regulation 19 provides that no 
action or suit shall lie against any public servant specifically authorized by the government of Sri 
Lanka to take action in terms of the regulations, provided that such person has acted in good faith 
and in the discharge of his official duties.  
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4.3. Non-legislative measures 
 
The 17th Amendment to the Constitution has been allowed to fall into abeyance by the government 
notwithstanding the emphasis placed on it by the government in the Status Report.105 That 
amendment provides for important checks and balances on the executive presidential powers by 
providing that appointments of independent commissions and persons to senior positions in the 
public service are subject to recommendations or approvals by the Constitutional Council. That is 
the case with, for instance, the Attorney General, the Inspector General of Police, the Chief Justice 
and other judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal.106 In the absence of a 
Constitutional Council, the President has appointed commissions and persons to senior positions 
directly. 
This affects the institutions discussed below in this subsection and has been a matter of concern.107 
It has been suggested that many of the institutions have lost much of their independence because of 
the President’s handling of the Amendment.108 This has adversely affected at least some of the 
institutions.109 
Together with a number of other factors, such as the prevailing climate of impunity and the absence 
of an effective witness protection scheme, it has adversely affected the effective implementation of 
human rights in Sri Lanka. 
 
4.2.1. Investigations carried out by the police 
States must effectively investigate all allegations of serious human rights violations with certain 
minimum standards. Such an investigation shall include the collection and analysis of all physical 
and documentary evidence and statements from witnesses.110 The duty effectively to investigate 
crimes becomes paramount particularly in those cases where there are allegations of serious human 
rights violations by the State’s security forces in order to bring those responsible to justice, 
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including persons responsible for crimes committed by State security forces, police and law 
enforcement agents, or paramilitary groups, so that the State sends a clear message that such 
killings are neither condoned nor sanctioned by government officials or personnel.111  
Section 56(d) of the Police Ordinance of Sri Lanka places a positive duty on all police officers to 
detect crime and bring offenders to justice.112 Police officers also have a positive duty to investigate 
crime under Part V of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP).113 All investigations must be completed 
without delay.114 
In an interview the Chairperson of the recent Commission of Inquiry noted that the "Commission 
was unique because we were asked to do the investigations based on the premise that Police 
investigation was not satisfactory ... At the end of the police investigation, they concluded that there 
were no witnesses and closed the case."115 
The efficiency of police investigations has been strongly criticised. For instance, on 14 May 2008 
Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
submitted a report to the 8th Human Right Council pointing out that during his visit to Sri Lanka he 
had found that the police failed to respect and ensure the right to life. He also stated that the 
government’s response to human rights violations by the police was unsatisfactory.116 The 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) noted in its submission to the Human Right Council 
Universal Periodic Review that the Sri Lankan authorities had proved unable or unwilling to solve 
the growing number of targeted killings of employees of international organisations in government 
territory. The police investigation into the killings in August 2006 of 17 Action Contre la Faim 
(AFC) workers had lacked impartiality, transparency or willingness to cooperate with outside 
forensic experts. In the absence of effective investigations, the number of killings had increased.117 
The investigation into the AFC killings has recently also been strongly criticised by University 
Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna).118 In June 2007 the International Crisis Group stated that in 
the face of the explosion of political crimes and rights violations, law enforcement agencies and the 
judicial system have failed almost completely. There had been almost no credible police 
investigations and very few arrests or indictments in any of the hundreds of killings, abductions, 
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and disappearances over the preceding year and half. There was no evidence of real investigation, 
even as Karuna forces operated openly throughout the Batticaloa district and the rest of the Eastern 
Province. The police were accused not only of a failure to act, but of an active obstruction of justice 
in order to cover up the role of government forces in rights violations.119 
There are two different types of flaws in the investigatory system. The first is the attitude and 
conduct of those responsible for the investigations and the second is the structural weakness of 
institutions designed to ensure that the police perform their role properly and independently. 
The attitude of the police may have been affected by the shift in their role under the emergency 
legislation. They have increasingly become a counter-insurgency force, rather than a body which 
maintains public order in the interest of the community and investigates crimes.120 Police, military 
and the government are reportedly more interested in distorting facts, perverting the evidence and 
silencing witnesses rather than conducting any real investigations. 
The failure to carry out effective investigations is, however, a long-standing problem and not 
simply the product of the situation since the end of the cease-fire. The Panel took note of the figure 
which has been regularly quoted that there exists a mere 4% conviction rate in criminal cases.121 
The danger in such a situation is that people think there is no point in complaining to the police and 
they may then take the law in their own hands.122 The lack of any effective system of witness 
protection also acts as a disincentive to submitting complaints.123  
Cases of investigation and prosecution and investigations of violations allegedly committed by the 
police, armed forces and government officials are thus inadequate, scant and number in single 
digits.124 The failing cannot be attributed solely to the difficulties caused by the armed conflict in 
Sri Lanka. For instance, the investigation of deaths in custody, where all the evidence is in the 
hands of the authorities, is no more successful. The causes of lack of successful investigations also 
include lack of training, lack of adequate forensic expertise and lack of witness protection. Above 
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all, the inadequate number of successful prosecutions is a product of lack of political will and an 
attitude of complacency towards the inadequacy of the legal system.125 During the period under 
review there is no evidence of any attempt to improve the effectiveness of investigations. All the 
recommendations made by the Special Rapporteur in his report in 2006, with one exception, have 
been ignored.126 In the same period, the incidence of unlawful killings from whatever cause has 
increased. 
The investigations into killings, whether carried out by State agents or persons for whom the State 
is responsible (SA/PSR) or others, have been wholly ineffective. This represents a wholesale failure 
of the criminal justice system.  
In many cases,127 the Supreme Court called upon the National Police Commission, the Police 
Department and the Prisons Department to take strict steps to subject erring individual officers to 
appropriate disciplinary action. None of these directions were implemented.128  
 
4.2.2. The role of the Attorney General’s Department 
The Attorney General’s Department is the chief legal advisor to the President and to all departments 
and ministries of government, including State security forces and the police. Under the 17th 
Amendment to the Constitution the Attorney General is appointed by the President subject to the 
approval of the Constitutional Council. However, the President appointed the current Attorney 
General in violation of the 17th Amendment. 
According to a report by the International Crisis Group many believe that the Attorney General’s 
Department has become "increasingly politicised" during President Rajapaksa’s tenure.129 
It has been suggested that the Attorney General’s Department does not vigorously prosecute 
criminal cases involving serious human rights violations. "Cases against State officials, when they 
do happen, take "many years" to prosecute, and the delays in torture cases are "even longer" than on 
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other charges."130 Given the laxity with which the perpetrators of torture are indicted by the 
Attorney General’s Department (in certain cases omitting on even the officer-in-charge of the police 
station who consented and acquiesced in the torture perpetrated upon the victim), it is not a matter 
for surprise that there is reluctance to indict perpetrators who inflict suffering, or for that matter, 
mental pain."131 
The Attorney General has the power to compel a Magistrate to transmit the case proceedings to the 
Attorney General and suspend the Magistrate’s inquiries.132 Should the Attorney General be of the 
opinion that a case is disclosed against a perpetrator by investigative proceedings taken by the 
Police and the Magistrate, but that the work of the police or the Magistrate is defective, the 
Attorney General has the power to order and instruct the Magistrate to re-investigate in the manner 
desired by the Attorney General. The Magistrate is bound to comply with such an order.133 Even if a 
Magistrate is of the view that there is sufficient evidence to commit a person to stand trial and so 
orders, the Attorney General has the power to quash the order and direct the Magistrate to discharge 
the complaint and the accused.134 
The role of the Attorney General in the prosecution of cases, including its responsibilities and 
powers during the investigative stage, by its very nature places the Attorney General in a conflict of 
interest as far as any inquiry into the administration of justice, thereby excluding him and any 
members of his Department from a role greater than the victims in an inquiry. 
The conflict of interest regarding the Attorney General’s Department was one of the reasons why 
the IIGEP concluded its work.135 
 
4.2.3. The courts 
The judicial system of Sri Lanka has not been capable of meeting the challenges caused by the 
explosion of political crimes and human rights violations.136  
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The judiciary is, or has been, vulnerable to two forms of political influence: from the government 
and from the former Chief Justice. Since the operation of the Constitutional Council ceased in 2005, 
presidential nomination of judges has not been the subject of any additional appraisal and approval 
process prior to formal appointment. This makes the judiciary vulnerable to executive interference 
and jeopardises its independence. However, many would not dispute the merits of the President’s 
appointments.137 
The perception that the judiciary suffers from political influence has arisen in recent years due to 
the excessive influence of the former Chief Justice, the apparently inconsistent jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court in relation to certain issues, and through tensions between the judiciary and the 
executive.138 It is commonly believed that the former Chief Justice used the administration of the 
case allocation procedure as a tool to sideline senior Supreme Court judges from hearing politically 
sensitive cases.139 It has also been suggested that the contempt of court powers of the Supreme 
Court have been used inappropriately, particularly by the former Chief Justice to stifle criticism 
from the civil society.140 Efforts to enact contempt of court-legislation have failed. 
High Court judges exercise a particularly important role in respect of criminal prosecutions in the 
High Court under the CAT Act. However, it has been reported that this is not a jurisdiction that has 
been exercised in a manner that justifies the objectives with which the CAT Act was enacted in 
1994.141 
 
4.2.4. The National Human Rights Commission 
The NHRC can only make recommendations and is not empowered directly to approach the courts. 
It therefore lacks the capacity to conduct detailed criminal investigations into complaints of 
torture.142 Additionally, the NHRC is not adequately funded or resourced and was therefore not 
capable of dealing with an exponentially worsening human rights crisis.143  
The NHRC enjoyed a good reputation during the first 10 years of its existence and was granted ‘A’ 
status by the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions (ICC). 
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However, an impasse at the Constitutional Council resulted in the President directly appointing his 
own members to the NHRC which flew in the face of the Constitution.144 UN Special Rapporteurs 
have questioned the enforcement capacity of the NHRC and expressed concern that the enabling 
legislation grants very limited powers to the NHRC.145The Bar and academics are unanimous that 
the NHRC is not seen as having the will or power to address the more serious human rights 
issues.146 Reduced capacity and willingness to investigate complaints, abandonment of the previous 
practice of holding hearings and a fractious relationship with civil society led to loss of public 
confidence in the NHRC. Serious concerns with the NHRC include: it is generally viewed as 
inactive, not prosecuting cases effectively through human rights investigations; incompetent or 
inactive senior staff in Jaffna; and an excessively hostile relationship with many NGOs.147  It has 
been suggested that these defects have the effect that human rights cases are passed off to a 
mediation body that has no human rights mandate or teeth, resulting in civil/political rights not 
being appropriately dealt with through the mediation procedure.148  However, the government had 
announced its intention to increase the powers of NHRC 
Also, in 2007 the NHRC sent internal circular No. 7 dated 20/6/2007 that the secretary of the 
NHRC had set down a prescriptive period for receiving complaints of 3 months meaning that all 
complaints of torture, extra-judicial killings, disappearances etc. were prescribed unless complaints 
were made within 3 months of the date of the violation.149 The NHRC also withdrew services such 
as visits to police stations and its 24 hour hot line for making complaints.150 On 21 October 2007, 
the NHRC imposed a ‘blackout’ on its sub-offices (including Jaffna).151 In effect, the NHRC placed 
a ‘gagging’ order on human rights abuses. According to representatives of the NHRC, it received 
405 complaints of torture in the first nine months of 2007. 
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4.2.5. Commissions of Inquiry  
The use in Sri Lanka of Commissions of Inquiry has been criticised. The particular Commission of 
Inquiry established in 2006 has also been criticized. 
On 7 January 2007 Kishali Pinto Jayawardene published an article stating, inter alia, that putting 
the primary focus on the Commission of Inquiry (aided as it is supposed to be by a team of 
international observers) and thus shifting attention away from the due functioning of the "normal" 
rights protection monitors such as the National Human Rights Commission, is unbelievable.152 
In October 2008 Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that the 
Commission of Inquiry is an ad hoc response to a series of particularly shocking incidents and 
should not be a substitute for effective action by relevant law enforcement agencies.153 
The IIGEP expressed in its first public statement concern that there were no adequate victim and 
witness protection provisions under Sri Lankan law.154 On 19 September 2007 the IIGEP issued a 
public statement according to which the IIGEP concluded that the investigation and inquiry process 
to date had failed to comply effectively with international norms and standards.  
On 17 March 2008 the IIGEP took the decision to cease its activities on the ground that the 
proceedings of inquiry and investigation had fallen short of transparency and compliance with basic 
international norms and standards. The IIGEP had time and again pointed out the major flaws of the 
process: first and foremost the conflict of interest at all levels, in particular with the Attorney 
General’s Department. Additional flaws included the restrictions on the operation of the 
Commission through lack of proper funding and independent support staff, poor organisation of the 
hearings and lines of questioning, and refusal of State authorities at the highest level to fully 
cooperate with the investigations and inquiries. Underlying it all was the impunity that had led to 
the prior fruitless investigations. There was a climate of threat, direct and indirect, to the lives of 
anyone who might identify persons responsible for human rights violations, including those who are 
likely to have been committed by the security forces. There had been and continued to be a lack of 
political and institutional will to investigate and inquire into the cases before the Commission.155 
In a final public statement on 15 April 2008 the IIGEP noted that the victims and witness protection 
programme enjoyed no statutory basis, lacked fully trained staff and did not have sufficient funds to 
offer adequate assistance to those in need of protection. The Commission had not ensured the 
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protection of victims and their families from intimidation and their representation by legal counsel. 
There was no provision to extend the protection arrangements beyond the life of the 
Commission.156  
In its report of 2009, published before the Commission of Inquiry had concluded its work, Amnesty 
International noted that the inquiries had not focused on the failures of the investigations by the 
police and the Attorney General’s department investigations into the same cases. Amnesty 
International also criticises the fact that the progress of the Commission’s inquiries was slow and 
that investigations were held in camera during the first year.157 The security forces may have 
obstructed the investigations, refusing to provide information on grounds of national security. 
Public hearings had been disrupted by private counsel who, both in the context of the hearings and 
in public statements, had attacked witnesses, members of the Commission and the IIGEP in 
inflammatory and political terms. There have also been problems with the translation of statements 
made by witnesses.158 
According to the Chairperson of the Commission of Inquiry, the IIGEP had from the beginning 
been confrontational. They had questioned the independence of the Commission. They had also 
been complaining over the delays but the Chairperson was of the view that the Commission had 
taken time for good reasons. The Commission had to have the Commission of Inquiry Act amended 
but that had taken eight months.159 
 
4.2.6. Conclusion 
The National Human Rights Commission is deeply flawed and has lost all credibility after being 
stocked by political appointees. Other domestic institutions are increasingly politicized or 
dysfunctional. The law enforcement agencies and the judicial system have failed almost completely. 
There had been almost no credible police investigations and very few arrests or indictments in any 
of the hundreds of killings, abductions and disappearances over the past year and a half of sustained 
violence.160 
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5.   Effective Implementation and Compliance 
 
Throughout the period in issue broad concern about the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has 
been expressed by a variety of credible sources, including UN special procedures and reputable 
NGOs.161 These suggest that there are problems with the compliance by Sri Lanka with its human 
rights commitments. 
By way of illustrative example, on 5 September 2006 Philip Alston stated at the Human Rights 
Council that the situation in Sri Lanka had deteriorated significantly since he visited Sri Lanka at 
the end of 2005. Civilians were not simply caught in the crossfire of the conflict but rather were 
targeted for strategic reasons.162 
On 13 October 2007 Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that in the 
context of the armed conflict and the emergency measures taken against terrorism, the weakness of 
the rule of law and the prevalence of impunity was alarming. There were a large number of reported 
killings, abductions and disappearances that remained unresolved. In the absence of more vigorous 
investigations, prosecutions and convictions, it was hard to see how this would come to an end. 
While Sri Lanka has much of the necessary human rights institutional infrastructure, critical 
elements of protection had been undermined or compromised.163 
On 11 December 2007 Louise Arbour addressed the 6th Session of the Human Rights Council 
stating, inter alia, that while the Government pointed to several initiatives it had taken to address 
these issues, there had yet to be an adequate investigation or credible public accounting for the vast 
majority of the cases of abductions and disappearances. Regrettably, the various national 
institutions and mechanisms that could be expected to safeguard human rights had failed to deliver 
adequate protection.164 
In December 2007 the Asian Human Rights Commission issued a report which summarized the 
situation in Sri Lanka as follows: "The situation of human rights, the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary deteriorated further during the year 2007...There were no 
improvement in any of the areas relating to human rights and the rule of law, in fact, even the 
discourse on human rights suffered a serious setback as the Sri Lankan government refused to 
                                                          
161 See further below. 
162 Statement by Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, Statement, 5 September 2006 
163 Press statement by Louise Arbour on conclusion of her visit to Sri Lanka, Colombo, 13 October 2007.  
164 Address by Ms. Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, on the occasion of the resumed 6th 
Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva, 11 December 2007. 
 45 
engage in any meaningful discourse about the improvement of the situation with the local human 
rights groups, international human rights groups, the Human Rights Council and with Louise 
Arbour..."165 
On 6 March 2008 Human Rights Watch issued a report166 which stated that the involvement of the 
security forces in "disappearances" is facilitated by Sri Lanka’s emergency laws, which grant 
sweeping powers to the army along with broad immunity from prosecution. 
At the 2nd Session of the Universal Periodic review on 5 – 16 May 2008 the International 
Commission of Jurists noted that concerns had been raised regarding the functioning and 
independence of some of Sri Lanka’s state institutions. The capacity to protect human rights is 
limited by the longstanding climate of impunity, the dangerous security situation and the sheer scale 
of the crisis.167  
On 19 June 2008 the International Federation of Human Rights in its annual report stated that the 
human rights situation in Sri Lanka had deteriorated dramatically, especially in the Jaffna peninsula. 
Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, recruitment of child soldiers, torture, threats, and, in 
general, massive violations of human rights and war crimes had increased, resulting in a real 
climate of fear and insecurity throughout the country. In 2007 the government established a policy 
to discredit, almost systematically, human rights activities, particularly by accusing defenders of 
human rights being "supporters of the LTTE", "traitors" or "enemies of the State".168 
In her statement of 26 May 2009 at the Eleventh Special Session of the Human Rights Council, on 
behalf of all Special Procedures mandate holders of the Human Rights Council, Ms. Magdalena 
Sepúlveda, independent expert on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, reiterated the 
concern at the serious human rights situation in Sri Lanka and at the lack of transparency and 
accountability that accompanies the crisis. Weak institutional structures permitted impunity to go 
unabated. Those defending human rights did not have the space they need to do their important 
work without fear or reprisals.169 
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On May 27 2009, at the same session, Forum Asia stated that the deep rooted issue of 
discrimination and impunity had been allowed to continue unabated throughout the decades. There 
had been a sharp increase of uninvestigated killings and disappearances of journalists, media 
workers, human rights defenders and religious personalities.170 
Justice Nihal Jayasinghe, Sri Lankan High Commissioner to the UK, categorically denied that 
civilians were killed by Sri Lankan artillery as the Sri Lankan artillery had never fired on civilians. 
The allegations that up to 4000 civilians had died in the final assault were baseless as the final 
assault on the LTTE leadership was carried out after all the civilians were rescued by the military. 
There were no disappearances, rape, torture or murder taking place in the "welfare villages" for 
displaced people.171 
The examination that follows of particular rights is not comprehensive. The non-inclusion of a right 
protected by the ICCPR should not be interpreted as signifying compliance by Sri Lanka with the 
relevant provision. 
 
5.1. Unlawful killings  
 
5.1.1. International standards 
Article 6 of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary killings and requires States to protect the right to life. A 
killing can be arbitrary either because there were no grounds for the resort to potentially lethal force 
or because the force used was disproportionate to the aim being pursued. Generally speaking, the 
framework of analysis is that of a law and order paradigm. During the conduct of hostilities, 
however, it is necessary to apply a LOAC/IHL paradigm, in which case a killing will only be 
arbitrary if it violates LOAC/IHL provisions.172 The obligation to protect the right to life requires 
the State to protect those within the jurisdiction from threats to life, even at the hands of third 
parties. It also requires the State to investigate all killings. 
The HRC in General Comment No. 6 to the ICCPR states that the right to life is non-derogable 
"even in time[s] of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation" (Article 4). While the 
right is not absolute, ‘protection against arbitrary deprivation of life which is explicitly required by 
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the third sentence of Article 6 (1) is of paramount importance’  and states ‘should take measures not 
only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing 
by their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the 
utmost gravity. Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a 
person may be deprived of his life by such authorities.’173 
 
5.1.2. Domestic implementation 
As noted above, Sri Lankan law does not expressly provide for the obligation to protect the right to 
life. The Penal Code in Chapter XVI, Articles 293-365 does, however, identify the different types 
of unlawful violence to the person, including offences affecting life.174 The UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions has, however, "… concluded that extrajudicial 
executions were widespread and included political killings designed to suppress and deter the 
exercise of civil and political rights as well as killings of suspected criminals by the police." The 
Special Rapporteur found that both Government forces and the LTTE were responsible and that the 
perpetrators enjoyed complete impunity. He found that the investigations carried out by the police 
were "completely inadequate."175 
This section considers unlawful killings in a law-enforcement context, unlawful killings during the 
conduct of active hostilities and deaths in custody.  
 
5.1.3. Unlawful killings by State agents or persons for whom the State is responsible in a law 
enforcement context 
Unlawful killings176 perpetrated by soldiers, police and paramilitary groups with ties to the 
government are a major problem in Sri Lanka.177 Even during the ceasefire, these types of killings 
were widespread and included political killings for the purpose of suppressing and deterring the 
exercise of civil and political rights as well as killings of suspected criminals by police.178 Philip 
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Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, estimated that there were around 300 
such killings, committed by all armed groups, in 2005.179 Other killings, such as massacres and 
reprisal killings have occurred implicating both the government and the LTTE.180  
The Government was compromised by its association with the Karuna faction, the TMVP.181 The 
Karuna faction worked openly with Government security forces at checkpoints, carried weapons on 
the streets and escaped investigation despite many complaints to police and security forces about 
their involvement in child abductions, torture, and killings of civilians.182 The relationship between 
the Karuna faction and the Government was unclear as of 2005.183 Special Rapporteur Philip Alston 
found ‘no clear evidence of official collusion’ but only ‘strong circumstantial evidence of (at least) 
an informal cooperation between government forces and the Karuna faction.’184 He subsequently 
(2008) found that the situation had evolved for the worse and that the two TMVP factions "… no 
longer constitute truly independent armed groups but instead receive direction and assistance from 
the security forces."185 In any event, it appears that the Government had completely failed to 
comply with recommendations to sever ties with the group and instead intensified its collaboration 
with various paramilitary factions.186 
Many killings and disappearances of civilians were carried out against those suspected of being 
informants for or collaborators with the LTTE, particularly Tamils around Colombo and Jaffna and 
had occurred in high security zones with a heavy military presence. In Jaffna, many of these 
violations had occurred during military imposed curfews. While many of the perpetrators were 
unknown, it appears there is involvement or complicity of security forces and supported by the 
Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) who work closely with Government forces.187 Groups 
known for carrying out extra-judicial killing and abductions, such as the Karuna faction, were 
reportedly housed in government security forces’ camps or in locations that were under security 
forces’ protection.188 
                                                          
179 Report of the Special Rapporteur Alston, Mission to Sri Lanka, para.10. Until December 2005, the ceasefire between 
the forces of the main parties was largely respected. Those killed were largely civilians; Ibid., para.4. 
180 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, p. 8-10; Minority Rights Group International Report,  
p. 6-7; Amnesty International , Submission to the UN Universal Periodic review for Sri Lanka, para 4.1. 
181 Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, para.16, p. 9. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, para. 49, p. 14.  
184 Report of the Special Rapporteur Alston, Mission to Sri Lanka, para. 16. 
185 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, para  50. 
186 Ibid., para. 52. 
187 Ibid., para. 18-20, p. 7-8; International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis; Minority Rights Group 
International  Report, p. 7; Amnesty International , Submission to the UN Universal Periodic review for Sri Lanka,, 4.1. 
188 Minority Rights Group International Report, p. 7; UTHR, Can the East be won through human culling, Special 
Report, 3 August 2007. 
 49 
Throughout the country, many Tamil and Muslim civilians were killed primarily for exercising 
rights including freedom of movement while others were killed in retaliation or because they were 
deemed to be LTTE ‘sympathizers.’189 Other civilians were intentionally killed for political or 
‘strategic reasons.’190 For example, the army assisted by the pro-government Tamil paramilitaries 
reportedly engaged in a deliberate policy of extra-judicial killings and abductions upon those they 
considered to be supportive of the LTTE.191 
Attacks, abductions, intimidation and threats against humanitarian aid and human rights workers 
(predominately Tamils) increasingly occurred by a number of perpetrators.192 For example, 
seventeen aid workers were killed allegedly by at least one member of the Muslim Home Guard 
(Jehangir) and two police constables in the presence of the Sri Lankan Naval Special Forces.193  
According to UN Undersecretary General John Holmes, thirty aid workers were killed ‘execution 
style’ between 2006 and 2007, sixteen of whom were Tamils.194 The government responded to the 
incident by calling Holmes a ‘terrorist.’195 A senior opposition MP accused an Air Force officer of 
being involved in the killing of two Red Cross workers leading to the officer’s eventual arrest.196 
"According to a study by the Law and Society Trust, from January 2006 through December 2007, 
44 humanitarian workers were killed, and 23 were disappeared. The worst affected organizations 
were Action Contre la Faim (17 dead), the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (9 dead), the Danish 
Demining Group (6 dead), Halo Trust (6 dead), and the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society (4 dead), but a 
total of more than 18 organizations have been affected."197 
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In the two years following the report of his visit to Sri Lanka, the Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial executions found that there had been a dramatic increase in the number of extrajudicial 
killings. Such killings were, by 2008, widespread but with significant regional variation in the level 
and pattern of abuse.198  
In the Jaffna area, for example, there was a high rate of killings amongst those suspected of being 
an LTTE informant, collaborator or ‘sympathizer’. The determination was based on arbitrary 
criteria such as a record of past collaboration with the LTTE.  Past collaboration ranged from 
attending LTTE rallies to receiving military training, Since Jaffna had been under LTTE control for 
such an extended period, virtually everyone had some voluntary or involuntary association with the 
LTTE and determining who was to be killed had little or no relationship to what individuals had 
actually done.199 Government forces attempted to identify suspects at check points and during 
search operations.  Identity cards were confiscated and suspects were ordered to report to a military 
base where they were interrogated. If government forces determined a person was a collaborator, 
they were at high risk of being killed and if they were not deemed to be a collaborator, they were 
threatened with death unless they provided the names of actual collaborators. An exact number of 
extra-judicial killings in Jaffna are not available due to the high rate of disappearances.  
In the East of Sri Lanka during this period there were also a significant number of unlawful 
killings.200 
During the ceasefire, when different areas of the country were controlled by different groups, there 
was a real difficulty in carrying out investigations when a suspect fled from a government-
controlled area to an area controlled by the LTTE.201 That being said, it should be noted that such a 
claim depends on their being a suspect, which cannot be determined without an investigation. The 
Special Rapporteur commented on the general lack of investigative ability on the part of the police 
and other impediments.202 The system for internal police investigations was structurally flawed and 
the Special Rapporteur found that there had been no investigation into any of the cases referred by 
him to the Government.203 He attributed a significant part of the difficulty to the fact that the police 
had become a counter-insurgency force.  
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By 2008, the Special Rapporteur reported that "More than two years later, the Government has 
completely failed to implement the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations for improving police 
respect for human rights, police effectiveness in preventing killings, and police accountability. 
Indeed, there has been significant backward movement. Rather than improving the investigative and 
crime prevention capacity of the police, the Government has even more completely subordinated 
the police to the counterinsurgency effort. Since the Special Rapporteur’s visit took place, the 
Government has required the Inspector General of Police to report to the Minister of Defence."204  
Of particular significance was the erosion of the independence of the National Police 
Commission.205  
 
5.1.4. Unlawful killings during the course of active hostilities206 
Between the report of his visit to Sri Lanka and the follow-up in 2008, the Special Rapporteur noted 
that there had been a new round of hostilities characterised by exceptional brutality and the 
disregard of LOAC/IHL and human rights law.207 
During the recent hostilities which resulted in victory for the Sri Lankan forces, there were 
widespread allegations that both sides showed a wanton disregard for human life and violated 
LOAC/IHL.208 It was claimed that the LTTE used the civilian population as "human shields" and 
prevented them from leaving the conflict zone. The government is said repeatedly to have hit 
facilities known to be fulfilling medical functions and to have fired heavy weapons into densely 
populated areas. The casualty figures for those killed and injures are not known.209 Owing to the 
refusal to grant access to journalists, it is not possible to obtain accurate figures. Without knowing 
what was targeted and why, it is difficult to establish whether the security forces breached their 
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obligations under human rights law, as interpreted in the light of LOAC/IHL.  The damage inflicted 
on a facility known to be serving as a hospital raises serious concerns, as does the subsequent 
detention of Tamil Doctors who reported the attacks to the outside world.210 The Sri Lankan 
government unilaterally undertook not to fire heavy artillery into the "no fire zone" but there is 
significant evidence that they in fact did so.211  
 
5.1.5. Deaths in custody 
In a report issued on 27 March 2006 the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions Philip 
Alston noted that the police were engaged in summary executions. Reports, unchallenged by the 
Government, to the Panels knowledge, show that from November 2004 to October 2005 the police 
shot at least 22 criminal suspects after taking them into custody. The Government confirmed that in 
no internal police inquiry had been opened in any of these cases. The other main cause of deaths in 
police custody is torture.212 
Force allegedly became necessary when handcuffed suspects attempted to escape or attacked the 
officers.  All shootings were fatal and no officers were injured. Government confirmed that none of 
these cases led to an internal police inquiry because no complaints were made.213 
An often reported reason given for killing of suspects in police custody or those held in detention is 
that the detainees attacked police with grenades or some other weapons and therefore, the use of 
lethal force was justifiable self-defence. Another common justification used by police is that 
suspects or detainees were trying to escape.214  However, many of these ‘justifiable killings’ are 
surrounded by questionable circumstances.215  Killings of detainees by the police has a long history 
in Sri Lanka and Magistrates often accept the versions given by police and will declare a shooting 
justifiable before such cases are brought before the High Court and before all of the evidence has 
                                                          
210 There were UN and Red Cross witnesses of the shelling of the hospital, see War Without Witness Sri Lanka, Sri 
Lankan Government paraded Doctors in custody, to cover-up War-Crime Evidences –But, facts speak for itself. 
211 See Sri Lanka admits attacks on ‘no-fire’ zone, Telegraph, 1 May 2009, and Sri Lankan hospital shelled in Tamil no-
fire zone, Guardian, 9 April 2009. 
212 Report of the Special Rapporteur, extrajudicial executions, para. 53 and 54; AHRC, State of Human Rights in Eleven 
Asian Nations, p. 323-345. 
213 Ibid. 
214 AHRC, State of Human Rights in Eleven Asian Nations, p. 298-299. 
215 Ibid., p. 323-345. 
 53 
been examined.216  Higher authorities are said to approve of these types of killings as former 
Inspectors General of Police have publicly approved of it.217  
 
5.1.6. Killings by unknown persons 
Lynching and mob killings by civilians were also reported to have taken place throughout 2007.218 
In all instances of mob killings people have taken matters into their own hands because they felt 
contacting the police was pointless.219 On 27 Sept. 2008, a grenade attack by unidentified persons 
was carried out against the Executive Director of Transparency International Sri Lanka.220  He was 
legal counsel in a number of sensitive fundamental rights cases including allegations of torture, 
extra-judicial killings and disappearances.221  Another lawyer who was appearing in a fundamental 
rights case against police received death threats. Unidentified persons killed his clients who had 
initiated a bribery cases against the police and a fundamental rights case 2 weeks earlier.222 
Attacks on the media, both through verbal threats by the Government and through brutal and 
physical assaults by unknown persons have been widely reported.223 A significant number of 
journalists have been killed (6-10 depending on the criteria used) since 2006 which prevented and 
deterred the press from closely monitoring conflict-related violence.224 The Free Media Group, an 
independent media watchdog, reported that a total of 12 Tamil journalists were killed from 2006 – 
2007 in Jaffna alone.225 In May 2007, gunmen entered the premises of the Uthayan newspaper 
office and randomly shot at workers, killing and injuring several.226 A fact-finding mission from 
Reporters without Borders found that since this attack "local journalists have lived and worked in 
fear." The report noted that "murders, kidnappings, threats and censorship have made Jaffna one of 
the world’s most dangerous places for journalists to work. At least seven media workers, including 
two journalists, have been killed there since May 2006. One journalist is missing and at least three 
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media outlets have been physically attacked."227 In another incident, the police removed the security 
detail protecting Sri Lanka’s top defence correspondent without warning on 18 August 2007.228 The 
security detail was provided after he had been previously attacked on a number of occasions.229 
Reporters Without Borders responded by stating that ‘Sectors of the army [were] trying to gag or 
kill’ him.230  Numerous journalists have been abducted, attacked, threatened or forced into exile.231  
Motivations for targeting journalists include: accusations of supporting the LTTE; having criticized 
the Government too strongly; and having revealed information the Government did not like.232 For 
example, during the military’s campaign in the eastern territories, journalists were repeatedly 
attacked for reporting on the humanitarian situation there and media organizations were labelled as 
‘terrorists’ if they were critical of the government.233 In some instances, journalists have been 
targeted for harassment by the Karuna faction with the blessing of government forces.234 Following 
the killing of Lasantha Wickrematunge, editor of the Sunday Leader, in January 2009, (a killing 
which he himself had foretold235 ), other journalists have fled Sri Lanka. An analysis conducted by 
Minority Rights Group International (MRG) shows that almost all journalists killed, attacked or 
threatened since 2006 were from minority groups.236  
Another group particularly at risk are human rights defenders. In November 2006, for example, 
Nadaraja Raviraj, co-founder of the Civil Monitoring Commission was shot dead in daylight in 
Colombo.237 Lawyers who defend those charged with security offences are also subject to 
harassment.238  
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A third group are those perceived as critics of the government. On 20 August 2009 the Executive 
Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, received an 
anonymous death threat. According to the death threat Dr. Saravanamuttu would be killed because 
Sri Lanka stands to be deprived the GSP+ benefits due to information supplied by Dr. 
Saravanamuttu to the EC Commissioner for External Relations.239 
 
5.1.7. Killings by persons for whom the State is not responsible 
The LTTE has notoriously used assassination of Tamil opponents as a mechanism for suppressing 
rival nationalist movements.240 The LTTE resorted to indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Ampara, 
Batticaloa and Trincomalee as means of terrorizing the population and this became more common 
during the first 5 months of 2008.241 The LTTE has also targeted journalists and forced critical 
Tamil newspapers to close.242  
 
5.1.8. Obligation to investigate killings 
The obligation to investigate any killing, whether committed by a SA/PSA or a third party, is an 
intrinsic element in the obligation to protect the right to life. There are two different types of flaws 
in the investigatory system. The first is the attitude and conduct of those responsible for the 
investigations and the second is the structural weakness of institutions designed to ensure that the 
police perform their role properly and independently. 
The attitude of the police may have been affected by the shift in their role under the Emergency 
legislation. They have increasingly become a counter-insurgency force, rather than a body which 
maintains public order in the interests of the community and investigates crimes.243 Police, military 
and the government are reportedly more interested in distorting facts, perverting the evidence and 
silencing witnesses than in any real investigation.244 For example, on 19 June 2007 three Tamil 
fishermen were shot and killed under questionable circumstances by the Sri Lankan military in the 
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eastern village of Kalkudah.245  When family members of the fishermen tried to locate their bodies, 
the army and police said that they would only release the bodies if the family members signed 
documents saying that they were members of the LTTE.246 When they refused, the wives of the 
fishermen were assaulted by the military.247 The next day, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence 
reported on its website that three LTTE members had been shot and killed by the military with the 
assistance of the police.248 In another incident, four Muslims were killed in Polonnaruwa (north-
central Sri Lanka) by the army on 28 June 2007.249 The army initially claimed that the four Muslims 
were among 11 LTTE members that they had killed but later changed their story claiming the 
Muslims had been killed by terrorists.250 
The Commission of Inquiry established to investigate fifteen (subsequently sixteen) high profile 
cases of killings, is not a substitute for an effective investigatory system. It is rather a sign of the 
failure of the latter. The Commission of Inquiry has completed its work but the results have not, as 
yet, been made public. It is not known whether they ever will be. The indictment of its effectiveness 
comes from the IIGEP.251 
During the early years of the cease-fire, there were some attempts to improve the operation of the 
independent oversight mechanisms, such as the NHRC and the National Police Commission. Since 
2005, these attempts have been reversed.252  
 
5.1.9. Conclusion 
During the period covered by the investigation, there has been a high rate of unlawful killings in Sri 
Lanka, including killings carried out by the security forces, persons for whom the State is 
responsible and the police. These include both operational killings and deaths in custody. There 
were also a large number of killings in areas controlled by the government where the perpetrator is 
unknown. The LTTE was also responsible for many killings. The level of killings increased 
following the end of the ceasefire. In the last few months of the armed conflict, there were 
significant levels of civilian casualties, even if the precise number is not known. There are real 
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concerns that both parties may have violated their obligations under human rights law, interpreted 
in the light of LOAC/IHL.   
 
5.2. Torture 
 
5.2.1. International standards 
Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
(CIDT) and the provision is non-derogable even during states of emergency.  The Humans Rights 
Committee (HRC) has stated in its General Comment 7 that it is not enough for states to simply 
prohibit and criminalize acts of torture or CIDT. They must ensure effective protection through 
some machinery of state control.  Additionally, states should not make sharp distinctions between 
different forms of treatment or punishment.  Distinctions depend on the kind, purpose and severity 
of the particular treatment in question.  
Part I (Articles 1-16) of CAT defines torture (Article 1), and commits parties to taking effective 
measures to prevent any act of torture in any territory under their jurisdiction (Article 2). These 
include ensuring that torture is a criminal offence (Article 4), establishing jurisdiction over acts of 
torture committed by or against a party's citizens (Article 5), ensuring that torture is an extraditable 
offence (Article 8), and establishing universal jurisdiction to try cases of torture where an alleged 
torturer cannot be extradited (Article 5). Parties must promptly investigate any allegation of torture 
(Articles 12 and13), and victims of torture must have an enforceable right to compensation (Article 
14). Parties must also ban the use of evidence produced by torture in their courts (Article 15), and 
are barred from deporting, extraditing or refouling people where there are substantial grounds for 
believing they will be tortured (Article 3). Parties are also obliged to prevent other acts of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to investigate any allegation of such treatment 
within their jurisdiction (Article 16). 
 
5.2.2. Domestic implementation 
Sri Lanka has various domestic laws that were enacted in order to prevent and criminalize torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT) by police, the military and other government 
officials. Under ordinary circumstances some of these laws and institutions meet international 
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standards to ensure, protect and enforce human rights but many of the safeguards against torture 
contained therein have either been rendered ineffective, inoperable or non-applicable under the 
government’s Emergency Regulations. At other times these laws, protections and procedures have 
for the most part been ignored. The provisions which safeguard against the risk of torture or CIDT 
include not only measures specifically addressing such ill-treatment but also provisions regulating 
the grounds of detention and safeguards against abuse in detention. The government has also 
created various human rights institutions at the national level that were designed to monitor human 
rights and to receive complaints regarding human rights violations including torture or CIDT.  
Some of these institutions have either advisory and/or investigative/prosecutorial powers.  
However, many, if not all, of these institutions have been rendered ineffective due to lack of 
resources (personnel/and funding), lack of political will, apathy and/or conflicts of interest.  
All of these issues have led to a climate where the police, armed forces and government officials 
have not only failed to fulfil their international obligations to protect against torture and CIDT. The 
ineffectiveness of institutional safeguards against torture and other human rights has allowed the 
police, armed forces and other government officials to engage in unlawful acts themselves or to be 
complicit in such acts with complete impunity.    
Article 11 of the Sri Lankan Constitution states: ‘No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ However, the Supreme Court applies a high 
standard of proof in torture related cases.253 According to the government, there are two standards 
of proof (i.e. balance and preponderance of the evidence (civil standard)) and beyond a reasonable 
doubt (criminal standard).254 In ‘Fundamental Rights Cases’ such as torture, the Supreme Court 
makes decisions based on documentary evidence and oral pleadings and applies the civil standard. 
Liability is primarily upon the State. Conversely, the Court must be satisfied that criminal offences 
(including torture), are proved beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal convictions to be upheld. 
Penal sanctions are imposed against the individual.255  
Article 13 foresees a number of fundamental safeguards, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest 
(Article 13(1)) and the right to be informed of reasons for arrest. Article 13(2) stipulates that ‘every 
person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty shall be brought before 
the judge of the nearest competent court according to the procedure established by law, and shall 
not be further held in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty except upon and in terms of 
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the order of such judge made in accordance with the procedure established by law.’ Article 15 
prohibits any limitation of this right in times of public emergency. However, it provides for the 
possibility of restriction of the safeguards and rights granted above in the interests of national 
security, public order and the protection of public health or morality.256 The Constitutional 
provisions do not, however, appear to be effective.  
The CAT Act incorporates international norms within CAT into domestic law. Torture is defined in 
Article 12 as: any act which causes severe pain, whether physical or mental, to any person, being an 
act, which is done for any of the following purposes: obtaining information or confessions;257 
punishing persons for any act which he or a third person has committed;258 intimidating or coercing 
such person or other persons; or done for any other reason based on discrimination, and being in 
every case, an act which is done by, or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of, a 
public officer or other person acting in an official capacity."259 The definition of Article 12 under 
the CAT Act is in conformity with Article 1 of CAT. However, it does not expressly include 
‘suffering’ and does not contain any provision on the right of either the victim or a dependant to 
compensation. There are relatively few successful cases under the Act.260 Under Article 2 of the 
Act, acts of torture, participation in torture, complicity, aiding and abetting, incitement, and the 
attempt to torture are punishable offences.261  Offences under the CAT Act shall be a ‘cognizable 
and non-bailable offence.262 The state may not use exceptional circumstances such as the state or 
threat of war, internal political instability, public emergency or the fact that a person(s) were given 
order to engage in unlawful acts by a superior officer or a public authority as a defence against 
charges of torture.263 
When seeking redress for alleged acts of torture preference is given to actions under constitutional 
fundamental rights in lieu of the CAT Act because the burden of proof is the civil standard under 
the Constitution rather than the criminal one required under the Act.264  For example, in the Sriyani 
Silva case, the Supreme Court used CAT itself instead of the CAT Act as the CAT Act does not 
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include provisions concerning compensation.265 Adoption of the CAT Act was an effort to 
criminalize torture and bring perpetrators to justice.  While a significant number of indictments 
have been filed under the Act, the majority of prosecutions initiated against police officers or 
member of the armed forced on charges of abduction, unlawful confinement, or torture have been 
inconclusive due to a lack of sufficient evidence and the unavailability of witnesses266.  
Articles 321 and 322 of the Penal Code criminalizes acts which may fall within the scope of CAT, 
such as intentionally causing harm or grievous harm with the aim of extorting confessions or 
information leading to the detection of an offence or misconduct or to compel restoration of the 
property.  Offences are punishable by 10 years maximum imprisonment and a fine. There are 
‘Illustrations’ to Article 321 which describe torture cases: ‘(a) A, a police officer, tortures Z in order 
to induce Z to confess that he committed a crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section. (b) A, 
a police officer, tortures B to induce him to point out where certain stolen property is deposited. A 
is guilty of an offence under this section.’ Article 364 of the Penal Code outlaws rape of a woman 
in custody (including in a remand home and a women’s and children’s institution) and foresees 
punishment of 10-20 yrs imprisonment and a fine. The perpetrator shall be ordered to pay 
compensation to the victim for injuries caused. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) provides safeguards against the risk of torture. The 
safeguards often take the form of rights for detained persons. Article 37 and Article 65 of the Police 
Ordinance set the legal time limit of police custody of 24 hours, excluding the time necessary for 
the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate; the requirement to maintain an ‘Information 
Book,’ including the file, by the Criminal Investigation Department and  any bureau of 
investigation for the purpose of recording statements; and the obligation of the officer in charge of 
the police station who is responsible for the Information Book to furnish three certified copies of all 
notes resulting from the investigation and of all statements recorded in the course of the 
investigation to the Magistrate (Article 147, CCP).  Other safeguards include: the notification of the 
Magistrate’s Court of arrests of persons without warrant by any police officer (including 
information whether the person have been offered bail or otherwise, Article 38, CCP); and 
informing the arrested persons of the reason for arrest (with a right for the arrested person to see the 
arrest warrant if so requested, CCP Article 53).  Where an officer in charge of a police station 
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‘considers that the examination of any person by a medical practitioner is necessary for the conduct 
of an investigation’, he can order such examination by a governmental officer (CCP Article 122(1)) 
However, the Code lacks fundamental safeguards such as the right to inform a family member of 
the arrest or the right to access to a lawyer and/or a doctor of their choice for a person arrested and 
held in custody. The code does not specify the interrogation conditions and is silent about the 
possibility of the presence of a lawyer and an interpreter during interrogation. Moreover, many of 
the protections in the CCP do not apply in cases of detention under the Emergency Regulations (See 
section on Emergency Regulations). 
Post-mortem examinations (including exhuming bodies) may be ordered by a Magistrate or an 
investigator empowered by the Minister (CPP Article 373). A person in police detention can 
complain to the Magistrate and ask for a medical examination by a Judicial Medical Officer (JMO).  
The Magistrate may subsequently order the police to take the victim to the JMO. There are serious 
flaws with this procedure.  In most cases the victim is accompanied to the JMO by exactly the same 
police officer who is responsible for the alleged torture or ill treatment and thus the independence of 
the examination is jeopardized. Access to the JMO is not guaranteed and the alleged victim is often 
taken to an ordinary medical doctor not trained in forensic medicine. Medical personnel in various 
prisons acknowledge that they regularly receive complaints of torture or ill treatment from detainees 
transferred from police stations to prisons and many of these complaints are corroborated by 
physical evidence. Medical personnel only feel responsible for treating obvious wounds and do not 
take further action to corroborate allegations of torture or ill treatment such as reporting the alleged 
abuse to the authorities or sending the victim to a JMO.267 
Articles 24 - 27 of the Evidence Ordinance (EO) do not allow confessions into evidence that were 
extracted through torture. This rule is not applicable to those detained under Emergency 
Regulations ((ER)-See below). 
The wide range of emergency measures introduced by the government authorize detention  in a 
much wider range of circumstances than the law ordinarily applicable but do, theoretically, contain 
safeguards. Although the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) of 1979 was suspended in 2002 after 
the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) was agreed, it was reintroduced under the emergency regulations. 
Section 9(1) allows for the detention of persons under a detention order (DO) for a period of ‘three 
months in the first instance, in such place and subject to such conditions as may be determined by 
the Minister’ and renewable for up to 18 months.  
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The ER 2005 confers powers of arrest, detention, search and seizure, and reduces legal rights during 
trial. The regulations were drawn from the PTA and allow detention without charge for 90 days, 
renewable for up to one year. Regulation 19 allows security forces to hold suspects for up to a year 
under ‘preventive detention’ orders issued by the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.268 A suspect 
detained under the ER 2005 need not be produced before a magistrate for up to 30 days. ‘Public 
Officers’ and those authorized by the President may make arrests in addition to the police or 
military.  The ER 2005 permits joint operations of arrest between the army and the police without 
clarifying their respective responsibilities (Regulation 19(2) and Regulation 24). Regulation 56 
allows for bodies to be disposed of without public notification and the deputy inspector general of 
police can cremate bodies and consequently destroy potential evidence of torture or CIDT. 
Safeguards require that persons arrested by the army must be turned over to the police within 48 
hours and families must be notified of arrest. The NHRC must be notified of all detentions within 
48 hours and it has the authority to visit detainees wherever they are held. The ER 2005 expands 
admissibility of confessions by allowing those made to senior police officers to be entered into 
evidence in court contrary to the Evidence Ordinance. In effect, the ER 2005 short circuits judicial 
scrutiny and supervision provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure.  ER 2005 was properly 
enacted but it does not meet international legal standards.  While criminal laws, specifically the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) and Emergency Regulations, all contain some procedural 
safeguards and check and balances, they are either not functioning effectively or being disregarded.  
The Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorism Activities, No. 7 of 2006 
allows for the criminalization of a broad range of activities as a result of the activities identified in 
regulations 6, 7 and 8 and the definition of terrorism in regulation 20.269 The Regulations contain an 
immunity clause for any government official for any action taken under the ER 2005 so long as they 
acted in good faith and within the discharge of their duties (Regulation 19).   
Presidential Directive of 7 July 2006 on Protecting Fundamental Rights of Persons Arrested and/or 
Detained addresses detention by the security forces generally. The Directive provides that no person 
shall be arrested or detained under any Emergency Regulation or the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
No. 49 of 1979, except in accordance with the law and proper procedure and by a person who is 
authorized by law to make such an arrest or order such detention; the person making the arrest or 
detention should identify himself by name and rank, to the person or relative or friend of the person 
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to be arrested; the person to be arrested should be informed of the reason for the arrest; all details of 
the arrest should be documented in the manner specified by the Ministry of Defence; the person 
being arrested should be allowed to make contact with family or friends to inform them of his 
whereabouts; when a child under 18 years of age or a woman is being arrested or detained, a person 
of their choice should be allowed to accompany them to the place of questioning; as far as possible, 
any such child or woman arrested or detained should be placed in the custody of a Women’s Unit of 
the Armed Forces or Police or in the custody of another woman military or police officer; the 
person arrested or detained should be allowed to make a statement in the language of his choice and 
then asked to sign the statement; if he wishes to make a statement in his own handwriting it should 
be permitted; members of the NHRC or anyone authorized by it must be given access to the arrested 
or detained person and should be permitted to enter at any time, any place of detention, police 
station or any other place in which such a person in confined; and the NHRC must be informed 
within 48 hours of any arrest or detention and the place the person is being detained. This Directive 
was reissued on 12 April 2007. Human Rights Watch argues that "The fact the President had to 
issue them [the Directives] twice suggests that members of the military and police were frequently 
violating the law and that the government lacked the will to hold those responsible for abuses 
accountable. Without concrete action, including prosecutions of those arbitrarily arrested by the 
security forces, the directives appear aimed more at assuaging international opinion than holding 
accountable police and soldiers who commit crimes."270 
 
5.2.3. Proscribed ill-treatment during the normal investigative process 
International reports indicate continued and well-documented allegations of widespread torture and 
ill treatment mainly committed by State forces (police and military) particularly in situations of 
detention.271  
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5.2.4. Proscribed ill-treatment of those detained under Emergency Regulations and/or those 
detained in the North and East of Sri Lanka 
Procedural safeguards and checks and balances against torture within the Emergency Regulations 
either do not apply or are disregarded leading to a situation where torture has become a routine 
practice in the context of counter-terrorism efforts.272 It is alleged that all groups involved in the 
conflict have engaged in torture and CIDT.273 There are particularly widespread allegations of 
torture, CIDT in and near recent conflict zones. The allegations include claims of sexual assault, 
including rape.274 There are consistent reports that such allegations are not promptly or impartially 
investigated.275 Allegations of torture or CIDT by the police of those in detention were reported to 
the Inspector General of Police, the Attorney General’s Department, and the NHRC by either the 
victims themselves or by human rights organizations on the victim’s behalf.276 Some of these cases 
were reported to the National Police Commission.277  However, remarkably few of these allegations 
resulted in serious investigations or prosecutions under the CAT Act.278  Whilst in previous years 
there had been some investigations by the Special Inquiry Unit (SIU) of the Criminal Investigation 
Division (CID), the Asian Human Rights Commission is not aware of any such investigations in 
2007.279   
Although some victims of torture in Sri Lanka are provided with compensation by the Supreme 
Court in cases brought under Article 11 of the Constitution, many of these cases have not been 
accompanied by criminal proceedings under the CAT Act.280 Constitutional rights litigation is not a 
substitute for the prosecution of suspected perpetrators. 
                                                          
272 Statement by Manfred Nowak to the Third Committee at the 62nd session of the General Assembly, 29 October 
2007; Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture, para. 70. 
273 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Need of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka, 
April 2009, p. 7-9.  
274 Ibid. 
275 Asian Legal Resource Centre, Sri Lanka: Prevention of impunity requires clear leadership from the government, 25 
February 2009; Asian Legal Resource Centre, Sri Lanka: The abdication of the duty to investigate crimes, 26 February 
2009, available at: http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/alrc_st2009/539/; see also International Press Institute, "IPI 
calls immunity a dark stain on Sri Lankan Government", 19 January 2009; see also ICG, Sri Lanka’s Return to War: 
Limiting the Damage, 20 Feb. 2008; Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Recurring Nightmare, p. 9, where it is stated that 
"those in conflict areas and refugee camps in the north and east have regular complaints of increased sexual violence 
and enforced sex work from soldiers and armed men." 
276 AHRC, State of Human Rights in Eleven Asian Nations, p. 298. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 UN News Service, UN human rights expert reports allegations of torture in Sri Lanka, UN News Service, 29 October 
2007 (explaining that 1994 Torture Act was meant to criminalize torture but while a significant number of indictments 
brought under the Act, only 3 people had been convicted at that time);  Report of the  Special Rapporteur on torture, 
para. 63-69, p. 18-19. 
 65 
Government officials candidly recognize that torture by police and security forces is widespread 
and those detained in police stations are routinely mistreated to exact confessions from suspects—
sometimes resulting in death.281 There are significant levels of police brutality and impunity.282 
Senior police officials have made appeals to the public not to make allegations of torture and 
mistreatment, so as to prevent the demoralization of officers, claiming that police officers are 
overburdened due to terrorism and an increase in organized crime duties.283 Government officials 
are complacent and tolerant of such conduct. The vast majority of deaths of those being detained are 
not caused by ‘rogue’ police officers but by ordinary officers taking part in an established 
routine.284 Fact-finding by UN Special Rapporteurs regarding ill-treatment and torture was at times 
impeded by hiding or transferring detainees, particularly those who had been most seriously 
subjected to torture, as they still bore marks of ill treatment.285  
Detainees and other victims often do not complain or report incidents of torture or CIDT due to 
intimidation by police officers and threats of further violence.286  Police have threatened to fabricate 
criminal cases of possession of narcotics or dangerous weapons against victims.287  Detainees 
regularly reported that habeas corpus hearings before a magistrate either involved no real 
opportunity to complain about police torture because they were often escorted to courts by the 
perpetrators of torture or CIDT or because the Magistrate did not inquire into whether the suspect 
had been mistreated in custody.288 Medical examinations conducted in alleged torture or CIDT of 
detainees are reportedly conducted in the presence of the perpetrators.289 Detainees are sometimes 
taken to see a JMO or District Medical Officer (DMO) who fail to examine the victims or prescribe 
treatment but merely sign papers implying that doctors are merely ‘signing off’ that the victim had 
been examined and/or treated.290  Detainees had previously not reported incidents of torture or 
CIDT treatment because they would be subjected to further and more severe similar treatment after 
returning from medical examinations.291 Although increased numbers of detainees began requesting 
medical treatment and reporting such abuse to doctors as of 2007, subsequent assaults were still 
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reported.292  In one case, the detainee was assaulted in front of the doctor for reporting ill treatment 
at the hands of those detaining him.293  
 
5.2.5. Inhuman conditions of detention - general 
A combination of antiquated facilities coupled with severe overcrowding give rise to degrading 
treatment at some prisons.294  
Conditions of detention in police stations are basic and often without natural light, sufficient 
ventilation and detainees sleep on concrete floors.295 Inadequate prison facilities have lead to 
convicted prisoners being held together with pre-trial detainees in violation of ICCPR Article 10.296 
Conditions for criminal suspects are not as problematic as they are only held for 24 hours but 
become inhuman for suspects who are held for many months and up to a year under the Emergency 
Regulations.297   
 
5.2.6. Inhuman conditions of detention – the camps 
In assessing the conditions of detention in the camps, in addition to the other sources generally 
relied upon, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have been used to interpret the 
relevant provision of the ICCPR, CAT and the CRC. 
Camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) have existed for some years, not only to 
accommodate people displaced by conflict, but also due to the 2004 Tsunami. "According to 
UNCHR, by February 2009 there were over 281.000 people internally displaced from the face of 
the conflict that began in 2006. This was in addition to a caseload of over 214.000 conflict-
displaced people from the period up to 2006 (UNOCHA CHAP, February  2009) bringing the 
number of people displaced in Sri Lanka by conflict to almost half a million."298 The Government 
has failed to protect IDPs in camps, particularly regarding physical security. In the past, there were 
continued incursions and attacks by the LTTE, disappearances and abductions and threats and 
attacks upon individuals by irregular and armed groups such as the TMVP, including infiltration of 
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camps at night. A further problem was the approaches used by security forces in response to 
security incidents, including roundups, the methods used to identify suspects, the reasons provided 
for detention and the location of some individual’s detention.299  
According to reports describing the camps during 2007, conditions within some of the camps could 
be construed as CIDT treatment.  For example, food shortages were common and family ration 
cards were arbitrarily distributed.300 Sanitation was grossly inadequate at many of the camps.301 
There were only eight latrines for 1,400 people and camp officials complained of overflowing 
toilets and cases of diarrhoea at the Arthiviravar camp in Batticaloa.302 Overcrowding was a 
problem at this same camp, Thiraimadu and at others.303 One tent was shared by 2 or 3 families and 
leaked whenever it rained.304 Other shelters were tin-roofed abodes that were scorching hot in the 
sun.305  
A specific situation emerged in the aftermath of the end of the conflict in spring 2009 which 
resulted in almost 300.000 civilians crossing to the government controlled areas from the conflict 
zone and being held for security reasons in military controlled IDP camps in the North. Current 
conditions in the camps established to meet the needs of recent IDPs are appalling. It must be 
recognized that the government was faced with a daunting practical challenge, in view of the 
numbers requiring assistance in a short period of time. Nevertheless, the conditions are avoidably 
inhuman and degrading, as reported by a number of domestic and international independent 
sources.306 There are very severe restrictions on the ability of humanitarian organizations to access 
the camps. In particular, they are not allowed to speak to any of the residents. There is severe over-
crowding, inadequate water, sanitation, food and health care. The security forces and members of 
groups for whom the State is responsible are free to wander around the camps. Many individuals are 
alleged to have been abducted. The camps are controlled by the security forces, both outside the 
camp and within. The over-riding priority is security concerns and not the meeting of humanitarian 
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needs.307 It is understood that a Constitutional Rights case has been filed with the Supreme Court on 
behalf of the IDPs in the camps.308 
 
5.2.7. Seeking a remedy 
The frequent failure to prosecute police accused of torture, CIDT and killing those in custody is due 
in part to deficiencies in internal investigations.  Complaints (other than those under the CAT Act) 
are received by the Inspector General of the Police (IGP), who selects either the Special 
Investigations Unit (SIU) or the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to carry out an internal 
investigation.309  This is likely to result in a member of the CID investigating the conduct of a close 
colleague in the police. Senior police officers with regional command responsibilities also conduct 
inquiries into allegations of torture. Investigations into serious incidents typically last 2-4 years. 
Many complaints are not investigated at all.310  Cases referred to the Attorney General seldom lead 
to convictions.311 This is due in part to the lack of evidence gathered and partly to a judiciary that 
moves cases along slowly - tolerating years of delay - because of the massive case overload.312  
Jurisdiction under the CAT Act lies with the High Court. Complaints therefore have to be addressed 
to the Attorney General’s Department (AG).313 Upon the instruction of the Attorney General, the 
Special Investigation Unit (SIU) under the supervision of the Inspector General of the Police 
conducts investigations.314 The Prosecution of Torture Perpetrators Unit (PTP), established pursuant 
to the recommendations of the UN Committee against Torture, monitors the work of the SIU and 
the CID, and is also in charge of investigation of torture cases.315 The Attorney General’s 
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Department decides on the indictment of alleged offenders on the basis of files submitted by the 
SIU and PTP.316  
Although there have been 34 indictments filed by the Attorney General under the CAT Act, these 
indictments have only led to three convictions as of October 2007.317 The emergency laws 
effectively render protections against torture and CIDT, such as the right to communicate with 
family, friends, counsel, the right not to be held in unofficial places of detention and other 
safeguards against arbitrary detention.  
 
5.2.8. Conclusion 
Whilst Sri Lanka has an impressive record in passing legislation to criminalise torture and to 
provide safeguards against torture and CIDT, in practice such treatment remains "widespread".318 
This is in part because the PTA and ER are not subject to the legislative protections. In addition, 
such protections as do exist in legislation appear to be routinely ignored in practice. Many 
complaints of proscribed ill-treatment are not referred to judicial authorities owing to a fear of the 
consequences and lack of faith in the effectiveness of the remedies. Where complaints are made, 
they are investigated neither effectively nor expeditiously. Whilst some proceedings have been 
successful, these have been principally Constitutional proceedings to the benefit of the victim, 
rather than criminal proceedings against alleged perpetrators. In these circumstances, it is not 
surprising that the proceedings do not appear to have had a deterrent effect on the commission of 
torture or CIDT. There is a prevailing climate of impunity for this human rights violation. The 
prohibition of torture and CIDT is not implemented in practice in Sri Lanka. 
 
5.3. Arrest and detention 
 
5.3.1. International standard 
Article 9 of the ICCPR states that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person and that 
no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention.  Any deprivation of this right must be based 
on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law (Article 9(1)).  
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At the time of a person’s arrest, he must be informed of the reasons for his arrest and promptly 
informed of the charges (Article 9(2)).  Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must also 
be promptly brought before a judge and given a trial within a reasonable amount of time (Article 
9(3)). Article 9(4) gives every person arrested and detained the right to challenge the lawfulness of 
his detention. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation (Article 9(5)).  
Article 10(1) of the ICCPR states that everyone arrested and detained shall be treated with humanity 
and dignity.  Accused persons must be segregated from convicted detainees and accused children 
must be segregated from adults in detention (Article 10(2)(a) and (b) respectively).   
Articles 9 and 10 of the Covenant are potentially derogable.319 It is not clear whether administrative 
detention or internment is compatible with the prohibition of arbitrary detention.320 This could be 
important as Sri Lanka has derogated from Articles 9(2) and 9(3) but not from Article 9(1). Whilst 
Articles 9 and 10 are potentially derogable, this does not mean that a State is free to disregard the 
essence of the right. It would appear from General Comment No. 29 that the Human Rights 
Committee would be unlikely to find it justifiable for a State to tell a detainee nothing of the 
charges against him or to exclude all possibility of review of the lawfulness of detention or, in the 
case of criminal detainees, for a trial to be indefinitely prolonged. Some modification of the 
normally applicable domestic provisions on account of the emergency would clearly be legitimate. 
For the purposes of this Report, it will be assumed that administrative detention is potentially 
lawful, even without derogation from Article 9(1) in situations of emergency but that there is a 
requirement that it be invoked only where necessary and in a proportionate manner.321 
 
5.3.2. Domestic implementation 
Constitutional safeguards relating to arrest and detention include Article 13 of the Constitution 
which foresees a number of fundamental safeguards, such as freedom from arbitrary arrest (Article 
13(1)) and the right to be informed of reasons for arrest. Article 13(2) stipulates that ‘every person 
held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal liberty shall be brought before the judge 
of the nearest competent court according to the procedure established by law, and shall not be 
further held in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty except upon and in terms of the 
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order of such judge made in accordance with the procedure established by law.’ Article 15 prohibits 
any limitation of this right in times of public emergency. However, it provides for the possibility of 
restriction of the safeguards and rights granted above in the interests of national security, public 
order and the protection of public health or morality.322  
As discussed above, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) relating to arrest and detention 
potentially safeguards the integrity of a person arrested or detained. However, many of the 
protections in the CCP do not apply in cases of detention under the Emergency Regulations (See 
above, Section 5.2.2, Domestic implementation on Torture and see Section 3.1.6. on Emergency 
Regulations) 
The ER 2005 confers powers of arrest, detention, search and seizure, and reduces legal rights during 
trial. The Regulations expand admissibility of confessions by allowing those made to senior police 
officers to be entered into evidence in court contrary to the Evidence Order. In effect, the 
Regulations short circuit judicial scrutiny and supervision provided in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  ER 2005 was properly enacted but it does not meet international legal standards with 
regard to arrest and detention. While criminal laws, specifically the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA) and Emergency Regulations (ER), all contain some procedural safeguards and check and 
balances, they are either not functioning effectively or being disregarded. 
The Prevention and Prohibition of Terrorism and Specified Terrorism Activities, No. 7 of 2006 
allows for the criminalization of a range of peaceful activities that are lawful under Sri Lankan and 
international law, as a result of the activities identified in regulations 6, 7 and 8 and the definition of 
terrorism in Regulation 20.323 This regulation contains an immunity clause for any government 
official for any action taken under the ER 2005 so long as they acted in good faith and within the 
discharge of their duties (Regulation 19).   
According to the Presidential Directive of 7 July 2006, on Protecting Fundamental Rights of 
Persons Arrested and/or Detained which addresses detention by the security forces generally, no 
person shall be arrested or detained under any Emergency Regulation or the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act No. 49 of 1979, except in accordance with the law and proper procedure and by a 
person who is authorized by law to make such an arrest or order such detention; the person making 
the arrest or detention should identify himself by name and rank, to the person or relative or friend 
of the person to be arrested; the person to be arrested should be informed of the reason for the 
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arrest; all details of the arrest should be documented in the manner specified by the Ministry of 
Defence; the person being arrested should be allowed to make contact with family or friends to 
inform them of his whereabouts; when a child under 18 years of age or a woman is being arrested or 
detained, a person of their choice should be allowed to accompany them to the place of questioning; 
as far as possible, any such child or woman arrested or detained should be placed in the custody of a 
Women’s Unit of the Armed Forces or Police or in the custody of another woman military or police 
officer; the person arrested or detained should be allowed to make a statement in the language of his 
choice and then asked to sign the statement; if he wishes to make a statement in his own 
handwriting it should be permitted; members of the NHRC or anyone authorized by it must be 
given access to the arrested or detained person and should be permitted to enter at any time, any 
place of detention, police station or any other place in which such a person in confined; and the 
NHRC must be informed within 48 hours of any arrest or detention and the place the person is 
being detained. This Directive was reissued on April 12, 2007.  As already noted at the end of 
section 5.2.2., according to Human Rights Watch "The fact the president had to issue them [the 
Directives] twice suggests that members of the military and police were frequently violating the law 
and that the government lacked the will to hold those responsible for abuses accountable. Without 
concrete action, including prosecutions of those arbitrarily arrested by the security forces, the 
directives appear aimed more at assuaging international opinion than holding accountable police 
and soldiers who commit crimes."324 
 
5.3.3. Duration of detention 
There is a problem of excessively prolonged detention by police under Emergency Regulations and 
a lack of safeguards for those detained under them.325  Information regarding the numbers of those 
arrested and detained under Emergency regulations and the status of those detained is rarely made 
available.326 Journalists, newspaper operators and political opponents have been arrested and 
detained under Emergency Regulations sometimes without charge or have been falsely accused of 
being a ‘terrorist’ for reporting the ‘wrong stories’ typically involving police, military or 
                                                          
324 Ibid. 
325 Address by Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6th Session of the Human Rights Council, 
Geneva, 11 December 2007;  Report of the  Special Rapporteur on torture; International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s 
Human Rights Crisis, p. 13; AHRC, State of Human Rights in Eleven Asian Nations,  p. 302. 
326 Minority Rights Group International Report, p. 4-5; AHRC, State of Human Rights in Eleven Asian Nations, p. 302. 
 73 
government officials.327 The case of the arrest of journalist J. S. Tissainayagam in March 2008 is a 
case in point which will be referred to in more details in a later section. The Emergency Regulations 
have also been used by the police to target Tamils via searches, arrests, and detention.328  Mass 
arrests are also a problem and the Supreme Court has tried to curtail them but the practice continues 
regardless of their rulings.329 Only a limited number of cases have been submitted to the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. In the majority of cases, the Sri Lankan government 
responded to the communication of the Working Group. In every case referred to it, the Working 
Group found the detention to be arbitrary.330 
Police operations during armed conflict were subject to emergency legislation that permitted 
prolonged detention without habeas corpus and admission of evidence of confessions that would 
not be admissible under ordinary rules of evidence.331 Many police officers are accustomed to 
‘investigating’ by forcibly extracting confessions and to operating without meaningful disciplinary 
procedures or judicial review.332  
In eastern Sri Lanka, families who have returned home whose children were formally associated 
with the LTTE are targeted and requested to report to the TMVP offices with their children.333  
There are reports the TMVP refused to release these children, claiming that they were holding them 
for questioning but in some instances this resulted in their recruitment into the TMVP. The 
TMVP/Karuna faction reportedly rounded up individuals (including children) and ‘arrested’ them 
on suspicion of being associated with or in support of the LTTE.’ When they were informed by 
UNICEF that they did not have authority to ‘arrest’ individuals, the group responded that it had in 
fact ‘arrested’ people but would either release them or hand them over to Sri Lankan Police.334 In 
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October 2007, a representative from the office of the TMVP in Trincomalee stated that the group no 
longer detained persons and that previously they had only taken individuals into custody for two 
days for questioning. However, this same representative stated that TMVP personnel were immune 
from arrest and searches by virtue of possessing a TMVP membership identity card that was issued 
by the TMVP. The card was said to be officially recognized by the police and armed forces.335  
More recently, UNHCR continues to report arbitrary detentions and abductions in the East of the 
country by the TMVP.336 
On 12 September 2006 new emergency regulations were put in place by the President appointing a 
Secretary of Justice as ‘Commissioner of Rehabilitation’ to oversee ‘protective accommodation and 
rehabilitation centres’ for persons separated from armed groups where they were to receive training 
and rehabilitation prior to their release.337 Subsequently, 200 persons including children sought this 
special protection and surrendered to Sri Lankan security forces. They were then held in Jaffna, 
Kandy and Pallekele Prisons and children were detained in the same cells as adults.338 There is an 
absence of clear procedures for the treatment of formerly recruited children who come within the 
custody of Sri Lankan security forces.339 The Government maintained that Sri Lankan armed forces 
no longer had the authority to detain persons and were obligated to immediately hand over any 
arrested persons to the police.340  
Prison visits by government officials or by the NHRC are being undertaken but do not extend to 
unpublished and unofficial places of detention authorized under the emergency regulations.341 
 
5.3.4. Detention in the camps 
Individuals have been detained in two types of camp: counter-terrorism detention camps and IDP 
camps. Emergency Regulations were also used by government armed forces to establish and detain 
predominately Tamils in ‘special counter-terrorism detention centres.’342 For example, one of these 
camps was set up in Boosa, a southern town in Galle. Only limited information about these centres 
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was available.343 In this camp alone, there were 118 people (predominately Tamils) detained 
without charge.344 Owing to the limited amount of information, it is not clear for how long 
detainees are held in such camps, whether they have access to independent third parties, such as 
doctors and lawyers, and to what conditions of detention they are subjected.   
During and following the fighting in the East of the country, camps were established for internally 
displaced people (IDPs). Whilst the conditions in and around the camps were not problem-free, 
people were generally free to live with family and friends and were not forced to live in the camps. 
Whilst there were difficulties in ensuring that the IDPs had access to their livelihoods, some of 
those in the camps were able to leave them for work. There was a significant level of return by IDPs 
to homes in the East from 2007 onwards, although again the circumstances of return and the 
conditions that awaited them were not problem-free.345 That is in dramatic contrast to the camps 
that have been established to deal with IDPs who fled the fighting in the North in 2008 and 2009. 
In 2009, massive numbers of displaced people have been housed in camps after they fled the 
conflict. The camps are surrounded and detainees do not have the right to leave the camps (e.g. to 
live with friends or relatives) or even to move between different parts of the same camp. Even 
family reunification within the camps is proving very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. The 
security forces not only provide perimeter security but manage the camps.346 No one can enter 
without their permission. It is reported that members of armed groups associated with the 
government wander round the camps in plain-clothes. Those in the camps are, in effect, deprived of 
their liberty. To all intents and purposes, they are interned. It is not clear whether there is any basis 
in Sri Lankan law for mass internment and, in particular, whether they are detained under the 
Emergency Regulations. It is not clear whether the Sri Lankan government regards them as being 
detained. If not, that is a novel form of unacknowledged detention. It is not that the detention of a 
specific individual is denied. It is the fact of the detention itself which would be denied. 
Whilst the huge practical challenge which faced the government has to be taken into account, the 
need to screen some IDPs and the need to provide food, water, sanitation, shelter and health care 
was foreseeable. The government had previously had to run camps, albeit on a much smaller scale, 
to deal with those displaced by the fighting in the East of Sri Lanka. Even internment powers have 
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to be used against individuals, rather than whole populations, on account of the risk possibly posed 
by specific individuals. Mass internment is not a lawful solution to the genuine need to screen IDPs 
in order to seek out former LTTE members. That is aggravated by the conditions in the camps, 
which may, in part, be the result of them being under the control of the military, whose only priority 
appears to be security, rather than civilians whose priority would be the meeting of humanitarian 
needs. Internees should, at least, be able to expect personal security. It is reported that persons have 
disappeared from within the camps, presumably at the hands of the security forces and those 
allowed to wander around freely.347 
 
5.3.5. Seeking redress 
Article 17 of the Constitution entitles every person to a remedy for the infringement of fundamental 
rights by State action.  Additionally, Article 126(2) states that "any person [who] alleges that any 
such fundamental right … has been infringed … may … apply to the Supreme Court … praying for 
relief or redress in respect of such infringement." In granting relief, the Supreme Court has 
construed the relevant constitutional provisions as containing the right to compensation.348  
Compensation cannot be claimed as part of criminal proceedings, however, in cases related to 
Article 321, PC (‘intentionally causing harm’), Magistrate courts may award compensation to be 
paid by the offender when the Court refrains from imposing a prison sentence or from a proceeding 
to conviction (Article 17(4), CCP). 
However, Section 26 of PTA 2002 states: "No suit, prosecution or other proceeding, civil or 
criminal, shall lie against any officer or person for any act or thing in good faith done or purported 
to be done in pursuance or supposed pursuance of any order made or direction given under the act." 
Although the PTA was suspended in 2002, it was reintroduced under the Emergency Regulations. 
Thus it seems that the abovementioned avenues of redress or compensation have been effectively 
rendered inoperable under the Emergency Regulations.  Since no remedies exist under the 
emergency laws and the Criminal Code for unlawful detention, the local magistrate courts and the 
provincial high courts are unable to order compensation for such offences.349  Although habeas 
corpus is available in the high courts, it is rarely successful in gaining releases and initial review of 
                                                          
347 See, for example, BBC report "Dolphin van scare in Vavunyia camps", 24 August 2009, available at 
http://bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2009/08/090824_idp_vans.shtml. 
348 Saman v. Leeladasa and Another, S.C. Application No. 4/88, 6 and October 1988. The right to compensation for 
unlawful detention is provided for in Article 9(5), from which Sri Lanka has not derogated.  
349 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s Judiciary: Politicised Courts, Compromised Rights, Asia Report N°172, 
Executive Summary, 30 June 2009.  
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detention decisions by magistrates is superficial.350 Although relief for arbitrary arrest and detention 
can ‘technically’ be found by filing a "fundamental rights" application in the Supreme Court; 
distance, difficulty of travel, (especially for Tamil litigants) and the cost of hiring one of the limited 
number of Colombo-based Supreme Court lawyers create impassable barriers for most litigants.351 
A constitutional fundamental rights case has been filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of those 
interned in the camps. 
 
5.3.6. Conclusion 
Some of the safeguards attaching to arrest and detention in "normal" circumstances are recognised 
in legislation in Sri Lanka. There are nevertheless certain missing protections. The operation in 
practice of the safeguards appears to be problematic and there appears to be no means in practice of 
obtaining effective redress, save, on occasion, from the Supreme Court.  
A more significant problem is detention related to the emergency. The powers of detention result in 
both arbitrary arrests and mass detention and there appears to be no effective possibility of review 
of lawfulness. Virtually all safeguards against arbitrariness are missing, together with safeguards 
against the risk of ill-treatment. The prohibition of arbitrary detention is not implemented in Sri 
Lanka, particularly in relation to detention under Emergency Powers. 
 
5.4. Disappearances 
 
5.4.1. International standard 
The UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearances describes "disappeared" persons as those who are 
"arrested, detained, or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of liberty by government 
officials, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the direct or 
indirect support, consent, or acquiescence of the government, followed by a refusal to disclose the 
fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their 
liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law."352  Disappearances are a 
violation of the right to due process, liberty and security of a person, and to freedom from torture. 
                                                          
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances, Preamble. 
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The Declaration also contains a number of provisions aimed at preventing "disappearances," by 
stipulating that detainees must be held in officially recognized places of detention, of which their 
families must be promptly informed; that they must have access to a lawyer; and that each detention 
facility must maintain an official up-to-date register of all persons deprived of their liberty.  
Enforced disappearances constitute "a multiple human rights violation."353 They potentially violate 
the right to life, the prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the right to 
liberty and security of the person, and the right to a fair and public trial.354 They represent the 
ultimate violation of the prohibition of arbitrary detention since, by virtue of the denial of detention, 
the disappeared person is denied all protection of the law. 
A disappearance is a violation not only of the rights of the missing person but also constitutes 
inhuman treatment for the next-of-kin. 
Sri Lanka has a duty to investigate serious violations of human rights and to punish the perpetrators 
under international law.355 States are obligated to criminalize enforced disappearances and to 
prosecute any person who commits, orders, attempts to commit, or otherwise participates in an 
enforced disappearance, or has responsibility as a superior.356 
                                                          
353 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted January 8, 2002, by Mr. Manfred Nowak, 
independent expert charged with examining the existing international criminal and human rights framework for the 
protection of persons from enforced or involuntary disappearance, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Commission Resolution 
2001/46, 2002, E/CN.4/2002/71, p. 36. 
354 Under the ICCPR, no one should be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. An arrested person should be 
informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and is to be promptly informed of any charges against him. 
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge must be brought in a timely fashion before a judge or other officer 
authorized by law to exercise judicial power, and every person deprived of his or her liberty by arrest or detention has 
the right "to take proceedings before a court, in order that the court may deicide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful." ICCPR, Article 9(4). Further protections are offered by 
Article 6 (the right to life), Article 7 (prohibition of torture), and Article 17 (protection from arbitrary interference with 
privacy, family and home). The rights under Articles 9 and 17 are derogable during public emergencies, but even then 
the derogation should be proportional and subject to judicial control. States must provide careful justification for any 
specific measures based on a proclamation of a national emergency. The principles of legality and the rule of law 
require that the fundamental requirements of a fair trial be respected even under Emergency Regulations. UN Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
(2001), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 186 (2003). 
355 ICCPR Article 2, CAT Articles 4, 5, and 7. Where enforced disappearances constitute a widespread or systematic 
attack against the civilian population, they may constitute a crime against humanity, Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, Article 7(1)(i). 
356 Independent expert Manfred Nowak in his 2002 report on "disappearances" to the UN Commission on Human 
Rights stated: "As the [UN] Human Rights Committee rightly concluded, in the case of particularly serious human 
rights violations, such as enforced disappearances, justice means criminal justice, and purely disciplinary and 
administrative remedies cannot be deemed to provide sufficient satisfaction to the victims. Perpetrators of enforced 
disappearance should, therefore, not benefit from amnesty laws or similar measures." United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, Report submitted January 8, 2002, by Mr. Manfred Nowak, independent expert charged with examining 
the existing international criminal and human rights framework for the protection of persons from enforced or 
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The State has an obligation to ensure that persons having knowledge of an enforced disappearance 
have the right "to complain to a competent and independent State authority and to have that 
complaint promptly, thoroughly and impartially investigated by that authority."357 The state should 
promptly refer the matter to the appropriate authority for investigation whenever there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that an enforced disappearance has been committed even in the 
absence of a complaint. Any person alleged to have perpetrated an act of enforced disappearance 
should to be brought before competent civil authorities for the purpose of prosecution and trial 
when the facts support the allegation.358 
Disappearances are deemed to be a continuing offence so long as the state continues to conceal the 
fate or the whereabouts of the "disappeared" person. The obligation to carry out an effective 
investigation into an alleged disappearance is also a continuing obligation.   
The ICCPR requires states to provide an "effective remedy" for violations of rights and freedoms 
and to enforce such remedies.359 The HRC has stated that "reparation can involve restitution, 
rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees 
of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the 
perpetrators of human rights violations."360  
 
5.4.2. Domestic implementation  
Sri Lanka’s Constitution meets international standards by guaranteeing fundamental human rights, 
including the right to liberty, and security of person, the right to a fair trial, and the prohibition 
against torture. However, the Emergency Regulations have superseded its protections.361 ER 2005 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
involuntary disappearance, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Commission resolution 2001/46" (New York: United Nations, 
2002), E/CN.4/2002/71. 
357 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances. This includes possible disappearances at 
the hands of non-State actors. See also Convention against Enforced Disappearances, Article 3. 
358 Ibid., Articles 13 and 14. 
359 General Comment No. 31, op. cit. 
360 General Comment No. 31, op. cit. 
361 The emergency regulations have consistently deviated from international standards, such as the ICCPR and the 
Convention against Torture. Specifically, on their face and in practice the emergency regulations are in conflict with 
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, Article 6 of the ICCPR on the inherent right to life and freedom from arbitrary deprivation of 
life, Article 7 on the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR on the rights of liberty and security and the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention, Article 9(2) ICCPR on 
the right to be informed on the reason for one’s arrest, Article 9(3) of the ICCPR on the right to be promptly produced 
before a judge, Article 9(4) on the right to take proceedings before a court, Article 9(5)of the ICCPR on the entitling of 
a victim of a human rights violation to compensation and Article 14 on the right to a fair trial. While, as mentioned 
above, Sri Lanka on several occasions submitted its derogations from ICCPR to the UN Secretary-General, it often 
failed to indicate the specific provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons for the derogation. See "The State 
of Civil and Political Rights in Sri Lanka," Asian Centre for Human Rights, December 2003; Reports by the Sri Lanka 
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enables security forces to arrest without a warrant any person "acting in any manner prejudicial to 
the national security or to the maintenance of public order, or to the maintenance of essential 
services." The term "prejudicial to the national security" is not further defined.362  The PTA was 
suspended in 2002; however, it is still in force through the Emergency Regulations and § 9(1) still 
applies. This section allows for the detention of persons under a detention order (DO) for a period 
of ‘three months in the first instance, in such place and subject to such conditions as may be 
determined by the Minister’ and renewable for up to 18 months. Although the PTA was temporarily 
suspended in 2002 after the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) was agreed upon, it was reintroduced 
under the Emergency Regulations. ER 2005 does not require officials to publish a list of authorized 
places of detention, in violation of international standards. 
 
5.4.3. Pattern of uninvestigated disappearances 
Sri Lanka has a history of disappearances during the armed conflict. Commissions have 
documented how thousands of people have been kidnapped by armed men. Disappearances appear 
to have been treated by the state as a legitimate means of warfare.363  The victims largely belong to 
the minority Tamil community, but youths from the Sinhala community disappeared during the JVP 
insurgency as well.364  In the late 1980s, Sri Lanka suffered tens of thousands of disappearances.365 
Many are still unaccounted for.366 That remains relevant in the period 2005 – 2009 owing to the 
continuing character of the violation and the continuing obligation to investigate. As of October 
2006, the ICRC had received more than 350 reports of disappearances.367 The Sri Lankan National 
Human Rights Commission logged 419 such complaints from December 2005 to September 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal and Disappearance of Certain Persons and by the UN Working Group 
on Disappearances concluded that emergency laws were among the key reasons contributing to the spree of 
disappearances in the 1990s. See "Final Report of the Commission Of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal and 
Disappearance of Certain Persons (All Island)," 2001, http://www.disappearances.org/news/mainfile.php/frep_sl_ai/; 
UN Commission on Human Rights, "Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Civil 
and Political Rights, Including Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions: Report on the Visit to Sri Lanka 
by a Member of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances," E /CN.4 /Add.1/2000/64 (1999). 
362 Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, The Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka Extraordinary, No.1405/14, August 13, 2005, Regulation 19. 
363 AHRC Statement, Sri Lanka: White vans without number plates; the symbol of disappearances reappear, September 
13, 2006, available at: http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2006statements/729/.  
364 Somini Sengupta, Specter of kidnappings returns to torment Sri Lanka - Asia - Pacific - International Herald 
Tribune, October 31, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/31/world/asia/31iht-
lanka.3348712.html?_r=1.  
365 Ibid. 
366 Ibid. 
367 Ibid. 
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2006.368 A private advocacy group, Home for Human Rights, documented 203 cases of missing 
people in the first nine months of 2006, using newspaper clippings and other reports. It listed 
another 965 victims of extrajudicial killings, some of whom may also have been abducted.369 
Sri Lanka has among the highest number of new cases in the world since 2006 and incidents of 
abductions and disappearances are carried out by State, non-state actors and opposition groups.370  
More than 1,500 people were reported missing from December 2005-December 2007.371  Some are 
known to have been killed while others were found in detention; however, the majority remains 
unaccounted for. During periods of armed conflict, it may obviously be difficult to determine 
whether a missing person has been "disappeared" or killed in the fighting. International 
humanitarian law contains provisions on the need to seek for the missing at the close of each 
military engagement. The NHRC does not publicize its data on ‘disappearances’ but Human Rights 
Watch learned there were 1,000 cases reported to the NHRC in 2006 alone and over 300 cases 
within the first 4 months of 2007. There is a pattern of enforced disappearances in the capital, 
Colombo.372 On 11 June 2008, the UN Working Group on Disappearances reported that "In the past 
two months alone, the Working Group has sent 22 urgent actions to the Government. Out of those 
cases, 18 disappearances took place in May. The Working Group is also concerned that both 
women and humanitarian aid workers are being targeted".373 
The NHRC ceased providing statistics on forced disappearances by state security forces, pro-
government paramilitary groups or the LTTE allegedly due to pressure from the government.374 In 
March 2008, Human Rights Watch provided documentation on several hundred cases compiled by 
                                                          
368 Ibid. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Human Rights Watch, Recurring Nightmare; Statement from Santiago Corcuera Cabezut, Chair-Rapporteur of the 
UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance, 10 March 2008; International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s 
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371 Address by Ms. Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 6th Session of the Human Rights 
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373 UN Press release, United Nations Expert Group deplores recent wave of disappearances in Sri Lanka, 11 June 2008, 
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374 Human Rights Watch, Recurring Nightmare. 
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local human rights groups since mid-2006.375 The number of disappearances increased throughout 
2008 by more than 500 cases after a brief decline in mid-2007.376 On 8 November 2008 the 
chairman of the Presidential Commission on Disappearances, retired High Court Judge Mahanama 
Tilakaratne, stated that 886 persons missing or abducted in the past two years were still 
unaccounted for.377 The greatest concentration of disappearances during 2008 occurred in Vavuniya 
and the Eastern Province.378 The HRW report concluded that a crucial factor was "the systemic 
impunity enjoyed by members of the security forces and pro-government armed groups for abuses 
they commit."379 
 
5.4.4. Pattern of "abductions" followed by subsequent recognition that the individual is detained 
It is alleged that, in a significant number of cases, persons are effectively kidnapped and, after a 
certain period of time has elapsed, they appear in detention. At the time they were detained, they 
were denied the protection of the law. Even if their detention is acknowledged subsequently, they 
are disappeared persons from the time of being detained until the detention is acknowledged. The 
fact that they are subsequently found in State detention, strongly suggests that the State was 
implicated in their original disappearance.380 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
375 Ibid. The appendix to this report contains a detailed description of 99 cases documented by Human Rights Watch. A 
list of 498 additional cases documented by Sri Lankan human rights groups is available at: 
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377 See ibid., p. 41-2: "On June 28, 2007, the chairman of the Presidential Commission on abductions, disappearances, 
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5.4.5. Other disappearances where there is evidence that State agents or persons for whom the 
State is responsible are implicated 
Abductions for ransom and other reasons have targeted both Tamils and Muslims in the capital.381 
Abductions for ransom are primarily utilized to fund the TMVP.382  Disappearances also appear to 
be part of the government’s counter-insurgency strategy.383 Many killings and disappearances take 
place inside high security zones and during curfew hours.384 This suggests that at least some may 
have been committed by people working directly with or with the consent of the security forces, in 
particular the Sri Lanka army.385 Many of those reported missing were abducted by either the LTTE 
or the TMVP as a means of forcible recruitment, particularly the abduction of children.386 
According to a Presidential Commission report, certain sectors of the population are 
disproportionately affected by disappearances and killings, with males under the age of 30 in Jaffna 
and Colombo comprising the majority of disappearances and killings.387 Other studies confirm this 
trend and reflect that a disproportionate number of those abducted or disappeared are Tamils.388 
A report issued on 10 January 2008 by the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary 
Disappearances reported cases examined by the Working Group between November 2006 and 
November 2007. In the report, it is stated that the Sri Lankan army and the Criminal Investigation 
Department were allegedly responsible for a large number of the cases. Other possible perpetrators 
include the Sri Lankans security forces, the police and the Karuna Group. According to the report 
there is a growing culture of impunity for perpetrators of enforced disappearances, as the 
Government is not taking effective steps to bring rising numbers of disappearances under control. 
The path to achieving justice for the victims and their families is reportedly long and arduous, with 
delays and interferences by high officials in investigations and inquiries, as well as threats to 
witnesses and family members.389 
There is no evidence that any measures have been implemented by the police or security forces to 
secure the release of children abducted, recruited and used by TMVP/Karuna faction despite clear 
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knowledge that it is taking place.390 The lines between politically motivated ‘disappearances’ and 
abductions for ransom are blurred.391 There have also been numerous cases of child abductions by 
Karuna forces (and the LTTE) from IDP camps.392 However, the LTTE and the TMVP, on behalf 
on its military wing Karuna, agreed with UNICEF to release abducted children within their ranks, 
with the objective of completing that process by 1 January 2007.393 As of September 2007, LTTE 
and TMVP continued to abduct children.394 In spite of the LTTE signing the ‘Action Plan’ on 15 
October 2007 regarding the concerns mentioned above, the TMVP/Karuna faction continued to 
abduct children for the purposes of recruitment.395 Sri Lankan security forces are complicit in the 
abduction of children by the Karuna faction and at least some elements of the security forces have 
facilitated and sometimes participated in those abductions.396 The complicity of certain security 
forces in the abductions is common knowledge in the eastern area.397 
The government responds extremely negatively to any criticism by issuing threats, particularly 
against international monitors, NGOs and journalists.398 International reports indicate continued and 
well-documented allegations of widespread abductions and disappearances mainly committed by 
the State’s police and armed forces. Allegations are not promptly or impartially investigated.399 
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5.4.6. Seeking redress 
Various agencies receive information about missing persons. The government of Sri Lanka has 
complained that this results in confusion with regard to numbers and an accurate indication of the 
identity of the missing. Save in the case of those who disappear and are subsequently acknowledged 
to be in detention, very few cases are elucidated and virtually no prosecutions have been brought for 
participation in a disappearance. 
Aside from the NHRC, the government has created at least nine special bodies to address human 
rights violations including ‘disappearances’ and abductions but thus far, all of them have failed to 
deter or stop these and other human rights violations.400  To the contrary, they appear to serve as a 
means for the government falsely to claim that it is taking steps to improve human rights in the face 
of the increasing number of those abducted and/or ‘disappeared.’401  
 
5.4.7. Conclusion 
Sri Lanka has failed to implement its obligation to prevent enforced disappearances by State agents 
and other forces for which it is responsible. Indeed such forces are implicated in the dramatic 
increase in disappearances between 2005 and 2009. It has also failed to prevent disappearances at 
the hands of third parties. It has also failed to implement its obligation to carry out effective 
investigations into alleged disappearances. The completely inadequate investigations result in 
complete or virtually complete impunity.  
 
5.5. Freedom of movement 
 
5.5.1. International standard 
ICCPR Article 12 provides that any person lawfully within the territory of a State has the right of 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. The right can be subject to restrictions 
but only if they are provided by law, necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the 
other rights recognized in the Covenant. Any restriction has to be on one of the grounds listed and 
                                                          
400 Human Rights Watch, UPR Submission, Sri Lanka, February 2008, available at 
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has to be both necessary and proportionate. In General Comment No. 27, the HRC stated that 
Articles 12 and 13 are closely linked.402 It emphasized that the possible limitations are exceptional. 
The law itself has to establish the conditions under which the rights may be limited. Article 12(3) 
clearly indicates that it is not sufficient that the restrictions serve the permissible purposes; they 
must also be necessary to protect them. Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of 
proportionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least 
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result; and they must be 
proportionate to the interest to be protected. The principle of proportionality has to be respected not 
only in the law that frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial authorities in 
applying the law. States should ensure that any proceedings relating to the exercise or restriction of 
these rights are expeditious and that reasons for the application of restrictive measures are provided. 
Restrictions should use precise criteria and should not confer unfettered discretion on those who 
implement them. The application of the restrictions permissible under Article 12(3) needs to be 
consistent with the other rights guaranteed in the Covenant and with the fundamental principles of 
equality and non-discrimination. Thus, it would be a clear violation of the Covenant if the rights 
enshrined in Article 12(1) and (2), were restricted by making distinctions of any kind, such as on 
the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.  
The relevant provisions of customary LOAC/IHL are superficially different. In fact, when one 
considers the situation which they are designed to address, there is no real difference. The right to 
be free to move around a country must also include the right not to move unless one wishes to do 
so. LOAC/IHL is designed to address the more common problem in situations of armed conflict. It 
imposes restrictions on the ability to oblige people to move on account of the conflict. The ICRC’s 
study of Customary International Humanitarian Law suggests that displacement can only be ordered 
when the security of the civilians or imperative military reasons so require.403 All possible measures 
must be taken to ensure that displaced civilians are received in satisfactory conditions of shelter, 
hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. Members of the same family should not be separated.404 
Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual 
residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist.405 
                                                          
402 General Comment No.27, Freedom of Movement, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 1999. 
403 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, op. cit., Rule 129. 
404 Ibid., Rule 131. 
405 Ibid., Rule 132. 
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When interpreting the provisions of human rights law on freedom of movement, account should be 
taken of these customary LOAC/IHL principles. 
 
5.5.2. Domestic legislation 
Article 14(1)(h) of the Constitution gives all citizens freedom of movement and freedom to choose 
a place of residence in Sri Lanka. Article 15(6) and (7) establishes the grounds on which limitations 
may be placed on the exercise of the right. The ER 2005, under Regulations 12, 14(1) and 18(1) 
allow for the imposition of specific restrictions, either by reference to the place or the individual. 
Section 18 of the PSO allows for broad restrictions to be imposed on freedom of movement. 
Specific Emergency Regulations establish a variety of special zones, such as "High Security 
Zones", "Prohibited Zones" and "Restricted Zones" 
 
5.5.3. Freedom of movement in practice 
Tamils, especially those from the North, cannot leave their areas without permission in writing from 
the security forces which restricts freedom of movement.406 Permission is required to enter security 
areas.407 The rules and procedures for such practices and for issuing permissions are arbitrary or 
impossible to discover by civilians and otherwise erratically enforced.408  It appears to be part of the 
increasing militarisation of life in the North of Sri Lanka. These restrictions prevent people both 
from moving around within an area and also from leaving the area to seek security. 
Mass evictions have also occurred. In 2007, the government reportedly expelled from Colombo 
hundreds of Tamils who were from the eastern and the northern regions.409  Emergency regulations 
were routinely used to cordon off particular areas within predominately Tamil neighbourhoods, and 
the Sri Lankan military would conduct searches of Tamil homes, check ID cards and set up 
stringent check points all of which inhibited their freedom of movement.410 The Supreme Court 
attempted to curtail mass evictions but they continued in spite of the Court’s rulings.411 
                                                          
406 Centre for Policy Alternatives, Monitoring Factors Affecting the Sri Lankan Peace Process, Cluster Report, Nov. 
2007- Jan. 2008, p.10-11; Feb.2008-April 2008, p.16-18; May 2008-July 2008, p. 9-10. 
407 Ibid. 
408 Ibid. 
409 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis. p. 15; Minority Rights Group International Report, p. 
4. 
410 Minority Rights Group International Report, p. 4. 
411 Ibid., p. 4-5.  
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Government forces have also restricted movement of Muslims and Tamils.  For example, the 
military allowed Muslims to return to their home adjoining High Security Zones (HSZs) but they 
faced severe restrictions on their movement which hampered their livelihood.412 Fishermen who 
make their best catches at night were not allowed to fish except during specific daylight hours and 
were only permitted access to a zone 2 km off the coast.413 Government-issued ID cards issued to 
returnees have hampered freedom of movement.414 The ID’s are additional to the standard national 
ID card and part of the Government’s anti-terror strategy. However, villagers expressed concerns 
that the additional documentation restricted family visitors, mobility and children’s access to 
education if they need to travel outside of their villages.415 In August 2006, the A9 highway linking 
the northern peninsula of Jaffna to the rest of the county was closed isolating 60,000 people and 
restrictions on farming and fishing were imposed limiting freedom of movement and putting 
civilians at risk of starvation.416  
A different aspect of the problem of freedom of movement was seen in IDP camps in 2008. A 
statement by Human Rights Watch highlighted the plight of over 400 IDPs who were ‘arbitrarily 
detained’ by the authorities. On May 10 and 11, local authorities conducted a survey in Kalimoddai 
camp to assess the wishes of displaced persons on their preferred place of residence. Out of the then 
camp population of 257, only five families indicated a wish to remain in Kalimoddai. The large 
majority indicated that they wished to leave and had alternative places to stay, including with 
nearby host families. As of July 2008, the CPA reported unconfirmed information indicates only 28 
people had been released.417 
The reverse of this problem was seen in the case of forced resettlement of IDPs in the East of Sri 
Lanka. In 2006, a battle to take over Vakarai in the Batticaloa district forced 35,000 civilian 
(including children, elderly and the sick) to make long and dangerous journeys to government 
controlled areas.418  Continued fighting from 2006-2007 forced thousands of more civilians to flee 
and the government began a massive drive of forced resettlement in violation of UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement—Principles 14 & 15.419 The government also forcibly returned 
                                                          
412 Ibid., p. 3. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Centre for Policy Alternatives, Monitoring Factors Affecting the Sri Lankan Peace Process, Cluster Report, May 
2008-July 2008, p.10, citing Human Rights Watch, Press Release, by Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights 
Watch, UK: Abusive Ex-Commander Allowed to Return to Sri Lanka, 2 July 2008. 
418 AHRC, State of Human Rights in Eleven Asian Nations, p. 310-313. 
419 Ibid., p. 311. 
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15,000-25,000 in September 2006 and another wave of forced returns occurred in March 2007.420 
IDPs were threatened by the government and military officials that humanitarian aid, water and 
electricity would be cut off if they refused to return to their homes.421 There were reports of the 
military threatening and beating IDPs with sticks to force them onto busses that were forcing them 
back to their homes.422 The government refused to allow humanitarian workers to accompany IDPs 
back to their places of return on ‘security grounds’ raising questions as to why IDPs were being 
returned to areas deemed ‘unsafe’ for humanitarian workers.423 
In May 2007 an area spanning 90 km in the Muttur East and Sampur areas were declared as High 
Security Zones (HSZ) and IDPs whose homes were located in this area and who had fled during the 
fighting were not allowed to return to their homes.424 However, this same area was then designated 
by the government as a ‘Special Economic Zone’ and subsequently opened to large local and 
foreign investment.425 In other words, some people were allowed to be in the zone but not the 
original inhabitants. 
Whilst the LTTE was not formally bound by human rights treaty obligations, it was bound by 
LOAC/IHL.426 The LTTE had a record of using killings to deter civilians from exercising their right 
to freedom of movement and other fundamental human rights.427  The LTTE imposed restrictions 
on the freedom of movement of civilians (including children 13 years and above), prohibiting 
people from leaving the Vanni unless they were provided with a pass. Permission to leave Vanni 
was dependent upon specific conditions, including that one family member remained in Vanni. 
Local passes were difficult to obtain. Children released by the LTTE were not provided with the 
necessary documentation to enable them to leave Vanni resulting in their inability to be reunited 
with their families.428 In one instance LTTE restrictions on movement was the direct consequence 
of the deaths of six IDPs when their boat capsized as they tried to flee Vaharai, Batticaloa, on 15 
December 2006.429 The LTTE also used civilians as human shields and prevented them from 
leaving the conflict zone.  
                                                          
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid., p. 311-312.   
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid., p. 312. 
424 Ibid. p. 314. 
425 Ibid. 
426 See 2.5 above. 
427 Statement of Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, 5 Sept. 2006. 
428 SG Report on children and armed conflict 2007, para. 5, 14-15, p. 2-3, 7, 40. 
429 Ibid., para. 35, p. 13. 
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Movement of humanitarian assistance and aid workers was also restricted by the LTTE.430 The 
detailed pass system that was implemented in January of 2007 created additional restrictions on the 
movement of humanitarian workers.431 The ‘Action Plan’ signed by the LTTE expressed 
commitments ensuring safe passage of humanitarian aid/workers but it did not meet international 
minimum standards.432   
Since the end of the conflict, a major issue has become the detention of civilians in what are, in 
effect, internment camps. The dramatic influx of people into the camps posed massive humanitarian 
challenges; huge numbers arrived within a very short period of time.  OCHA estimated that around 
20,000 people arrived in the camps in two or three days in mid-May, 2009.433 At checkpoints into 
government-controlled areas, those who were known to be or who claimed themselves to be LTTE 
cadres were taken away and are being held away from the camps. The rest of the displaced are 
being held in camps, with a view to being screened. In June 2009, the United Nations was more 
worried about the issue of freedom of movement than living conditions in camps.434 Two months 
after the conflict ended, the Government continued to hold approximately 280,000 people 
(predominately Tamils) in detention camps.435 
As discussed above (5.3.4), there appears to be no freedom of movement between different sub-
camps and the IDPs are not free to leave, even if they have family or friends with whom they could 
be accommodated. Other issues of concern include the military nature of the camps, distribution of 
identification cards to those in the camps, the lack of family reunification, and the severe limitations 
on access to the camps by humanitarian workers. 
Stringent security measures post-conflict continue throughout the country, hampering the 
movement of people and goods, adding costs to economic activities.436   
 
 
 
                                                          
430 Ibid., p. 13-15. 
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432 Ibid., para. 48, p. 16. 
433 UN News Centre, UN efforts focusing on plight of civilians in post-conflict Sri Lanka, 18 May 2009, available at 
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434 Megan Rowling, UN aid chief urges free movement for Sri Lanka's war-displaced, AlterNet, 10 June 2009, available 
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5.5.4. Seeking redress 
In the case of restrictions imposed under emergency legislation, there would appear to be no 
possibility of challenging the provisions and little or no possibility of challenging the manner of 
their implementation. It is not clear on what legal basis IDPs can be held against their will in the 
internment camps or subjected, in effect, to rule by the military. As noted above a constitutional 
fundamental rights case has been submitted to the Supreme Court on behalf of the IDPs. 
 
5.5.5. Conclusion 
Restrictions on freedom of movement are not, in and of themselves, a violation of human rights 
law. In order for the restrictions to be legitimate, they need to be necessary and to be applied in a 
reasoned, non-arbitrary and proportionate manner. The principal problem posed by the general 
restrictions on freedom of movement in Sri Lanka is that they appear to be imposed and enforced in 
an arbitrary and disproportionate manner. In relation specifically to the recently established camps, 
it must be recognised that the government does have legitimate security concerns. The screening of 
IDPs in order to identify LTTE fighters is legitimate. The mass internment of the civilian 
population in the North, however, is both arbitrary and disproportionate 
 
5.6. Freedom of assembly 
 
5.6.1. International standards 
The right of peaceful assembly has been regulated in ICCPR Article 21.437 Restrictions on that right 
if in place must be "in conformity with the law and necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others". That right is potentially derogable under Article 4. 
 
 
 
                                                          
437 The freedom of association is regulated by ICCPR Article 22 which makes reference to the ILO Convention 
Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize. On this matter see 
joint submission of European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and International Trade Union Confederation of 19 
November 2008. 
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5.6.2. Domestic implementation 
The Constitution of Sri Lanka recognizes the right of peaceful assembly.  However, according to 
Article 14(b), this right is reserved for citizens and permanent legal residents of Sri Lanka only. 
The ER 2005, part 3, control of meetings, processions, publications, firearms and right of entry,438 
provides in Regulation 13(1) that "The President may, by order, prohibit the holding of public 
processions or public meetings, or of such public processions or meetings as may be specified in 
that order in any area in Sri Lanka for such period as may be so specified, subject to such 
exemptions as may be made by that order or by any subsequent order made under this regulation 
processions and meetings". 
The Emergency Regulations were criticized during the Universal Periodic Review for Sri Lanka in 
2008. Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF) noted that the Emergency Regulation stifle media 
freedom and freedom of expression at an alarming level, and enable the President to ban any public 
meeting, procession,  or gathering which, in his opinion, threatens national security or public 
order.439 
According to the US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour 
(report concerning the situation in 2005, 8 March 8 2006),440 as far as freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association is concerned, "the law provides for freedom of assembly, and the government 
generally respected this right in practice; however, some restrictions existed. The Emergency 
Regulations enacted on August 18 give the president the power to restrict meetings, assemblies and 
processions. The law states that rallies and demonstrations of a political nature cannot be held when 
a referendum is scheduled; however, the government generally granted permits for demonstrations, 
including those by opposition parties and minority groups. On May 9, police and security forces 
fired into a crowd of rock-throwing protesters, killing 1 and injuring 15 in Batticaloa District. The 
estimated crowd of 500 was protesting the establishment of a new checkpoint. On June 10, police 
broke up a political protest in Colombo using tear gas, water cannons, and baton charges when 
protesters blockaded the presidential residence". 
 
                                                          
438 Regulations made by the President under Section 5 of the Public Security Ordinance (Chapter 40), The Gazette of 
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, No. 1405/14 –- Saturday, August  13,  2005. 
439 Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF), Submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka, 2008, p. 9. See also Joint Civil Society 
Report, joint submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p.2. 
440 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61711.htm. 
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5.6.3. Conclusion 
The law provides for freedom of association and assembly, and the government generally respected 
this right in practice. However, some restrictions exist, such as those under the ER.  Available 
information does not allow forming firm conclusions as far as an effective implementation of those 
rights is concerned. The emergency regulations have a serious negative impact on the practical 
implementation of the right to assembly. 
 
5.7. Freedom of expression  
 
5.7.1. International standards 
Freedom of expression regulated in ICCPR Article 19 is a cornerstone of democratic society. 
Article 19(2) requires protection of the right to freedom of expression, which includes not only 
freedom to "impart information and ideas of all kinds", but also freedom to "seek" and "receive" 
them "regardless of frontiers" and in whatever medium, "either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of his choice".  Article 20(2) prohibits "advocacy of 
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence". 
 
5.7.2. Domestic implementation 
Sri Lankan law guarantees freedom of the press and freedom of speech (Articles 10, 14(1)(a) of the 
Constitution). However, the ER 2005 Regulations 18, 28, 29 and 33, the ER 2006 Regulation 9 and 
the PTA enable the Government to enact regulations restricting freedom of expression, assembly 
and association. Analysis of those regulations presented by the International Commission of Jurists 
show that "these emergency regulations are so broadly defined that it is difficult for a person to 
know whether or not they are committing an offence. This creates pre-conditions for self-censorship 
and a chilling effect on free and open debate."441 Emergency regulations go far beyond permitted 
restrictions of the freedom of media. In particular they fail to distinguish between information that 
could threaten national security and the legitimate expression of controversial ideas. 
                                                          
441 International Commission of Jurists, Sri Lanka: briefing paper, Emergency Laws and international standards, March 
2009, p. 25-26. 
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The case of journalist J. S. Tissainayagam, an ethnic Tamil columnist with the Sunday Times 
newspaper and editor of the Outreach website, who was arrested by the police Terrorist 
Investigation Division (TID) on 7 March 2008 is particularly significant.442 Following his arrest Mr 
Tissainayagam was detained for more than five months without charge, and following charge, for a 
further year before his trial in August 2009. Mr Tissainayagam was convicted on 31 August 2009 of 
two charges inciting racial disharmony/communal violence under the PTA through writing and 
publishing two articles in the North Eastern Monthly magazine at the time where the Cease-Fire 
Agreement was in force. He was convicted on a further charge under the ER of aiding and abetting 
terrorist organisations through raising money for this magazine. When the articles in question were 
published the Cease-Fire Agreement, under which the PTA was suspended, was in force. Mr 
Tissainayagam was sentenced to twenty years of rigorous imprisonment. His publisher is awaiting 
trial on the same charges, while his publisher’s wife is awaiting trial on charges and abetting her 
husband. 
The practical implementation of the freedom of expression remains one of the most serious 
problems in Sri Lanka. In 2003 the HRC recommended, inter alia, that Sri Lanka protect media 
pluralism443 and raised concern about persistent reports of harassment against media personnel and 
journalists, and that the majority of such allegations had been ignored or rejected by the competent 
authorities.444 The government in its report to the Human Rights Council stated that "participation 
and democratic scrutiny are guaranteed by free media – both printed and electronic ..."445 However, 
in the Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Sri Lanka several countries 
formulated the recommendations concerning freedom of expression. "Take measures to safeguard 
freedom of expresses ion and protect human rights defenders, and effectively investigate allegations 
of attacks on journalists, media personnel and human rights defenders and prosecute those 
responsible (Ireland); Take measures to improve safeguards for freedom of the press (Denmark); 
Adopt effective measures to ensure the full realization of the right to freedom of expression for all 
persons (Poland).446 
Recently the government decided to reactivate the Sri Lanka Press Council Law No. 5 of 1973, 
which provides for the possibility to fine and/ or sentence journalists and publishers to terms of 
                                                          
442 On this case see, for example, Human Rights Watch, "Letter to President Mahinda Rajapakse of Sri Lanka to Free 
Journalists Unfairly Held", 22 January 2009. 
443 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Sri Lanka, 13 December 2003, CCPR/CO/79/LKA, para. 
17. 
444 Ibid., para. 18.  
445 National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 
5/1, A/HRC/WG.6/2/LKA/1, 2 May 2008, para. 55, p. 13. 
446 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Sri Lanka, A/HRC/8/46, 5 June 2008, para. 39-41. 
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imprisonment.  That move has been criticized by the several media organizations in the country. In 
the letter to the President they point out "a media culture cannot be based on slapping charges 
against journalists, fining them or sending them to jail."447 
The 2007 Global Freedom Report published by Freedom House has described the Sri Lanka press 
as "not free".  According to the U.S. State Department 2008 report, "The government made several 
attempts to prevent independent media houses from criticizing the government and its policies." 
Senior government officials repeatedly accused critical journalists of treason and often pressured 
editors and publishers to run stories that portrayed the government in a positive light."448 
Based on various information and reports one is forced to conclude that the above mentioned 
recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee have not been implemented and that in fact 
the situation, as far as freedom of press is concerned, has deteriorated. The Commonwealth Human 
Rights Initiative reported: "... Members of the press have been repeatedly treated as enemies of the 
state for questioning or criticising the government, for reporting on Tamil issues or disseminating 
Tamil – language news"449. 
On 3 May 2008 the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) released its 6th Press Freedom 
Report for South Asia (2007-2008).450 The report states that, in the case of Sri Lanka, "Verbal and 
physical attacks, harassment, restrictions on access and vilification of media personnel have become 
a common feature in the lives of journalists, photographers and all those engaged in the gathering, 
publication and dissemination of information in Sri Lanka. The lackadaisical approach of law 
enforcement agencies toward complaints made by media personnel about attacks and harassment 
has enhanced the culture of impunity for attacks on the media community. No progress has been 
made in any investigations into killings of journalists that have occurred during the period under 
review (…) A range of emergency regulations has been promulgated that restrict access to conflict-
affected areas for civil society actors, including humanitarian agencies and the media. The 
regulations enable arbitrary arrest and detention, and control dissemination of information 
considered to be contrary to the interests of national security." 
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On 19 June 2008 the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) issued its Annual Report for 
2007. In the report451 FIDH states "Since the resumption of hostilities in 2006 between the 
Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) …, 
the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has deteriorated dramatically, especially in the Jaffna 
peninsula. Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, recruitment of child soldiers, torture, 
threats, and, in general, massive violations of human rights and war crimes have increased, resulting 
in a real climate of fear and insecurity throughout the country … In 2007, the safety of defenders 
considerably worsened, especially following denunciations of abuses committed by the parties in 
conflict, corruption and impunity, in a context where the number of attacks and threats from all 
parties to the conflict against them increased dramatically. Journalists have been particularly 
affected by acts of retaliation and intimidation because of their role in these denunciations … In 
2007, the Government established a policy to discredit, almost systematically, human rights 
activities, particularly by accusing defenders of being "supporters of the LTTE", "traitors" or 
"enemies of the State". On several occasions, the Government challenged the "allegations" of 
human rights defenders who dared to question its policy on human rights, saying they were 
"unfounded" and influenced by LTTE propaganda". 
In October 2008 a joint mission to Sri Lanka of members of the International Press Freedom and 
Freedom of Expression took place.  The mission "found deterioration in the press freedom situation 
since its last visit in June 2007 marked by continuing murders of journalists, attacks, abductions, 
intimidation and harassment."452 
The next report for 2008-2009 brought even more drastic evidences of serious violations of the 
freedom of press. On 8th January 2009 Lasantha Wickramatunge, the editor-in-chief of the Sunday 
Leader, has been brutally murdered. 
In May and June 2009 in Sri Lanka a significant increase in the number of threats on the media 
community has been observed. According to the statistics provided by Media Matters Sri Lanka 
Bulletin (15) – 29th of June 2009453 one media worker was physically attacked; eleven were 
threatened seriously (one was abducted, seriously threatened and later released; four are under 
investigation, one is in detention and four are potentially at risk. Three media workers have left the 
country due to safety reasons. One of those, well-known media activist Sunanda Deshapriya and his 
                                                          
451 See International Federation of Human Rights, Asia – Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders – 
Annual Report 2007, available at: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/OBS2007-UK-asie.pdf. 
452 See Media under fire: Press freedom lockdown in Sri Lanka, Report, International Press Freedom and Freedom of 
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family, who are currently in Sri Lanka, have continued to receive threats by callers, and through 
postings on websites. The most recent case is well-known astrologer Chandrasiri Baranda who had 
a column in a Sinhala weekly and who also appeared on television, and has been issued with a 90 
day detention order under ER. His crime appears to have been a prediction that suggested political 
changes where the President will lose power.  
The media workers of some newspapers in Jaffna were seriously threatened in June 2009. 
The authors of the Bulletin cited above believe that the threats appear to be coordinated and are 
targeting journalists and media workers who have previously written stories critical of the 
government or military and/or who are suspected of having links with the international community. 
The nature of some of the threats is violent, while others have been treated well.  
On 1st of June 2009 Mr Poddala Jayantha, a secretary of the Sri Lanka Working Journalists 
Association and an award winning journalist, was abducted and severely assaulted. He too was 
named by the state media as a traitor indirectly implying that all his efforts aimed at improving 
freedom of media was done due to obtain financial reward from the LTTE. 
According to the survey made by the Committee to Protect Journalists: Special Report: Journalists 
in Exile 2009454 at least 11 Sri Lankan journalists were driven into exile in 2008 amid an intensive 
government crackdown on critical reporters and editors. The surge from Sri Lanka accounted for 
more than a quarter of the journalists worldwide who fled their native countries in 2008 after being 
attacked, harassed, or threatened with violence or imprisonment.455  
The Ministry of Defence in Sri Lanka seems to be in disagreement with the statements that freedom 
of press in Sri Lanka is under threat. On the webpage review conducted by the Ministry and focused 
on attacks against journalists, lawyers, civil society456  there were published various statements 
claiming, "The accusations against Sri Lanka are not only unfair it is overrated and fabricated and 
Sri Lanka deserves an apology for the manner it has been treated."457 The authors of the articles 
published at the website mentioned above, have different approach to the current situation and state 
that „some media groups sympathetic to the LTTE became hostile to the government and presented 
material from the Tamil Website without verification. Others from international organisations wrote 
reports based on data supplied by the same source. Thus these groups ganged to mould public 
                                                          
454 Available at: http://cpj.org/reports/2008/06/exiles-08.php. 
455 For more examples on attacks on journalists, see section 5.1.6., supra. 
456 Available at: http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=20090618_02. 
457 Shenali Waduge, Where in the world is there no Discrimination?, Available at:  
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opinion in favour of the LTTE in an unethical manner. As such, they failed in their responsibility to 
preserve the canons of justice, fair play and honest commitment."458   
On 16th July 2009 the International Press Freedom Mission to Sri Lanka issued an open letter to 
President Rajapaksa expressing an extreme concern over the deterioration of press freedom despite 
the military victory over the LTTE.459 
In the Joint Civil Society Report (JCSR) it was noted that media freedom has been heavily 
restricted with the imposition of stringent limitations on reporting on the war.460 SLDF noted that 
the emergency regulations stifle media freedom and freedom of expression at an alarming level, and 
enable the President to ban any public meeting, procession, or gathering which, in his opinion, 
threatens national security or public order.461 
According to JCSR, media persons and institutions have been subjected to a range of acts of 
violence and intimidation including assassination and assault, arson and intimidation.462 ACHR 
urged the Government to ensure independent functioning of the freedom of the press, and not to use 
anti-terrorism laws to question and arrest media personnel for political ends.463 OMCT noted that 
human rights defenders in Sri Lanka are facing increasing persecution and threats to their lives.464 
Amnesty International points out that "there are severe restrictions facing journalists, as well as the 
unlawful killing of journalists with insufficient investigation into murder."465 
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5.7.3. Conclusion 
As far freedom of expression and information in Sri Lanka is concerned one can conclude that the 
Sri Lankan legislation, in particular the very general antiterrorist legislation, imposes limitations of 
that freedom, which are not compatible with the obligations under ICCPR Article 19. The policy of 
the government and its propaganda against all critics of its policy effectively puts very serious 
restrictions on the freedom of press. The culture of impunity prevails as far as physical assaults and 
attracts against journalist are concerned which de facto seriously limits the freedom of press. 
 
5.8. Freedom of religion 
 
5.8.1. International standards 
ICCPR Article 18 guarantees freedom of religion. Its beneficiaries are all persons subject to 
jurisdiction of the State party to the Covenant. According to Article 18(2) "no one should be subject 
to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice." 
The fundamental character of that right is underlined by the fact that no derogations from provisions 
of Article 18 are permitted under Article 4 of the Covenant. Limitations are allowed provided that 
they are "prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of others" (Article 18(3)).  
In its General Comment No 22 the HRC pointed out that "Article 18.2 bars coercion that would 
impair the right to have or adopt a religion or belief, including the use of threat of physical force or 
penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and 
congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to convert". 
 
5.8.2. Domestic implementation 
Freedom of religion is protected by the Constitution, Articles 10 and Article 14(1)(c), freedom of 
worship. However, according to Article 9 Buddhism is accorded the foremost place and the State is 
obliged to protect it and foster it.  That provision combined with case law,466 which clearly forbid 
proselytizing Christianity while accepting encouraging Buddhism, may give reason for concern as 
far as standards under Article 18 are concerned. 
                                                          
466 See Catholic Ministry provincial Sisters of the Holy Cross of the Third Order of St. Francis in Menzigen, Special 
Determination No. 19/2003, 25 July 2003. 
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Sri Lanka was known as the country of religious tolerance. However deterioration of religious 
freedom of minorities has been observed. 
From 2 to 12 May 2005, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief carried out a visit 
to Sri Lanka with a view to assessing the situation of freedom of religion or belief in the country, in 
particular in the light of recent reports of attacks against certain religious groups, allegations of 
unethical conversions and the introduction of draft laws criminalizing certain acts aimed at 
converting anyone to another religion. In her report, she condemns the attacks that have been 
carried out against members of the Christian minorities and criticizes the passive attitude of the 
Government. She urges the Government to take systematic action, including through its judicial 
apparatus, to address these attacks. Moreover, noting certain instances of the use of improper ways 
of persuading people to change their religion by some religious groups, the Special Rapporteur calls 
on those groups to respect the religions of others and not to use aggressive forms of proselytism, 
which could disturb the atmosphere of religious harmony and exacerbate religious tensions. 
However, she advises against the adoption of draft laws that would criminalize certain acts aimed at 
converting anyone to another religion as their implementation would lead to human rights 
violations, and because they are not an appropriate response to the current religious tensions.  
The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief noted that the recent deterioration of 
religious tolerance and the absence of appropriate action by the Government had brought respect for 
freedom of religion or belief to an unsatisfactory level.467 The Special Rapporteur stated that the 
draft legislation on the criminalization of "unethical conversions" was not an appropriate response 
to religious tensions468 and that it would lead to violations of the right to freedom of religion or 
belief.469  
During the Universal Periodic Review for Sri Lanka in 2008 the Institute on Religion and Public 
Policy (IRPP) reported that religious freedom in Sri Lanka is generally respected and protected by 
both the Government and society at large; however, proposed legislation on religious conversion 
would seriously curtail religious freedom.470 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty (BFRL) 
reported that the most troubling aspect of the draft anti-conversion legislation is that it would 
criminalize a central principle of religious liberty - the ability to freely choose and change one’s 
                                                          
467 Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion, E/CN.4/2006/5/Add.3, para. 109. 
468 Ibid., para. 121. 
469 Ibid., para. 122. 
470 Institute on Religion and Public Policy, cit., p. 1. See also People for Equality and Relief in Sri Lanka, Submission to 
the UPR of Sri Lanka, 2008, p. 5. See also Christian Solidarity Worldwide and Tamil Centre for Human Rights, joint 
submission, p. 2. 
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religion.471 BFRL added that since 2001, the Supreme Court has issued a series of judgments 
restricting the rights of non-Buddhist religions under law.472 IRPP noted that episodes of religious 
violence and unrest arise sporadically.473  
 
5.8.3. Conclusion 
In general Sri Lanka is complying with its obligations under Article 18. However some recent 
developments, including attempts to pass new restrictive law and deterioration of freedom of 
religion in practice, seriously compromise implementation of Article 18 of the ICCPR. 
 
5.9. Access to justice and the right to a fair trial  
 
5.9.1. International standards 
Article 14 of the ICCPR provides that all persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. 
Everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law (Article 14(1)). Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law (Article 14(2)). Article 14(3) 
provides, inter alia, that everyone shall be entitled to be tried without undue delay, to have the free 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court and not to be 
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
Sri Lanka has also committed itself to the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary. Further interpretative guidance regarding the independence of the judiciary can be found 
in international guidelines such as the Beijing Statement on Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary in the Lawasia Region.474 
The notion of judicial independence means that the judiciary must not only be institutionally 
independent from the other branches of government, but also that individual judges are capable of 
deciding cases before them according to the law and principles of justice  while being free from 
                                                          
471 The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka, p.2-3.  
472 Ibid., p.1-2. 
473 Institute on Religion and Public Policy, cit., p.1. See also submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008 by People for 
Equality and Relief in Lanka, p.5; Christian Solidarity Worldwide and International and Tamil Centre for Human 
Rights, joint submission, p.2.  
474 Adopted in August 2007 
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reprisals of any kind. It is well-established in international law that the independence of the 
judiciary is to be ensured with particular regard to the manner in which judges are appointed as well 
as the conditions governing their promotion, manner of qualifications, transfer and cessation of their 
functions.475 
 
5.9.2. Domestic implementation 
 There are severe restrictions on access to judicial review of legislation and while the Constitution 
permits review of executive/administrative action, some emergency regulations operate to shield 
actions of officials from the courts.476  The Supreme Court is a court of first instance in fundamental 
rights cases and exercises a quasi-investigative role.477  It is an Apex Court so there is no right of 
appeal.478 Lower courts determine whether or not a detention is lawful (habeas corpus).479 The 
powers of magistrates to investigate these questions are, however, limited by provisions in the 
emergency legislation.480 The judges have little power to grant any real remedy for illegal or 
abusive detention. A judge has no power to order release, even if a person is ill-treated or detained 
for manifestly improper reasons.481 Such a limited judicial role in detention also results in little 
protection against torture.482 There is a fear of reprisals for bringing suits regarding human rights 
violations, creating a ‘chilling effect’ which discourages victims from seeking redress before the 
court.483 
The Sri Lankan Constitution guarantees the independence of the judiciary in Article 107, which 
provides for removal of judges of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal upon an order of the 
President supported by a majority of Parliament on the grounds of proven misbehaviour or 
incapacity. 
Some of the problems relating to the appointment of judges have been discussed above.484 
                                                          
475 General Comment, No 13, Equality before the courts and the rights to a fair trial and public hearing by an 
independent court established by law, Section 1 (Article 14) adopted at the 21st session 1984. 
476 HRC, Communication No. 1376/2005, 24 July 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C93/D/1367/2005.  
477 Aquinas V. v. Tambimuttu, Sri Lanka: Legal Research and Legal System, Hauser Global Law School Program, New 
York University School of Law, January 2009, available at: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Sri_Lanka.htm.  
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
480 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s  judiciary: politicised courts, compromised rights, Asia report No 172, 20 
June 2009, p. 16-17. 
481 Ibid., p. 18. 
482 Ibid., p. 19. 
483 HRC, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee, Sri Lanka, 1 December 2003, CCPR/CO/79/LKA, 
para. 9.  
484 Section 4.2.3. 
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As far as removal of judges is concerned there have been threats of impeachment proceedings 
against a judge of the Supreme Court. Such threats have a chilling effect on members of the 
judiciary willing to speak out on rule of law related issues.485 As regards the removal of judges from 
the High Court and the courts of first instance there have been reports that the former Chief Justice 
had misused his role in the Judicial Services Commission (JSC) in order to dismiss or transfer 
judges without any apparent or objective reasons.486 The dismissal procedures of the JSC have been 
criticised by HCR.487 
Although hundreds of police officers and military personnel have been indicted since 1994 there 
have, according to a report by Amnesty International of June 2009, been only a small number of 
convictions. There have been three convictions under the CAT and up to 2007 fewer than 30 
convictions for adduction or wrongful confinements. There is only one case where security forces 
were convicted for murder.488 
In its report of June 2009 Amnesty International is of the view that the criminal justice system has 
critical shortcomings that obstruct justice for victims of human rights violations. It is subject to 
political pressure, lacks effective witness protection and is glacially slow. The vast majority of 
human rights violations over the last 20 years have never been investigated, let alone heard in court. 
Those that do make it to trial rarely conclude with a conviction. Defendants are acquitted for want 
of evidence, witnesses refuse to testify, hearings are subject to repeated delays and even the 
prosecution has failed to appear in court in key human rights cases. This is not simply a problem of 
inadequate resources or institutional capacity; it is a problem of political will.489 
Amnesty International also criticises the practice of transferring cases from one court to another. 
Such transfers, which according to Amnesty International, are not infrequent in Sri Lanka, 
contributes substantially to the problem of impunity and make it more difficult, more expensive and 
more dangerous for witnesses, victims and their family members to reach the court, increasing the 
likelihood that they will fail to appear and that their cases will be dismissed for lack of evidence.490 
The transfer of cases may also result in problems with accurate interpretation during the 
proceedings. 
                                                          
485 IBA report, p. 27. 
486 Ibid., p.28. 
487 Communication No 1376/2005, 24 July 2008, UN Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1376/2005. 
488 Amnesty International, Twenty Years of Make-believe, p 11. 
489 Ibid., p. 2. 
490 Ibid., p. 23. 
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As regards the right to a fair trial a major flaw arises out of the fact that there is no witness 
protection program in Sri Lanka. In view of the intimidation of witnesses, witnesses are reluctant to 
come forward.491  A proposal for witness protection legislation has been tabled and recent 
information indicates that it might advance.492 
 
5.9.3. Conclusion 
The Sri Lankan legislation of the right to a fair trial and access to justice, and particularly the 
emergency legislation, as well as their implementation do not in all respects guarantee the rights 
provided for in the ICCPR. The system is slow and cannot guarantee a fair trial within a reasonable 
time. The powers of magistrates to investigate whether a detention is lawful or not, the lack of 
efficient remedies for illegal or abusive detention and the fact that a judge has no power to order 
release, even if a person is ill-treated or detained for manifestly improper reasons prohibits efficient 
judicial control of detentions. The fear of reprisals for bringing suits regarding human rights 
violations, creating a ‘chilling effect’ which discourages victims from seeking redress before the 
court. The prevailing climate of impunity, in particular under the ER, and the lack of a witness 
protection scheme seriously endanger a fair trial. 
 
5.10. The rights of the child 
 
5.10.1. Situation of child soldiers 
In the context of the implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) in Sri 
Lanka of particular concern is the situation of child soldiers. The Optional Protocol to the CRC on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict, which has been ratified by Sri Lanka,  clearly 
specified State obligations in that area.  The Penal Code Article 35 (d) prohibits recruitment of a 
child for use in armed conflict. 
However, almost 25 years of civil conflict has had an extremely negative impact on the situation of 
children in Sri Lanka. During the transition to peace and the reconstruction process, children who 
have been affected by the armed conflict remain a particularly vulnerable group. 
                                                          
491 International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, p. 23, footnote 143. 
492 See Assistance and Protection to Victims of Crime and Witnesses Bill presented on 8 June 2008. Statement by the 
Mission of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 3 August 2009, Ref.: B/PRO/6, point II. 
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In 2003 the Committee on the Rights of the Child (the CRC Committee) had recommended Sri 
Lanka to implement a plan of action for the respect of the rights of children during the 
reconstruction process.493  In particular, the Committee recommends that the State party: 
(a)  Prioritize the demobilization and reintegration of all combatants under 18 and 
ensure that all armed groups reintegrated into the national armed forces adhere to the 
minimum age of recruitment of 18 years;  
(b)  Develop, in collaboration with NGOs and international organizations, a 
comprehensive system of psychosocial support and assistance for children affected by 
the conflict, in particular child combatants, unaccompanied internally displaced persons 
and refugees, returnees and landmine survivors, which also ensure their privacy; 
(c)  Take effective measures to ensure that children affected by conflict can be 
reintegrated into the education system, including through the provision of non-formal 
education programmes and by prioritizing the rehabilitation of school buildings and 
facilities and the provision of water, sanitation and electricity in conflict-affected areas; 
(d)  Seek in this regard technical assistance from, among others, UNICEF. 
The Committee also requested additional information on child combatants and child prisoners of 
war to be included in the Sri Lanka initial report under the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. 
In October 2008 the Government of Sri Lanka submitted its third and fourth combined periodic 
reports to the CRC Committee. The reports address the issues mentioned above. However, they 
have not yet been a subject of review by the CRC Committee. 
It has to be stressed that the Government has undertaken efforts to improve the situation of children 
affected by the armed conflict. The Government also takes steps to report these efforts to the CRC 
Committee. However, there is reliable information confirming that the armed conflict has had an 
extremely negative impact on the implementation of the CRC in Sri Lanka. The recruitment of child 
soldiers remains one of the most problematic issues in Sri Lanka. 
On 13 November 2006, Allan Rock, the Special Advisor to the UN Special Representative for 
Children and Armed Conflict visited Sri Lanka. In its press statement he said that494 
"the mission's initial findings revealed that the LTTE had not complied with its commitments under 
the Action Plan, to stop child recruitment and release all the children within their ranks. Under-age 
recruitment continued and the LTTE had yet to release several hundred children as verified by 
UNICEF. 
                                                          
493 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations, Sri Lanka, 2 July 2003, CRC/C/15/Add. 207, 
para. 44–46. 
494 See Press Statement at the conclusion of the mission, available at: http://www.un.org/children/conflict/pr/2006-11-
13127.html. 
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The mission also found that the Karuna faction continued to abduct children in government-
controlled areas of the East, particularly in the Batticaloa district. Between May and November 
2006, 135 cases of under-age recruitment by abduction had been reported to UNICEF, with 
evidence that this trend was accelerating. 
The mission also discovered a disturbing development involving the Karuna abductions. It found 
strong and credible evidence that certain elements of the government security forces are supporting 
and sometimes participating in the abductions and forced recruitment of children by the Karuna 
faction." 
On 24 January 2007 Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued its report Sri Lanka: Complicit in Crime: 
State Collusion in Abductions and Child Recruitment by the Karuna Group.495 In this report, HRW 
documented a pattern of abductions and forced recruitment by the Karuna group in Sri Lanka over 
the year 2006. With case studies, maps and photographs, it showed how Karuna cadres operated 
with impunity in government-controlled areas, abducting boys and young men, training them in 
camps, and deploying them for combat. The report states that "at least since June, and probably 
before, the Sri Lankan government has known about the abductions. The areas where they have 
taken place are firmly under government control, with myriad military and police checkpoints and 
security force camps. No armed group could engage in such large-scale abductions, and then hold 
and train the abductees for combat in established camps, without government knowledge and at 
least tacit support".496 
According to the report of the Civil Monitoring Commission, Free Media Movement and Law & 
Society Trust issued in 31 October 2007 (using the UNICEF data) from January up to August 2007, 
the total number of children recruited was 1683: held by LTTE – 1469, held by Karuna – 214. 
On 21 December 2007 the Secretary-General of the United Nations presented to the UN Security 
Council a Report on "Children and armed conflicts in Sri Lanka"497 pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1612 (2005). The Report states that498 "Abduction and recruitment of children by the 
Karuna faction continued to take place from the streets, temples, homes and internally displaced 
persons camps in the east, mainly in Government-controlled areas. Reports were also received that 
children were recruited and abducted in areas in close proximity to Sri Lankan security forces 
offices and checkpoints…There has been no evidence to date that any measures have been 
instituted by the police or the security forces to secure the release of the children abducted, recruited 
                                                          
495 Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Complicit in Crime: State Collusion in Abductions and Child Recruitment by the 
Karuna Group, January 2007, Vol. 19, No.1(C), available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/srilanka0107webwcover.pdf 
496 Ibid., p. 4. In June 2006, UNICEF issued a public statement noting dozens of child abductions by the Karuna group 
and calling for government action to halt the abuse. 
497 See SG Report on Children and Armed Conflict, 2007. 
498 Ibid., para. 23 and 57.   
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and used by the Karuna faction despite clear knowledge of the same by the police or the security 
forces. There is an urgent need for the Government of Sri Lanka to exercise its primary 
responsibility of protecting its citizens, actively take steps to secure the release of all children 
abducted by the Karuna faction who are being held in Government-controlled areas and ensure their 
return to their families."  
In its 2007 report499 International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) states that "Since the 
resumption of hostilities in 2006 between the Government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)… the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has 
deteriorated dramatically, especially in the Jaffna peninsula. Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial 
killings, recruitment of child soldiers, torture, threats, and, in general, massive violations of human 
rights and war crimes have increased, resulting in a real climate of fear and insecurity throughout 
the country …". 
In 2008 during the Universal Periodic Review on Sri Lanka, the Asian Centre for Human Rights 
noted that armed opposition groups have been responsible for grave violations of international 
humanitarian law through killings, abductions and recruitment of child soldiers..500 Of the non-state 
actors, the LTTE remained the main violator of international humanitarian law, in particular 
through targeting of civilians with explosive devices.  
The Sri Lankan Civil Society Working Group on Child Recruitment (SLCSWG) noted that the 
forced recruitment of children and the use of child combatants have been long associated with Sri 
Lanka’s violent ethnic conflict.501 According to the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF), the 
United States were dismayed that in spite of assurances given to the UN and international scrutiny, 
the LTTE and the Karuna faction had not ceased to recruit children nor kept their commitments to 
release all children in their ranks. SLDF further noted that though the LTTE and the Karuna faction 
were primarily responsible for recruitment, the government could not absolve itself from taking 
responsibility for TMVP actions, given the visible and close association between the TMVP and the 
government.502  
                                                          
499 See International Federation of Human Rights, Asia, Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, op. 
cit., p. 224. 
500 See Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15 
(C) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, A/HRC/WG.6/2/LKA/3, 3 April 2008. 
501 Sri Lankan Civil Society Working Group on Child Recruitment (including) the Centre for Policy Alternatives 
(CPA), The Institute of Human Rights (IHR), National Peace Council (NPC), Law and Society Trust (LST), Mothers 
and Daughters of Lanka International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination (MADR)) submission to the UPR 
of Sri Lanka, 2008. 
502 Sri Lanka Democracy Forum (SLDF), submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka, 2008. 
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On 20 May 2008 the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers issued its Child Soldiers Global 
Report 2008 – Sri Lanka.503  The report stated that "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
continued to recruit and use children, despite repeated commitments not to do so. Children in the 
east of the country were forcibly recruited and used by the Karuna faction, a breakaway group of 
the LTTE, with the complicity of, and in some instances actively working with, the security forces". 
According to the report "In February 2006 the Penal Code was amended to make 
"engaging/recruiting children for use in armed conflict" a crime punishable by 20 years' 
imprisonment. Despite these provisions, there had so far been no arrests of cadres of the LTTE or 
Karuna faction (…) in relation to child recruitment.504 This was partly because the police often 
refused to accept complaints from parents of abducted children, despite parents having information 
about the identity of the abductors."505 
The report further stated that "President Rajapaksa and other Sri Lankan officials repeatedly 
promised that the government would investigate the allegations of state complicity and hold 
accountable any members of the security forces found to have violated the law. HRW repeatedly 
asked the government for the results of the investigations and, in August 2007, questioned the 
sincerity of the government's commitment to an investigation. A government committee was 
established in 2007 to investigate the allegations." 
The report also presented "longstanding concerns about the treatment of children who 'surrendered' 
to the security forces." In December 2006 the government was criticized for not making a 
distinction between children and adults.506 The government subsequently appointed a commissioner 
general for rehabilitation, and as of mid-2007 was developing a rehabilitation program in 
cooperation with UNICEF. This included setting up a rehabilitation centre for "child surrenders", of 
whom there had been more than 60, all of whom had been recruited by the LTTE. As of that time, 
however, no specific program had been established for girls.507 
The report of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers expressed its particular concern 
relating to formerly recruited children in the custody of the Sri Lankan security forces and their 
                                                          
503 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008 - Sri Lanka, 20 May 2008, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/486cb131c.html. 
504 Ibid. See also Communication to Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, from Sri Lanka High 
Commissioner, 31 July 2007.  
505 Ibid. See also Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka – Complicit in Crime: State Collusion in Abductions and Forced 
Recruitment by the Karuna Group, January 2007. 
506 Ibid. See also Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka, S/2006/1006, 20 
December 2006, para. 28-29. 
507 Ibid. See also Child Soldiers Coalition, Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, chapter on Sri Lanka, available at: 
http://childsoldiersglobalreport.org. 
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exposure to the media. Concerns were raised that this public exposure resulted in stigmatization and 
increased the vulnerability of the child and their family.508 
The problem of child recruitment was also mentioned in the Security Council Reports,509and  as 
well as in the Conclusions on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka of the Working Group on 
Children and Armed Conflict.510  According to the Security Council Report S/2007/758, in 2007 
"abduction and recruitment of children by the Karuna faction continued to take place from the 
streets, temples, homes and internally displaced persons camps in the east, mainly in Government-
controlled areas. Reports were also received that children were recruited and abducted in areas in 
close proximity to Sri Lankan security forces offices and checkpoints. All of the TMVP/Karuna 
faction abduction cases involved forced recruitment, in some cases by armed men who identified 
themselves as members of the faction". Moreover, "there has been no evidence to date that any 
measures have been instituted by the police or the security forces to secure the release of the 
children abducted, recruited and used by the TMVP/Karuna faction despite clear knowledge of the 
same by the police or the security forces. There is an urgent need for the Government of Sri Lanka 
to exercise its primary responsibility of protecting its citizens, actively take steps to secure the 
release of all children abducted by the TMVP/Karuna faction who are being held in Government-
controlled areas and ensure their return to their families".  
The latest Security Council report highlights that "limited progress has been registered with regard 
to dialogue with armed groups for action plans to stop the recruitment and use of children.  
Though LTTE continued to fail to achieve the necessary requirements of a bona fide action plan 
throughout, TMVP has prepared an action plan in conjunction with the United Nations country 
team and the Government of Sri Lanka. However, concrete steps towards the complete release of 
children and their effective reintegration remain to be fully taken. In addition, allegations of other 
armed groups engaging in recruitment, most especially in internally displaced persons camps in the 
north of the country, need to be more aggressively monitored and appropriate action taken to halt all 
abuses". 
As a positive development one should consider the fact that on 1 December 2008 the Government 
of Sri Lanka, the TMVP and UNICEF developed and signed Action Plan to ensure that the practice 
                                                          
508 Ibid. See also SG Report on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka, 20 December 2006, para. 28-29. 
509 SG Report on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka 2007, para. 23 and 57, and Report of the Secretary General 
on children and the armed conflict in Sri Lanka, 20 December 2006, para 16-17 and 58-59. 
510 Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Conclusions on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka, 21 
October 2008, S/AC.51/2008/11 and Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, Conclusions on children and 
armed conflict in Sri Lanka, 13 June 2007, S/AC.51/2007/9. 
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of child recruitment by the TMVP would be stopped and all children recruited or used by the armed 
group are released and provided with reintegration assistance. 
The fact of signing the Action Plan by the TMVP confirms that this paramilitary group that operates 
in government-controlled areas had child soldiers. However, it is unclear to what extent the Action 
Plan has been implemented so far and whether the child soldiers referred to in the Action Plan 
represent all those being currently used.  
According to Sri Lanka’s National Report, which was presented during the UPR in 2008 "Sri Lanka 
volunteered to work with the United Nations Security Council Working Group on Children and 
Armed Conflict pursuant to SC Resolution 1612 in setting up a Task Force for Monitoring and 
Reporting as a means to giving effect to the Government’s zero-tolerance policy on child 
recruitment."511 This policy was confirmed by the statement made by Mr Suhada Gamalath, 
Secretary/Ministry of Justice & Commissioner General of Rehabilitation at the Meeting of the 
Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict held in New York on 1 July 
2009 at present most child combatants have been identified and are in a process of being sent to 
child rehabilitation centres.  According to that statement "these children are being treated as victims 
and not as suspects in detention for their involvement in terrorist activities. It is a high priority for 
the Government to see these children returned to their families and to be able to either resume 
schooling or be gainfully employed in a trade and integrate into normal life in society."512 
 
5.10.2. Conclusion 
It has been confirmed that the child recruitment was a serious problem in Sri Lanka in 2005 – 2008, 
in clear violation of the State obligations under the CRC and its OP. The Government has taken 
steps to remedy that situation. At present it is impossible to judge if those efforts will prove to be 
adequate. 
 
 
                                                          
511 National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (A) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution  
5/1, 2 May 2008, A/HRC/WG.6/2/LKA/1, para. 79, p. 18. Further details are contained in Sri Lanka's report submitted 
to the UN Committee against Torture on 14 August 2009, para. 4.13. 
512 In addition, on 31 July 2009 a National Framework on the Reintegration of Ex-combatants covering also child-
soldiers was adopted. 
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5.11. The rights of minorities and prohibition of discrimination 
 
5.11.1. International standards 
Rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities are regulated in ICCPR Article 27.  Prohibition 
of any form of discrimination based on, inter alia, race, ethnicity, language, religion and any other 
status, including for example sexual orientation, is formulated also in Article 26. In addition, 
general equality principles have been formulated in Articles 2 and 3. 
 
5.11.2. Domestic implementation 
Rights of minorities are not protected in the Constitution but some aspects of those rights, such as 
the use of languages and the prohibition of incitements to racial hatred, are protected in different 
legislative acts. The same may be said as far as prohibition of discrimination on various grounds is 
concerned. However, implementation of those rights as described below does not meet the ICCPR 
standard. 
From the point of view of rights of minorities, people of Tamil ethnicity remain one of the most 
vulnerable groups in Sri Lanka. According to the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the 
International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Sri Lanka513 issued in April 2009, "the 
significant majority of reported cases of human rights violations in Sri Lanka involve persons of 
Tamil ethnicity who originate from the North and East.  These individuals are at risk within these 
regions, and in other parts of Sri Lanka, from Government actors, the TMVP and other pro-
Government paramilitary groups as well as the LTTE, because of their race (ethnicity) and/or 
(imputed) political opinion."514 
According to the Guidelines, "The security and human rights situation throughout the North [of Sri 
Lanka] remains poor.  Strict security and anti-insurgency measures implemented by the 
Government forces to identify LTTE members and suppress LTTE activities in the North have 
involved increasingly frequent cordon and search operations, arrests, detentions and restrictions on 
movement of Tamils in and from the region515. Tamils who are suspected of having LTTE 
affiliations are at high risk of suffering harassment, intimidation, arrest, detention, torture, 
                                                          
513 Hereinafter referred to as the Guidelines. The Guidelines are posted on UNHCR’s Refworld website at 
http://www.refworld.org. 
514 The Guidelines, p. 21. 
515 "Sri Lanka Government implements new system to identify LTTE Tigers", Colombo Page, 23 February 2009, 
available at http://www.colombopage.com/archive_09/February23144256RA.html. 
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abduction and/or killings at the hands of the military, police and security forces in the North.516 
Throughout the North, targeted acts of violence and human rights violations continue to be 
committed against individuals of specific profiles by the Government forces, the LTTE and other 
actors.  Members of the pro-Government Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP)517 and People’s 
Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE)518 have been implicated in extensive and serious 
violations of human rights, including, extortion, detention, torture, disappearances and extra-judicial 
killings in the North and have acted with impunity.519 Incidents of rape of Tamil women in police or 
military custody in the North, including women who are held in Government-run IDP camps, are 
reportedly occurring.520  A very significant majority of the reported incidents in the North have 
involved individuals of Tamil ethnicity".   
Regarding the situation in the East of Sri Lanka, the majority of the reported incidents of human 
rights violations have involved young Tamil males.  The Guidelines cited above stated, "Tamil 
civilians, men and women of all ages, have been among those subjected to serious human rights 
abuses.  Many of the reported incidents have been related to the anti-insurgency measures 
implemented by the SLA and the STF, which have been associated with significant restrictions on 
freedom of movement and access to land and livelihoods, arbitrary arrests, mistreatment in 
detention, sexual assaults, extrajudicial killing and disappearances of Tamils. Cordon and search 
operations are carried out regularly throughout the East, and are very frequently associated with 
arrests, primarily of Tamils."521  Furthermore, according to the Guidelines, "As a result of the 
ongoing LTTE attacks on Government and civilian targets in the country, which have included 
suicide attacks by Tamil men and women, Tamils, in particular those originating from the North 
and East have been under suspicion.  Wide scale arrests and detention of Tamils have been reported 
                                                          
516 Human Rights Watch, Recurring Nightmare. The authors of the Guidelines also mentioned that "The European 
Court of Human Rights is also citing several reports that confirmed the risk of being targeted by the authorities if 
political affiliation with the Tamils is presumed see NA. v. The United Kingdom. Appl. No. 25904/07. Council of 
Europe: European Court of Human Rights. 17 July 2008, p. 31-35, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docIbid./487f578b2.html. See also Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Return to War - 
Human Rights under Siege, 6 August 2007, available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/08/05/return-war (see also 
the Guidelines, p. 7, footnote 26).  
517 A pro-Government political party and paramilitary group led by Douglas Devanda, a Minister in President 
Rajapaksa’s cabinet. See United States Department of State, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Sri 
Lanka, 25 February 2009.  
518 See the PLOTE’s official website at: http://www.plote.org/. 
519 Free Media Movement, Independent media in Jaffna threatened by armed cadre of EPDP, 29 October 2008, 
available at: http://freemediasrilanka.wordpress.com/2008/10/29/independent-media-in-jaffna-threatened-by-armed-
cadre-of-epdp/.  
520 "Colombo’s war crimes turn to rape of the fleeing – Jaffna MP, 28 January 2009", TamilNet; see also "Sri Lanka 
State Terrorism Rape & Murder of Eelam Tamil Women", Lanka Newspapers, 3 April 2008, available at: 
http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2008/4/26384_space.html.  
521 See the Guidelines, p. 8 and the sources cited there. 
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throughout the country. As in the North and the East, they are frequently associated with cordon 
and search operations and frequently follow bombings or other attacks by the LTTE.  Tamils who 
are without proper identity documents are more likely to be arrested and detained in these 
operations."522 
Inter-ethnic and political tensions in the East of Sri Lanka continue to result in violent clashes and 
are affecting individuals not only from Tamil but also from Sinhalese and Muslim communities. 
According to the Guidelines, "Sinhalese residents of the East have experienced ethnic backlash 
resulting from resentment and fear within the Tamil and Muslim communities of a Government 
population policies designed to establish a Sinhalese ethnic majority in the region. Ethnic tensions, 
largely related to land disputes, also exist between the Muslims and Sinhalese in the Ampara, in 
particular, where Muslims represent 40% of the population but where Sinhalese hold 75% of the 
available land. LTTE cadres are reported to have recently attacked a predominantly Sinhalese 
village in Inginiyagala in Ampara hacking to death 8 Sinhalese farmers, killing a total of 21 people, 
including three children and injuring several others.  The LTTE has denied responsibility and 
suggested that pro-Government paramilitary may be responsible."523 
In the context of the inter-ethnic and political tensions, Muslims have experienced targeted violence 
and other human rights violations by Government actors as well as pro-Government Tamil groups, 
in particular in the North and East. In addition, Muslims who are perceived to oppose Government 
policies or to be outspoken against the LTTE or other Tamil groups, in particular those who are 
humanitarian workers and human rights advocates, journalists etc., are considered to be at greater 
risk of harassment, threats and violence524.   
While targeted incidents involving Sinhalese are less common than those involving Tamils and 
Muslims, as noted above, ethnically motivated attacks against Sinhalese have been reported, in the 
East and the North in particular. Sinhalese who are perceived to oppose Government policies or to 
be outspoken against the LTTE or other Tamil groups are considered to be at greater risk of 
harassment, threats and violence.525 
On 13 December 2007, Minority Rights Group (MRG) International issued a report entitled "One 
year on: counter-terrorism sparks human right crisis for Sri Lanka’s minorities."526 The report 
concluded: "Sri Lanka’s human rights situation is deteriorating. There are daily reports of extra-
                                                          
522 See the Guidelines, p. 13 and the sources cited there. 
523 See the Guidelines, p. 10 and the sources cited there. 
524 See the Guidelines, p. 24 and the sources cited there. 
525 Ibid. 
526Minority Rights Group International Report, op. cit. 
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judicial killings, disappearances and abductions. Human rights in Sri Lanka have reached a crisis 
point and the violations occur in a climate of impunity with little or nothing done by the 
government."  
During the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for Sri Lanka in 2008 the International Displacement 
Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council (IDMC) noted fears among minority 
communities of state-sponsored programmes aimed at changing the ethnic demography of Eastern 
Province. Tamil and Muslim residents in the Eastern Province provided examples of this to IDMC. 
These include the Government-sponsored movement of Sinhalese settlers into Tamil and Muslim 
areas, the movement of administrative boundaries seeking to reduce the size of minority 
populations in certain areas, as well as the declaration of minorities’ land as sacred for construction 
of Buddhist temples.527 People for Equality and Relief in Lanka (PEARL) reported the eviction of 
nearly 400 Tamil civilians from Colombo by the police in June 2007, allegedly because they could 
not provide valid reasons for being in Colombo in June 2007.528  
During the UPR the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) reported that Muslim minorities 
have increasingly been alienated by Government policies and yet the armed separatists have 
deliberately targeted them on account of their supposed role in the conflict. According to IHRC, the 
government has employed Muslim troops in action against the LTTE during combat operations 
with allegations of anti-Tamil civilian violence.529 The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) 
added that 130,000 Muslims continue to languish in refugee camps in abject poverty, 
unemployment, and with a lack of basic facilities including health and education.530 The Sri Lanka 
Democracy Forum (SLDF) urged the LTTE to allow the Tamil and Muslim populations to exercise 
their rights to freedom of movement, expression, association and assembly, to take part in public 
affairs and to vote, and to family life, including the right to marry.531   
During the UPR, a joint submission of eight NGOs (JS1) was presented regarding the situation of 
Up-Country Plantation Tamil People.532 JS1 noted that many of about 200,000 persons who were 
registered citizens under the Citizenship Act No 35 of 2003 and other acts face difficulty with the 
                                                          
527 International Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian Refugee Council, p.1-2. 
528 See submissions to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008 by People for Equality and Relief in Lanka, p. 2, and Interfaith 
International/Tamil Centre for Human Rights, joint submission, p. 2.  
529 Islamic Human Rights Commission, submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p. 2. 
530 Asian Centre for Human Rights, submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p. 5.  
531 Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p.10. 
532 Submission to the Second UPR of Sri Lanka, 2008, by IMADR Asia Committee, Human Development Organization 
and other Civil Society Organizations in Sri Lanka on minority rights of the Up-Country Plantation Tamil People in Sri 
Lanka, p. 2, available at: 
http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session2/LK/HDO_LKA_UPR_S2_2008_HumanDevelopmentOrganiz
ation_uprsubmission.pdf. 
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respective authorities denying them the right to have their names registered in the voters list. JS1 
further noted that many of the arrests and detentions of the Up-country Tamil youths are attributed 
to their inability to prove their identity by producing their National Identity cards, which is rooted 
in the absence of a proper mechanism on the plantation where most of them were born. JS1 further 
explained that Government officials in the Up-country plantation areas do not speak Tamil, though 
it is recognized as an official language. This makes it difficult for Tamil people to interact with 
officials.533 JS1 also highlighted the growing poverty among the plantation people, the low literacy 
rate, and the absence of or poor basic health facilities in the plantation sector.534 It also noted that on 
many plantations women are involved in compulsory family planning and sterilization violating 
their reproductive rights.535 
According to recommendations given as an outcome of the UPR, Sri Lanka has to "Continue to 
strengthen its activities to ensure that there is no discrimination against ethnic minorities in the 
enjoyment of the full range of human rights..."536 
 
5.11.3. Other grounds for discrimination 
5.11.3.1. Gender based discrimination 
The areas of discrimination in Sri Lanka are not limited only to ethnicity. It is possible to mention 
other grounds for discrimination. As it was described during the UPR,537 and based at the joint 
submission of three NGOs (JS2),  
"women may be seen as an especially vulnerable group with ethnic, caste, class and gender 
discriminations simultaneously impacting on them. Unemployment rates are particularly high 
among women and some have responded to this situation by joining the stream of migration 
abroad.538 Women and Media Collective (WMC) noted that the Women’s Rights Bill has yet 
to be finalized and approved by Parliament; and that marital rape is only recognized in cases 
of judicial separation.539 The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) urged Sri 
Lanka to review all laws which discriminate against women, and repeal or reform them in 
order to ensure compliance with internationally accepted human rights standards.540 
                                                          
533 Ibid. 
534 Ibid., p.2-3. 
535 Ibid., p.3-4.  
536 Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Sri Lanka, A/HRC/8/46, 5 June 2008, 
recommendation no. 38, in para. 82 p. 20. Such recommendation enjoyed the support of Sri Lanka. 
537 Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) 
of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, A/HRC/WG.6/2/LKA/3, para. 9–10.  
538 Joint submission by the IMADR Asia Committee, Human Development Organisation and the International Dalit 
Solidarity Network to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p. 4. 
539 Women and Media Collective, submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p.1, 4-5.  
540 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p. 8. 
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According to WMC, state land distribution policy awards property in the name of the head of 
household; customarily only men are viewed as heads of households, unless the man is dead 
or missing. Muslim women in the East owned almost 95% of the houses that were destroyed 
by the Tsunami and have been deprived of ownership to replacement houses which were 
registered in the name of the adult male in the family."541 
Moreover, "JCSR reported that acts of violence against women are growing.542 ACHR added that 
women have been specific targets during the war because of their gender. In 2005, the Sri Lankan 
Parliament passed the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act yet domestic remedies are 
insufficient.543 WMC explained that there are often delays of between five and twelve years before 
cases of sexual violations are concluded. Regarding domestic violence, the majority of police 
complaints are resolved through police mediation or referral to Mediation Boards and there is very 
limited use of the Domestic Violence Act."544 WMC also reported that women held under the public 
security laws have complained that they are not afforded basic safeguards. Regarding detention 
centres for girls, there is no separation between girls who have come into conflict with the criminal 
law and girls in need of care and protection. Sexually abused girls are held in custody until cases 
against perpetrators have been completed.545 WMC further reported that Muslim women have 
unequal rights in marriage and divorce under Muslim personal law; there is no minimum age of 
marriage, and polygamy is recognized in the Muslim Personal Law. WMC further noted that, whilst 
in theory a women’s consent is necessary for marriage, in practice, they could be married off 
without their consent.  Men could divorce without giving a reason or compensation, whereas 
women have to prove fault. Muslim women cannot be appointed as family court judges or registrars 
of marriages.546 WMC noted that there is fear amongst families, both within and outside IDP 
camps, about the security of, and sexual violence against young women, resulting in families 
arranging ‘marriages’ for their teenage daughters. Young girls are not sent to school due to the 
increased number of checkpoints. At many camps and welfare sites facilities are minimal with 
regard to health issues, such as family planning, child bearing and feeding infants. Single women or 
widows responsible for family welfare among the displaced, are particularly at a disadvantage with 
regard to accessing services and provisions.547 
According to recommendations given as an outcome of the UPR, Sri Lanka has to "Give special 
attention to the rights of women and further promote education and development and their 
                                                          
541 Women and Media Collective, submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p.3. 
542 Joint Civil Society Report, joint submission to the UPR of Sri Lanka 2008, p.5.  
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representation in politics and public life..."548 
 
5.11.3.2. Discrimination of LGBTIQ persons 
"Equal Ground (EG) highlighted some of the major challenges that the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, Intersex and Questioning (LGBTIQ) community of Sri Lanka is currently facing in 
relation to their human rights, such as state sanctioned hate speech on the basis of sexual 
orientation, use of the legal system to harass human rights defenders working for LGBTIQ rights, 
impunity for crimes committed against LGBTIQ people, violence, death threats and extrajudicial 
killings based on sexual orientation, marginalization and wide-spread persecution of LGBTIQ 
individuals.549 JCSR added that LGBTIQ individuals are denied access to health services, education 
and employment and the ability to participate in social and public life.550, 551 
JCSR reported that consensual sexual activity between adults of the same sex remains a crime under 
Article 365 and 365A of the 1883 Penal Code. 74 ILGA and Equality Ground (EG) raised similar 
concerns.552 
 
5.11.4. Conclusion 
In Sri Lanka protection against any form of discrimination is a very sensitive issue. In the main 
there is no reason to question the legislative framework of those rights. However, the present 
situation leads to the conclusion that rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in particular 
Tamil population from East and North parts of the country, have not been protected effectively. 
Those categories of people have been subjected to various forms of discriminations contrary to the 
country obligations under the ICCPR. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the material before it the Panel is forced to conclude that the three Conventions 
under scrutiny have not been effectively implemented in Sri Lanka. That is the case even if the 
Government of Sri Lanka has consistently asserted its effective implementation553 and denied non-
compliance in all its public statements. However, the Government has mainly done that in general 
terms and mostly without providing sufficient evidence in order to rebut specific allegations made 
by many sources.554 
In some of the submissions made in response to the invitation by the European Commission it has 
been held that the legal system in Sri Lanka adequately meets the legislative requirement of the 
Conventions. The Panel cannot fully agree with that assessment. Some of the provisions of the 
Conventions have not been transposed at all, while the provisions in the domestic legislation on 
other points are more restrictive than the corresponding provisions in the Conventions. The Sri 
Lankan legislation does also contain provisions which are not in compliance with the Conventions. 
Under these circumstances effective implementation of the Conventions has not been, and cannot, 
be achieved by means of the case law of the Sri Lankan courts without setting aside legislation. 
The emergency legislation poses a number of problems. That legislation overrides provisions 
elsewhere in the legislation, including the Constitution. In the emergency legislation human rights 
are restricted beyond that which is permitted according to the Conventions and sweeping powers 
are given to the authorities. Criminal offences are vaguely defined and the regulations contain 
provisions that excessively limit, or eliminate, the accountability of State agents. Basic fair trial 
rights are undermined in the emergency regulations. 
Many of the State authorities in Sri Lanka entrusted with the task of protecting human rights have 
lost their legitimacy and credibility because of the non-application of the 17th Amendment to the 
Constitution. In the assessment of the Panel this is a result of political decisions. 
The evidence shows that the police are unable or unwilling to investigate human rights violations. It 
also indicates that torture in police custody is at least widespread. The absence of a witness 
protection programme and harassment of witnesses discourages witnesses from appearing and 
operates as a disincentive to make complaints. 
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554 A large number of these have been reviewed in this report. 
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The Attorney General and his department influenced adversely the work of the recent Commission 
of Inquiry while being initially an object of its investigation.   
The court system has failed. There are strong indications that it has been politicized. The former 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has misused his position by putting pressure on judges who has 
acted to his disliking. Judges have been removed by the Judicial Service Commission when they 
have demonstrated too much independence. 
There are severe restrictions on access to justice. The Supreme Court, which is the first and the last 
instance in human rights cases, is not easily accessible from the north and east of Sri Lanka. 
Provisions in the emergency regulations shield actions against officials from the courts. There is a 
fear of bringing suits regarding human rights violations, creating a chilling effect which discourages 
victims from seeking redress before a court. Cases have been transferred from one court to another 
which has complicated the situation for parties. The court system is particularly slow which makes 
the protection of human rights in Sri Lanka illusory. 
The enforcement capacity of the National Humans Rights Commission has been questioned. The 
Commission is not seen as having the will or power to address the more serious issues. 
The recent Commission of Inquiry has been seen as not meeting international norms and standards. 
There was a lack of proper funding and independent support staff. There was a climate of threat to 
anyone who might identify persons responsible for human rights violations. There was a lack of 
political will to inquire into the cases before the Commission. 
Whilst the politicization of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies is of recent origin, there were not 
previously adequate structures in place to prevent that from occurring. The inadequate functioning 
of the process of criminal investigation is a long-standing problem, with knock-on consequences for 
the operation of the criminal justice system as a whole. Throughout the period in issue broad 
concern about the human rights situation in Sri Lanka has been expressed. 
Unlawful killings are a major problem in Sri Lanka, perpetrated by soldiers, police, paramilitary 
groups or others, not only during the course of active hostilities. There was a significant level of 
unlawful killings, particularly of civilians, during the period covered by the investigation. There is 
overwhelming evidence to suggest that during the final months of the conflict significant numbers 
of civilians were unlawfully killed in military operations In general, there are also concerns 
regarding the lack of investigative ability on the part of the police. 
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While Sri Lanka has an impressive record on passing legislation to criminalize torture and to 
provide safeguards against torture, in practice such treatment remains widespread. This is in part 
because the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the emergency regulations are not subject to 
legislative protections. Such protection as exists in legislation appears to be routinely ignored in 
practice. Complaints are investigated neither effectively nor expeditiously. The prohibition of 
torture is not implemented in practice in Sri Lanka. 
Some of the safeguards attaching to arrest and detention in normal circumstances are recognized in 
the Sri Lankan legislation. There are nevertheless certain missing protections. The operation in 
practice of the safeguards appears to be problematic. There appears to be no means in practice of 
obtaining effective redress. 
A more significant problem is detention related to emergency. The powers of detention result in 
both arbitrary arrests and mass detention and there appears to be no effective possibility of review 
of lawfulness. Virtually all safeguards against arbitrariness are missing. The prohibition of arbitrary 
detention is not implemented in Sri Lanka, particularly in relation to detention under emergency 
powers.  
Sri Lanka has failed to implement its obligation to prevent enforced disappearances by State agents 
and other forces for which it is responsible. Such forces are implicated in the increase of 
disappearances between 2005 and 2009. It has also failed to prevent disappearances at the hands of 
third parties. It has also failed its obligation to carry out effective investigation into alleged 
disappearances. That result in complete or virtually complete impunity. 
The principal problem posed by the general restrictions on freedom of movement in Sri Lanka is 
that they appear to be imposed and enforced in an arbitrary and disproportionate manner. In relation 
to the recently established camps, it must be recognized that the government does have legitimate 
security concerns. The screening of internally displaced persons in order to identify LTTE fighters 
is legitimate. The mass internment of the civilian population in the North is both arbitrary and 
disproportionate. 
The law provides for freedom of association and assembly. Restrictions exist under the emergency 
legislation. Available information does not enable firm conclusions as to whether an effective 
implementation of these rights is concerned. The emergency regulations have a negative impact on 
the practical implementation of the right to assembly. 
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The practical implementation of the freedom of expression is one of the most serious problems in 
Sri Lanka. 
The legislation, in particular the antiterrorist legislation, imposes limitations on the freedom of 
expression which are not compatible with the obligations under the ICCPR. The policy of the 
government and its propaganda against all critics of its policy effectively destroys the freedom of 
the press. The culture of impunity prevails as far as physical assaults and more serious attacks 
against journalists are concerned which de facto seriously limits that freedom. 
In general Sri Lanka is complying with its obligations under the provisions in the ICCPR on 
freedom of religion.  
The criminal justice system of Sri Lanka has critical shortcomings that obstruct justice for victims 
of human rights violations. The biggest problem is the complete inadequacy of the system of 
criminal investigation. Whilst this is a problem of long standing duration, it has been aggravated by 
the fact that the police have increasingly been given a quasi-military role in the insurgency, during 
which they have become, along with the armed forces, significant perpetrators of violations, rather 
than investigators. The criminal justice system is subject to political pressure, lacks effective 
witness protection and is slow. The right to a fair trial is hampered by the harassment of parties and 
witnesses and by the transfer of trials from one court to another. Access to justice is limited both in 
geographical terms and, in particular, by the emergency legislation. 
Child recruitment was a serious problem in Sri Lanka during 2005-2008. Although the main 
offender was the LTTE, paramilitary groups in Government-controlled areas were also involved in 
child recruitment. The government has taken steps to remedy the situation. At present it is 
impossible to assess if these steps will be adequate. 
The legislative framework concerning the protection of minorities does not raise problems. In 
practice, however, rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in particular to the Tamil 
population from in the East and North, have not been adequately protected. 
On the basis of the preceding findings, the Panel has come to the conclusion that neither the 
ICCPR, the CAT nor the CRC, nor the Sri Lankan legislation incorporating the obligations under 
these Conventions have been effectively implemented in Sri Lanka during the period covered by the 
investigation. 
